Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV02678, Date: 2024-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV02678, Date: 2024-06-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02678 Hearing Date: June 11, 2024 Dept: 61

RACHAEL BURKHOLDER vs HOUSE NINJA, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiff Rachael Burkholder’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Medical Records are GRANTED in part, and the subpoenas are limited in scope to documents created on or after June 1, 2021, and to records related to Plaintiff’s pregnancy, emotional or mental distress, anxiety, and physical pain and anguish. No sanctions are awarded.

Moving party to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff Rachel Burkholder (Plaintiff) moves to quash two subpoenas seeking her medical records dating from 2018 onward from non-parties Cedars Sinai Medical Center and One Medical. Plaintiff contends that the subpoenas seek private information related to Plaintiff’s overall condition beyond the issues that she has tendered for adjudication in this case, and argues that the subpoenas ought to be quashed in their entirety or else limited to conditions that are at issue — i.e. her pregnancy and claims of emotional distress. (Motion at pp. 5–13.)

The subpoenas at issue seek essentially the same records from both entities:

All records regarding RACHAEL BURKHOLDER (AKA RACHAEL HOLT) including, but not limited to, medical records, psychiatric records, mental health records, patient charts, patient questionnaires, patient history notes, evaluation reports, work status reports, work restrictions, treatment records, correspondence (including to or from medical providers related to the evaluation and/or treatment of the above-named patient), medications administered and/or prescriptions written, medical/legal reports, disability reports and records, billing records, and invoices from January 1, 2018 to present.

(Motion Exh. 2.)

The California Constitution protects an individual’s right to privacy. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1013.) The right to privacy extends to medical records. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.) Communications between patients and their physicians or psychotherapists are also protected by statutory privileges. (Evid. Code §§ 994 [physician-patient], 1014 [psychotherapist-patient].)

None of these protections or privileges is absolute. Physician-patient privilege does not exist if the communication sought is “relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by . . . the patient.” (Evid. Code § 996, subd. (a).) In the constitutional privacy context, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)

“[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one's constitutional right of associational privacy, the scope of such ‘waiver’ must be narrowly rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational affiliations and activities. Therefore . . . an implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842.)

Plaintiff is correct that the only records potentially at issue here are those relating to her pregnancy beginning in 2022 and her claims for emotional distress resulting from Defendants alleged unlawful employment practices. Plaintiff alleges claims for pregnancy discrimination and harassment, and acknowledges that these two areas are relevant to the instant case. (Motion at pp. 1–2.)

Defendants House Ninja Inc., Ramit Varma, and Brett Marz (Defendants) argue in opposition that they are entitled to records related to Plaintiff’s “physical condition.” (Opposition at p. 5.) Yet there is no reason to construe the issues of this case so broadly. Defendants argue that Plaintiff contracted E. coli, shigella toxin, and Covid-19 in the latter half of 2022, during which time she had to take time off work (Opposition at p. 5), but do not explain how these illnesses relate to the present case. The fact that the plaintiff suffered illness during the time period at issue does not give Defendants carte blanche to search her medical records, since any waiver of applicable privacy and privilege interests is to be narrowly construed. (Vinson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842.)

Defendants are correct, however, that in addition to Plaintiff’s allegation of mental distress, she also alleges that Defendants’ misconduct has caused her “physical pain and anguish.” (Complaint ¶ 15.) Accordingly, the subpoenas may seek records related to Plaintiff’s experience of pain.

Finally, although the subpoenas seek all records dating from 2018 onward, Defendants have offered in informal meet-and-confer efforts to limit the temporal scope of the subpoenas to those documents created in or after June 2021. (Opposition at p. 8.) The subpoena is properly limited thereto, as Defendants do not make a showing of good cause for documents dating further back.

The motion is therefore GRANTED in part, and the subpoenas are limited in scope to documents created on or after June 1, 2021, and to records related to Plaintiff’s pregnancy, emotional or mental distress, anxiety, and physical pain and anguish.

II. SANCTIONS

“Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff seeks $5,000.00 in sanctions, representing ten hours of attorney work at $500 per hour. (Zilifyan Decl. ¶ 5.) No sanctions are appropriate, as Defendants opposed the motion with substantial justification.