Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV22225, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV22225, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22225 Hearing Date: May 23, 2024 Dept: 61

SYLVIA CUELLAR, AN INDIVIDUAL vs COURTNEY N. PHILLIPS, TRUSTEE OF THE CLARK LIVING TRUST DATED JANUARY 19, 2023, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Courtney N. Phillips, Trustee of the Clark living Trust dated January 19, 2023’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant Courtney N. Phillips, Trustee of the Clark living Trust dated January 19, 2023 (Defendant) demurrers to the fourth through sixth causes of action for the failure to transfer certain personal property on the grounds that no creditor’s claim was made to Defendant for these items. (Demurrer at pp. 9–10.) Defendant raises the same argument as to Plaintiff Sylvia Cuellar’s (Plaintiff) claim for damages under the first through third causes of action based on the failure of Defendant to convey the subject real property on Hunter Point Road in Pomona. (Demurrer at pp. 10–11.) Defendant finally argues that the first through third causes of action for failure to transfer the property are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, based on the court’s decision in probate proceedings establishing the Defendant trust’s interest in the real property at issue. (Demurrer at pp. 11–13.)

While the present motion was pending, Plaintiff dismissed the fourth through sixth causes of action, rendering the demurrer moot as to those claims.

Defendant’s argument as to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims for money damages resulting from the real property contract are undeveloped and unpersuasive. Defendant notes only that under Nevada law — Defendant’s trust is by its terms to be administered under Nevada law — that a creditor’s claim against a trust settlor must be made within 90 days of the posting of a notice to creditors. (Demurrer at pp. 9–11, citing 164.025, subd. (3).) But Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff made just such a claim for the property at issue. (FAC ¶ 25.) Although Plaintiff does not allege making a creditor’s claim for damages, or for quantum meruit relief based on the services rendered in reliance on the alleged contract to convey the property, Defendant presents no authority for the proposition that a creditor must make not only serve a claim for the delivery of contractually promised items but also the damages resulting from the trustee’s hypothetical failure to honor the claim.

Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff’s claims to title to the subject property are precluded by prior probate proceedings. The preclusion of subsequent claims already adjudicated in a prior proceeding “requires an affirmative answer to the following three questions: (1) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (2) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the subsequent litigation? (3) Was the party against whom the principle is invoked a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?” (Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1534.)

The prior proceedings at issue here consisted of a petition filed by Defendant on July 31, 2023, seeking an order under Probate Code § 850 that the subject property be transferred to the trustee, on the grounds that the decedent settlor had executed a trust document transferring the property to the trust, but had died prior to the actual conveyance. (RJN Exh. A,.) On October 16, 2023, the court granted Defendant’s petition to order the conveyance from the decedent’s estate to the trust. (RJN Exh. C.)

Defendant overstates the effect of these prior proceedings. These proceedings were not necessarily in the nature of a “quiet title” action, in which the court determined the present interests of all persons claiming interest in the property. Rather, the purpose of the petition was to authorize a particular transfer of the subject property, namely from the Decedent to his trust. (See Probate Code § 856; RJN Exh. A at p. 10.) Defendant’s petition alleged that Decedent “had insufficient time . . . to execute any title transferring his interest” in the property to the trust before his death. (RJN Exh. A, ¶ 17.) The court accordingly authorized the conveyance of the property from Decedent to the trust. (RJN Exh. C.) Although “[a]n action brought under this part may include claims, causes of action, or matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a petition filed under this part” (Prob. Code § 855), there is little indication here that Defendant’s petition operated more broadly than to effectuate the transfer identified.

As Plaintiff notes in opposition, the transfer of the subject property from Decedent personally to the trust was not necessarily inconsistent with her claims for specific performance. The transfer of real property into a trust does not prevent the trust settlor (like Decedent here) from making contracts to transfer that property to other persons, provided they had the right to dispose of trust property during their lifetime. (. (See Walgren v. Dolan (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 572, 579–580.) and furthermore does not prevent the transferee from enforcing that contract against the trust. (See Walgren v. Dolan (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 572, 579–580 [holding that an action for specific performance on a real property purchase contract after the death of the seller “necessarily had to be brought against the successors-in- to the title to the realty, which would be either the trustees or the successor beneficiaries of the trust”].)

Defendant argues that a final judgment on a section 850 petition is analogous to a quiet title action, and is “conclusive against the whole world and not just parties to the litigation.” (Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1534, internal quotation marks omitted.)But Defendant does not present authority for the proposition that any section 850 petition operates to such a broad extent, or that the petition that preceded the present action had such an operation. As noted above, the import of the order sought by Defendant’s petition was to carry out a transfer of the property into the trust. The import of the authority cited by Defendant is that the “whole world” is now barred from contesting the validity of that transfer. (Redfield, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1534.) But per the authority discussed above, the effectiveness of the transfer of property into the trust does not prevent Plaintiff from seeking performance of the contract.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first through third causes of action.