Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV19504, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV19504, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19504 Hearing Date: November 30, 2023 Dept: 30

23STCV19504 Ploozian v. Prince

Hearing on Demurrer

TENTATIVE

Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. As a result, Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT. Moving party to give notice.

Discussion

Demurrer

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege any extreme or outrageous conduct. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to show intent to cause,

or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to provide a factual basis as to her allegation that she suffered extreme emotional distress.

“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903, internal quotations omitted.) For conduct to be outrageous it must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (See Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.) Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) “Severe emotional distress means . . . emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376.)

“[I]t is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.) “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Id.) While there is no bright-line as to what constitutes outrageous conduct and thus this involves a case-by-case analysis, courts can determine whether conduct was sufficiently outrageous at the demurrer stage. (Id. at 494.)

The complaint alleges that on March 23, 2022, at or about 11:25 am, Plaintiff was a pedestrian, lawfully crossing a crosswalk at the intersection of George Burns Road and 3rd Street in the City of Los Angeles. Defendant Harvey was operating a red Tesla that was registered to Suzanne. Defendant’s vehicle reversed into Plaintiff and struck Plaintiff who was pregnant at the time. After the crash, Plaintiff approached Defendant Harvey in his vehicle and Defendant and his wife fled the scene of the accident. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff then alleges that Harvey’s conduct was outrageous, despicable and in a reckless and conscious disregard for the safety and well being of plaintiff. Defendant realized plaintiff was injured and needed medical assistance and despite same, defendant, fled the scene of the accident. It was evident that defendant realized his culpability for the accident and that he had seriously injured plaintiff and left her in need of medical attention such that he formed the plan and intent to evade detection. Defendant’s conduct in this regard was in a conscious and reckless disregard of the safety of plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. (Id., ¶ 30.)

The Court finds that the complaint sufficiently pleads the elements of reckless disregard, and outrageous conduct. It is outrageous conduct to strike a pregnant woman with a

vehicle and leave the scene of the accident despite knowing that Plaintiff needed medical assistance. Further, the complaint alleges that Defendant had seriously injured plaintiff and left her in need of medical attention such that he formed the plan and intent to evade detection. These allegations regarding Defendant’s conduct thus show a reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress. However, Plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts that she suffered severe emotional distress of such a quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure. Her conclusory allegations that she suffered severe emotional distress due to Harvey’s conduct is insufficient. Further, tracking the language of the IIED law is also insufficient. Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts to show that she in fact did suffer severe emotional distress.

The Court notes that Defendant repeatedly refers to specific evidence of what actually occurred relating to crash at issue, including that Defendant reversed his vehicles to accommodate pedestrians walking in front of his car, and that Defendants did not know a collision occurred. However, the only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The facts of the complaint do not contain the “evidence” Defendant refers to, and thus, those matters cannot be considered via a demurrer, but are more proper for a motion for summary judgment, unless Defendant is able to bring that evidence in by way of judicial notice.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer as to the cause of action for IIED is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

Defendants also move to strike the allegations regarding punitive damages, arguing Plaintiff failed to allege with specificity any acts of oppression, fraud, or malice.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87.) Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.)

As the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained, the motion to strike punitive damages arising out of the third cause of action is DENIED as MOOT.