Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV07195, Date: 2024-10-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV07195, Date: 2024-10-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV07195 Hearing Date: October 29, 2024 Dept: 61

NB PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC vs DONDEAGO JOHNSON, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Marcus Stroud’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment is DENIED.

Clerk to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) states:

The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken . . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment . . . unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney's affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties."

Defendant Marcus Stroud (Defendant) seeks to vacate the stipulated judgment entered against him on December 1, 2023, on the grounds that Plaintiff NB Property Management, LLC (Plaintiff), the party who entered the stipulated judgment, failed to comply with certain provisions of the settlement agreement that preceded its entry. (Motion at p. 2.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the stipulated judgment was to be entered pursuant to the terms of an accompanying settlement agreement, yet Plaintiff breached the settlement agreement in the following ways:

· By failing to dismiss Defendant Blue Fox Capital Corporation within five days of execution of the settlement agreement on July 19, 2023;

· By seeking entry of default against Defendant after the settlement was executed, despite provisions in the settlement requiring prior notice of any default under the agreement and an opportunity to cure.

(Motion at pp. 4–5; Stroud Decl. ¶¶ 3–6.)

Defendant identifies no basis to vacate the stipulated judgment, because mere breach of the agreement underlying a stipulated judgment is no basis to vacate the judgment, as one might rescind a contract. “[W]hile a consent judgment for the purpose of interpretation and construction is regarded as a contract between the parties and must be interpreted and construed as any other contract, ‘as to the matters in issue (it) is as conclusive as one entered upon contest and trial.” (Stevens v. Stevens (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 426, 435.) Accordingly, “the rules applicable to rescission of contracts” do not apply to stipulated judgments, since doing so would provide an additional grounds for relief from judgment that does not exist for other judgments.” (Ibid.)

Indeed, Defendant does not identify any grounds that would suffice for rescission of an ordinary contract. Only a “material breach” of contract discharges another party’s obligation to perform. (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) Although Defendant claims that Plaintiff failed to timely dismiss Blue Fox Capital, that dismissal was entered on September 25, 2023, several months before entry of the stipulated judgment. The contract contains no time-is-of-the-essence provision, and Defendant does not explain why this delay amounted to a material breach. (Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group, L.L.C. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 357, 367.)

There was also no breach in seeking to enter Defendant’s default prior to entry of judgment. Defendant relies on provisions of the agreement applicable to default in his obligation to pay settlement amounts, which require notice and an opportunity to cure before judgment on the agreement can be entered, and erroneously conflates the “default” mentioned there with an entry of default against a party in this litigation. (Stroud Decl. ¶¶ 2–6.) Setting aside the fact that no default was ever actually entered against Defendant, Defendant also identifies no provision of the settlement governing such procedural defaults under the Code of Civil Procedure, as opposed to his own default in paying the funds. Defendant does not dispute that he defaulted on payments, and acknowledges that notice of default was provided on September 20, 2023. (Stroud Decl. ¶ 5.) The stipulated judgment was properly entered thereafter.

The motion is also untimely under Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subd. (b), which requires a motion be brought within a reasonable time not exceeding six months of the entry of judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473, subd. (b).) Judgment here was entered on December 1, 2023, and Defendant did not seek to set it aside until September 11, 2024, more than six months later. Although Defendant cites statutory authority allowing courts to set aside void motions, he does not identify any authority by which the judgment can be deemed void.

The motion is therefore DENIED.