Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV26131, Date: 2024-08-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV26131, Date: 2024-08-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV26131 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 61

JOSE IRIZARRY vs HUNTSMAN ADVANCED MATERIALS AMERICAS, LLC, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendants Huntsman Advanced Materials Americas LLC, Huntsman International LLC, and David Jarquin’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendants are ordered to answer within 20 days.

Plaintiff to give notice.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant Huntsman Advanced Materials Americas, LLC, Huntsman International LLC, and David Jarquin (Defendants) demurrer to Plaintiff Jose Irizarry’s third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as amended in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) following this court’s order sustaining Defendants’ prior demurrer to the same claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute outrageous conduct for the purposes of the IIED tort. (Demurrer at pp. 3–5.)

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corporation (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 228–29.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

This court sustained Defendants’ previous demurrer in reliance on authority holding that mere personnel management activity could not constitute outrageous conduct under the IIED tort:

Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for discrimination. (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80.) Because the original complaint alleged only unfair performance improvement plans and his ultimate termination, this court concluded that no IIED claim was stated, as none but personnel management activity was alleged.

Plaintiff’s FAC includes additional allegations of non-management conduct on the party of his nonparty co-workers Johnny Foster and another coworker named Tevin. The FAC alleges that after Plaintiff reported Foster’s unsafe workplace practices,

Foster would belittle PLAINTIFF, yell at plaintiff, speak to plaintiff in an aggressive tone, and would threaten and intimidate PLAINTIFF. For instance, on multiple occasions, Johnny Foster would walk toward Plaintiff and call him a “snitch” while looking at Plaintiff in a threatening way.

Further, PLAINTIFF’s coworker Tevin would walk aggressively towards PLAINTIFF, yell at PLAINTIFF in an aggressive tone, and slam doors in front of Tevin to intimidate him. On one occasion, PLAINTIFF’s coworker Tevin approached him aggressively and raised his voice at PLAINTIFF, which made PLAINTIFF feel threatened and fearful for his safety. During that incident, a manager had to physically stand between Tevin and PLAINTIFF to ensure that the situation did not escalate. In another instance, an employee warned PLAINTIFF that PLAINTIFF should be careful about what PLAINTIFF said in front of Johnny

PLAINTIFF reported Johnny and Tevin’s retaliatory behavior and actions to EMPLOYER and JARQUIN on multiple occasions. PLAINTIFF also informed EMPLOYER and JARQUIN that Johnny was calling him a “snitch” and that he felt threatened and unsafe. On one occasion, a manager named Gwen even told PLAINTIFF “they aren’t going to forgive you for snitching on them to HR,” which made Plaintiff feel fearful for his safety. Despite PLAINTIFF’s complaints, EMPLOYER and JARQUIN failed to take any action and failed to address his concerns. Instead, EMPLOYER and JARQUIN allowed Johnny Foster and Tevin to continue retaliating against PLAINTIFF. (FAC ¶¶ 33–36.)

Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of outrageous conduct. Plaintiff alleges conduct on the part of his fellow employees that amounted to, in his telling physical threats, including one instance in which he and another coworker had to be physically separated. He further alleges that his complaints were met with not only inaction, but statements by a manager embracing the characterization that he had “snitch[ed]” on his coworkers, allowing the conduct to continue. (FAC ¶¶ 35–36.) This conduct is alleged in conjunction with the personnel management actions — such as false performance reviews and Plaintiff’s ultimate termination — which formed the sole basis for the claim in the previous iteration of the complaint. (FAC ¶¶ 37, 39.) “[I]f reasonable persons may differ” as to the outrageousness of the conduct, “it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)

The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED.