Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV13829, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13829    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 61

OKORIE OKOROCHA vs MARY ELLEN ATTRIDGE

Tentative:

Defendant Mary Ellen Attridge’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $39,927.50 in fees and $4,120.77 in costs.

Moving party to provide notice.

Analysis:

I. ATTORNEY FEES

Defendant Mary Ellen Attridge (Defendant) seeks $39,927.50 in attorney fees incurred defending this court’s rulings against the dual appeals of Plaintiff Okorie Okorocha (Plaintiff), plus an additional $10,000 in sanctions against Plaintiff based on the frivolousness of his appeal. (Motion at pp. 14–15.)

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, subd. (c)(1) states that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.” “The party prevailing on a special motion to strike may seek an attorney fee award through three different avenues: simultaneously with litigating the special motion to strike; by a subsequent noticed motion, . . . or as part of a cost memorandum.” (Carpenter v. Jack In The Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.) The statute authorizing attorney fees to a successful bringer of an anti-SLAPP motion also authorizes fees incurred defending against an unsuccessful appeal. (See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (See id.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination . . . [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at p. 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV).) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys’ fees are recoverable. (See id. at p. 624.)

Defendant seeks $39,927.50 for 96.7 hours worked during Plaintiff’s unsuccessful appeals of this court’s rulings on Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and motion for attorney fees. (Gray Decl. Exh. D.) This work includes time spent not merely directly litigating the appeals and Plaintiff’s procedural failures therein, but also time spent negotiating with Plaintiff regarding the potential dismissal of the appeal, including Plaintiff’s threats to go into bankruptcy, or countersue Defendant for negligence and false light. (Gray Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6–10.) Because Plaintiff did not file a bond to cover his appeals, Defendant also incurred hours to enforce the judgment on real estate owned by Defendant. (Gray Decl. ¶ 9.)*

These fees sought are supported by the declaration of Gilson Gray, who attests to the qualifications of himself and the other attorneys who performed work on this appeal. (Gray Decl. ¶¶ 13–20.) The average hourly rate performed among the attorneys here amounts to $412.90. (Gray Decl. Exh. D.) The hourly rates, and the fees sought, are reasonable.

No additional sanctions against Plaintiff are properly awarded here, however. Defendant presents a statute stating, “When it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just,” and case authority interpreting the same. (Code Civ. Proc. § 907; see Workman v. Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1062; Clarity Co. Consulting, LLC v. Gabriel (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 454, 466.) But this court is not “the reviewing court” of Plaintiff’s appeal. Moreover, as Defendant’s judgment collection efforts ultimately resulted in full payment of the amounts owed, and a dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal, it is likely that the fees sought here to compensate Defendant for these efforts will prove sufficient to deter future misconduct. (Gray Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11–12.) Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the present motion.

The motion is therefore GRANTED in the amount of $39,927.50 in fees and $4,120.77 in costs.

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*Fees incurred to enforce an anti-SLAPP fee judgment are themselves recoverable. (See York v. Strong (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477.)