Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV07337, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV07337, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV07337 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: 61

RAMIRO GONZALEZ vs GOLDEN BOY PROMOTIONS, INC., et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendants Golden Boy Promotions, Inc. and Oscar De La Hoya’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

Moving party to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

I. OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff Ramiro Gonzalez’ objections to the declarations of Hugo Chavez are OVERRULED, as the objections cite language in paragraphs that does not appear in the paragraphs cited, and indeed which does not appear in the declaration at all. The objections to the declaration of Kenny Tran are also OVERRULED, as Tran testifies only to the filings and correspondence exchanged between counsel in this case, matters for which he has foundation in personal knowledge.

II. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate a controversy, a court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines the arbitration agreement exists, unless (1) the petitioner has waived its right to arbitrate; (2) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (3) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

“[T]he party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The role of the trial court is to sit as a trier of fact, weighing any affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, together with oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a determination on the issue of arbitrability.” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Defendants Golden Boy Promotions, Inc. and Oscar De La Hoya (Defendants) move to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Ramiro Gonzalez’s (Plaintiff) claims for wrongful termination and employment discrimination based on an arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff in January 2007, alongside an employment agreement and non-disclosure agreement. (Chavez Decl. Exh. A.) The agreement applies to all claims “arising out of or relating to your employment,” including statutory discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as “any claim arising out of or relating to the ending of your employment with the company.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff in his own declaration acknowledges signing the agreement. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 6.) But he opposes the motion on several grounds under various captioned legal theories: He asserts there was no meeting of the minds in making the arbitration agreement, that the agreement was subsequently orally modified, that there was no mutual assent to the agreement, that the agreement is unconscionable, that Defendants have waived the right to compel arbitration by engaging in mediation, and that his claims fall outside the scope of the agreement. (Opposition at pp. 5–25.)

The failure of Plaintiff’s opposition is comprehensive. It is, first, overlong. Rule 3.1113 of the California Rules of Court (CRC) states “no opening or responding memorandum” except in summary judgment motions “ may exceed 15 pages,” excluding “the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service.” (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Plaintiff’s memorandum is 25 pages long, not counting the caption page, and thus contains ten pages of extraneous argument. The court may therefore consider Plaintiff’s memorandum to be untimely filed. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).)

The arguments are also without merit. Though filed under a number of different headings, all of Plaintiff’s arguments that are not directed to the issue of waiver amount to one argument based on the contention that Defendant De La Hoya’s subsequent oral promises to Plaintiff render the arbitration agreement inapplicable.

Plaintiff testifies that he was induced to join Defendants’ team by De La Hoya’s promises that Plaintiff would be “taken care of” and “have a role I could rely on indefinitely,” that Plaintiff had his “100 percent support and loyalty,” that his position at Golden Boy would be “safe for as long as I remained loyal to him and the company,” and that Plaintiff “could expect a share in Golden Boy’s growth, including potential equity sharing.” (Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Plaintiff testifies that De La Hoya made other representations after he was hired: that Plaintiff was “an indispensable part of the company, that his “commitment to Golden Boy would always be reciprocated with job security and opportunities,” that Plaintiff was “part of the Golden Boy family,” that Plaintiff’s “allegiance” to Defendants “would be rewarded with lasting job security and opportunities.” (Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 2–5.)

These representations do not affect this motion, however, because none of these representations address the arbitration agreement or indicate any intent to modify its terms, let alone waive Plaintiff’s obligation to arbitrate. Plaintiff contends that these representations effected a change of employment status from employment “at-will” to employment that could only be terminated for cause. But even taken as true, these representations would affect the terms of Plaintiff’s at-will employment agreement, not his separate agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of his employment and the termination thereof. In short, the only evidence before the court as to the parties’ intent to arbitrate disputes is the arbitration agreement executed by Plaintiff here.

Plaintiff’s claims fall squarely within the terms of that agreement. He argues that his implied-in-fact contract claims are beyond the scope of arbitration, yet the authority he cites does not even mention such claims. (Opposition at pp. 20–21, citing Mitchell v. American Fair Credit Ass’n, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.app.4th 1345, 1355.) And Plaintiff’s argument that FEHA claims are not arbitrable is simply incorrect. The very authority that Plaintiff cites stands for the opposite proposition. (Opposition at pp. 22–24, citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102 [describing criteria arbitration agreements must satisfy to allow for arbitration of FEHA claims].)

Plaintiff’s waiver objection is likewise infirm. “In the past, California courts have found a waiver of the right to demand arbitration in a variety of contexts, ranging from situations in which the party seeking to compel arbitration has previously taken steps inconsistent with an intent to invoke arbitration, to instances in which the petitioning party has unreasonably delayed in undertaking the procedure.” (St. Agnes Medical Center, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196, internal citations omitted.) In evaluating whether the right to compel arbitration has been waived, courts consider:

(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate;

(2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate;

(3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay;

(4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings;

(5) whether important intervening steps e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration had taken place; and

(6) whether the delay “affected, misled, or prejudiced” the opposing party.

(Id. at p. 1193, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted.)

Here, Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants have litigated in a manner inconsistent with arbitration, or that they have unreasonably delayed bringing the motion, but rather that Defendants have waived arbitration by attempting to mediate this case after filing the motion. (Opposition at pp. 14–19.) Yet this fact alone offers little basis to find a waiver, since Defendants have consistently pursued arbitration of this matter. In their Answer filed on January 22, 2024, they asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense. As noted in the declaration of Defendant’s counsel, Defendants corresponded with Plaintiff about arbitration, and were led to believe in January 2024 that Plaintiff was amenable to stipulating to arbitration. (Tran Decl. ¶ 5.) Indeed, the mediation that Plaintiff cites as waiving the right to arbitration occurred in August 2024, after the present motion was filed on May 13, 2024. (Tran Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendants have not waived the right to arbitration.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.