Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 23STCV29258, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV29258, Date: 2024-10-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV29258 Hearing Date: October 23, 2024 Dept: 61

JAIME ALVARADO, JR. vs CLEAN HARBORS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendants Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc., Ogletree Deakins, Nash, Smoak, & Stewart, and Gabriel Medel’s Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP) the Complaint is GRANTED.

Moving parties to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

In 1992 the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 as a remedy for the “disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16, subd. (a); Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 817.) The lawsuits are commonly referred to as “SLAPP” lawsuits, an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57, fn. 1.) A defendant opposing a SLAPP claim may bring an “anti-SLAPP” special motion to strike any cause of action “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

In ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, a trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure at any early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) This is a two-step process. First, the defendants must show that the acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States of California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16 subd. (b)(1).) Next, if the defendant carries that burden, the burden shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 subd. (b)(3).) In making both determinations the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)

Defendants Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc., Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC, and Gabriel Medel (Defendants) seek to strike Plaintiff Jaime Alvarado’s malicious prosecution complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.

A. PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The anti-SLAPP statute defines protected activities as:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

Protected activity thus encompasses statements made before a “judicial proceeding,” i.e. litigation-related activities. (Ibid.) Courts “have adopted a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908.) “Correspondence made in anticipation of litigation “contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration can be a petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 472.)

Here, it cannot reasonably be disputed that that Defendants conduct in filing a petition for a restraining order in court and offering testimony in support thereto, as alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, constituted protected, litigation related activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. “[B]y its terms, section 425.16 potentially may apply to every malicious prosecution action, because every such action arises from an underlying lawsuit, or petition to the judicial branch. By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734–735, internal citations omitted.) This reasoning applies here.

The Complaint therefore arises from protected activity.

B. LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING

After a defendant meets their burden of showing that the gravamen of the complaint involves protected activity, the plaintiff must then “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) A defendant can meet its burden if it can establish that the plaintiff cannot overcome an affirmative defense. (Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275 at 285.) “[A] plaintiff cannot simply rely on his or her pleadings, even if verified. Rather, the plaintiff must adduce competent, admissible evidence.” (Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 480.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim arises from the filing of a workplace harassment petition under Code of Civil Procedure § 527.8, and that such petitions cannot be the basis for a malicious prosecution action as a matter of law. (Motion at pp. 13–14.) Case authority indeed holds that “petitions under the Workplace Violence Safety Act do not provide a basis for malicious prosecution actions.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.) Thus Plaintiff’s own claim for malicious prosecution is infirm.

Moreover, Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion. Because this court has found that his claim arose from protected activity, it is his burden to present evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor. He has not done so.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.