Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV14504, Date: 2024-05-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV14504    Hearing Date: May 24, 2024    Dept: 61

SHAROLEY LAVERN SANTOS vs WESTLAKE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Westlake Services, LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice.

DISCUSSION 

A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438 subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendant’s motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to alleges facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (See id., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.)

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

(Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court not only should assume that all facts alleged in the SAC are true but also should give those alleged facts a liberal construction. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515–516, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) In particular, the court should liberally construe the alleged facts “‘with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ [Citation.]” (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.)

Defendant Westlake Services, LLC (Defendant) seeks judgment on the pleadings against Plaintiff Sharoley Lavern Santos (Plaintiff) on the grounds that her first cause of action for breach of contract affirmatively disclaims the existence of a contract, and further that the second cause of action for fraud is not alleged with sufficient particularity. (Motion at pp. 4–7.)

Defendant is correct that no breach of contract claim is pleaded here. “Establishing that claim requires a showing of “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800.) The Complaint here alleges that Defendant failed to adequately respond to Plaintiff’s requests for proof of the existence of a contract between them. Plaintiff in fact alleges that Defendant claims payments from Plaintiff “without a valid contract in place.” (Complaint at p. 3.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the first cause of action without leave to amend.

Defendant’s argument as to the deficient specificity of the fraud claim is also persuasive. “[F]raud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993.) The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

Plaintiff does not allege the misrepresentation upon which she relied. Plaintiff alleges that she obtained financing for a vehicle purchase in 2018, and that Defendant has presented evidence of the sales agreement, payment history, and a “Form 553” purporting to show its assignment of the interest in the loan. (Complaint at p. 4.) Plaintiff does not attach these documents or explain the deficiencies that she claims renders Defendant’s requests for payment fraudulent, or what facts Defendant allegedly concealed from her.

Permitting leave to amend would be futile here. The sole basis for fraud articulated in the pleading is the assignment of the auto loan without Plaintiff’s consent. (Complaint at p. 4.) However, “[p]arties may contractually assign and assume the obligations of a prior contract.” (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360.) Plaintiff offers no basis in the opposition to believe this defect may be cured by amendment, and instead argues that she is a “secured party creditor of the UNITED STATES, INC.,” who is “authorized by Congress to create money with my signature.” (Opposition at p. 3.) Plaintiff goes on to offer a number of citations to federal statutes without elaboration. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED without leave to amend.