Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV16753, Date: 2023-11-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16753    Hearing Date: February 6, 2024    Dept: 30

V.S. FLORES PEREZ, et al. vs PROYECTO PASTORAL, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED. Plaintiffs must comply with CCP §¿425.14 if they seek to allege punitive damages against Defendant.  Moving party to give notice.  

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of its Certificate of Restated Articles of Incorporation with the Secretary of the State of California. (Martinez Decl., Exh. B.)

¿The request for judicial notice is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452(c) and (h).

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).)¿The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436;¿Stafford v. Shultz¿(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)¿

Meet and Confer

The meet and confer requirement has been met.

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike portions of the FAC using language for punitive damages, arguing it fails to state a claim for punitive damages, and further, because it is a religious corporation, Code of Civil Procedure section¿425.14 requires Plaintiff to obtain leave of court before alleging punitive damages.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the¿defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)¿¿

¿“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Courts have viewed despicable conduct as conduct “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)

“An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages ..., based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.... With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, [or] ratification ... must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code § 3294.) The California Supreme Court interpreted the “latter statement as requiring the officer, director, or managing agent to be someone who ‘exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged conduct that would allow for punitive damages. The FAC alleges that Defendants’ daycare workers inflicted illegal, cruel and inhuman corporal punishment, and physical abuse upon Plaintiff, who was two, while at Defendants’ daycare and while under their care, by unlawfully restraining and taping Plaintiff V.S.’s hands with tape in the classroom an inappropriate and cruel manner. This would be considered malicious, because this conduct was carried on with willful and conscious disregard of the rights of the child. Tying or taping a two-year-old’s hands would certainly be looked down upon by ordinary people as vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome.

However, the FAC fails to state a claim for punitive damages against Defendant, as the employer of the daycare workers, as there are no allegations relating to Defendant’s advance knowledge of the unfitness of the daycare workers, nor any allegations to establish that Defendant employed them with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. Further, if Defendant is a corporation the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, or ratification must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civil Code § 3294.) These allegations are missing.

In addition, CCP §¿425.14 provides that “[n]o claim for punitive or exemplary damages against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be filed…”¿ (CCP §¿425.14.)¿ Defendant references its Request for Judicial Notice in support of its qualification as a religious corporation. As Defendant is a religious corporation, the Court finds that Plaintiffs must comply with CCP §¿425.14 if they seek to allege punitive damages against Defendant.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that this Court adjudicated the issue of punitive damages in its last ruling pertaining to Defendant’s first motion to strike. However, the Court did not reach the merits of the motion to strike because it sustained the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it was uncertain. Thus, the motion to strike was denied as moot because the demurrer to the complaint was sustained.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED.