Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV00238, Date: 2024-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV00238, Date: 2024-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV00238 Hearing Date: September 12, 2024 Dept: 61

DEMETRIO LUNA-REYES, , et al. vs ARCHITECTURAL SURFACES, INC., et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Caesarstone Ltd.’s Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the language regarding “other stone products to be identified during discovery,” and DENIED as to the prayer for punitive damages.

Moving party to provide notice

DISCUSSION

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendant Caesarstone, Ltd. (Defendant) moves to strike language from the First Amended Complaint (FAC) including among Defendant’s products alleged to have injured Plaintiffs Demetrio Luna-Reyes and Guillermina Valdez (Plaintiffs) “other stone products to be identified during the course of discovery.” (FAC at pp. 7–8.) Defendant also moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages, on the grounds that insufficient basis for malice, oppression, or fraud is alleged. (Motion at pp. 5–7.)

Defendant argues that this “other products” language is improper because the California Supreme Court in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, prescribed, among the essential pleaded elements for a toxic products liability tort the requirement that the plaintiff “must identify each product that allegedly caused the injury. It is insufficient to allege that the toxins in defendants' products caused it.” (Id. at p. 80.) Defendant thus argues that language leaving open the products at issue to “further discovery” is improper.

Defendant’s argument is persuasive. Bockrath specifically forbade plaintiffs from prosecuting toxic torts by generally alleging that “the toxins in defendants’ products” caused injury. This language was directed to prevent claims from “plaintiffs who lack any real notion of the identity of the product which was a substantial factor in causing their injury.” (Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 218, 241.) But by including this “other products” language in the FAC, Plaintiffs have effectively obviated any utility that such a requirement was meant to provide. This allegation is therefore properly stricken.

However, Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations are adequately set forth. Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) The terms are defined as:

1. “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

2. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

3. “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

Plaintiffs allege a claim for fraud against Defendant, and fraud is a basis for punitive damages. Although Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ punitive damages allegations are insufficiently specific, they are similar to those upheld against demurrer in Jones v. ConocoPhillips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187.) There, family members of a deceased employee, Carlos, at certain tire and rubber companies brought suit against 19 manufacturers of 34 chemical products, alleging that each had contributed to the death of Carlos. (Id. at p. 1191.) The complaint listed the defendants’ products to which Carlos had been exposed, then explained:

[A]s a result of Carlos's exposure to the foregoing toxic chemical products, toxins within said toxic chemicals entered Carlos's body. Each of the foregoing toxic chemical products contain organic solvents and cardiotoxic, hepatotoxic, nephrotoxic and other toxic chemicals, which by and through their cardiotoxic, hepatotoxic and nephrotoxic nature, caused Carlos's chemically induced cirrhosis of the liver, chemically induced cardiomyopathy and chemically induced kidney failure and other injuries. Each toxin that entered Carlos's body was a substantial factor in bringing about, prolonging, and aggravating Carlos's chemically induced cirrhosis of the liver, chemically induced cardiomyopathy and chemically induced kidney failure and other injuries.

(Id. at p. 1192, internal alterations omitted.) The court described the complaint as alleging the following with regard to defendants’ knowledge of these toxic products and their concealment:

[T]he amended complaint alleges defendants were “aware of the toxic nature of their products” and “owed a duty to disclose the toxic properties of their products to [Carlos] because [they] alone had knowledge of material facts, to wit the toxic properties of their products, which were not available to [Carlos].” It also alleges defendants owed a duty to disclose because they “made representations regarding their products, but failed to disclose additional facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, and/or which rendered the disclosures made likely to mislead [Carlos].” These conclusory allegations are supplemented with respect to the single compound, DMF. The Joneses cite studies published as early as 1969 attesting to DMF's toxicity, several years before Carlos began working at Goodyear where he was exposed to the Dow product containing DMF.

(Id. at pp. 1199–1200.)

The trial court had sustained a demurrer to the complaint for failing to plead fraudulent concealment with specificity, but the court of appeal reversed. Taking note of the above allegations, the court noted its general inquiry in assessing whether a complaint had pleaded fraud with the requisite specificity was to determine “whether the . . . complaint, considered as a whole, provides defendants with sufficient notice of the particular claims against them.” (Id. at p. 1200.) The court concluded that, based on the allegations in the complaint,

[E]ach defendant has received notice of the particular product it made that was used at the Goodyear and Upjohn plants at which Carlos worked. The pleading further alleges these products “contained significant concentrations of organic solvents ... and other toxic chemicals” and “[t]he toxicity of various organic solvents to the liver and kidney has long been recognized.” Each defendant is therefore on notice that it allegedly concealed or failed to disclose the toxic properties of the product it sold to Goodyear and Upjohn during the course of Carlos's employment. Although sparse, nothing more is required at this early stage of the litigation.

(Id. at p. 1200.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations here are essentially similar. Plaintiffs identify each manufacturer and the products that they allege caused them harm. (FAC at pp. 6–26.) The FAC alleges that as a result of exposure to these products, the toxins contained within them, “including silica, metals, and other toxic substances,” entered Luna-Reyes’s body. (FAC ¶ 483.) It is alleged that these toxic materials caused Luna-Reyes’s silicosis. (FAC ¶¶ 484–485.) As with Jones, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew of the toxic nature of their products, and had a duty to disclose this information based on their superior knowledge, which was “not accessible to Plaintiff.” (FAC ¶ 475.)

Plaintiffs’ support their allegations of Defendants’ knowledge with further allegations of the history of silicosis and the stone industry’s knowledge of these hazards (FAC ¶¶ 47–71), as well as studies performed on the particular types of products at issue here dating back to 1997. (FAC ¶¶ 85–96.) As with Jones, Plaintiffs’ FAC gives notice to Defendant of the particular products that he used at the particular locations, and alleges that they contained certain types of long-recognized toxic chemicals. Defendant is on notice of the allegations against it.

As to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs fails to “allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they

said or wrote, and when it was said or written” (Tenet Health System Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838), this argument has little persuasive application to a fraudulent concealment claim, as the nature of the allegation is that no corporate representative disclosed the information to Plaintiff. The question of which corporate officer was responsible for the alleged concealment, or ought to have been responsible for disclosure, is a fact which “lie[s] more in the knowledge” of Defendants, and thus need not be pleaded with specificity. (Id. at p. 838.) The same is true for pleading punitive damages against a corporate employer under Civil Code § 3294, subd. (b).

The motion to strike is therefore GRANTED as to the language regarding “other stone products to be identified during discovery,” and DENIED as to the prayer for punitive damages.