Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 23STCV31578, Date: 2024-09-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31578    Hearing Date: September 11, 2024    Dept: 61

DOE 1, et al. vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.

TENTATIVE

Plaintiffs Does 1–4’s Pitchess Motion for Discovery of Officer Personnel Records is GRANTED, with the limitation that Requests No. 1 and 2 are limited to the officers listed in Appendix A, and are limited to complaints or investigations against them relating to the Centurions football team.

Plaintiffs to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

Evid. Code section 1043, subd. (a) requires that a party seeking disclosure of police officer “personnel records” file a particular motion, a Pitchess motion. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) “Personnel records” are defined as “primary records specific to each peace or custodial officer's employment, including evaluations, assignments, status changes, and imposed discipline.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd (d)(1).)

The Pitchess provisions “take precedence over the general discovery rules outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Davis v. City of Sacramento (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 393, 400.)

Evid. Code section 1043, subd. (b) details what a Pitchess motion shall include:

(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard.

(2) A description of the type of records or information sought. [And]

(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.

“A finding of ‘good cause’ under section 1043, subdivision (b) is only the first hurdle in the discovery process. Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information ‘in chambers’ in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (“Santa Cruz”) (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) The excluded categories of information include, in criminal proceedings, “the conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint filed pursuant to section 832.5 of the Penal Code,” and otherwise include “[f]acts sought to be disclosed that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (Evid. Code § 1045, subd. (b).)

“Section 1043 clearly requires a showing of ‘good cause’ for discovery in two general categories: (1) the ‘materiality’ of the information or records sought to the “subject matter involved in the pending litigation,” and (2) a ‘reasonable belief’ that the governmental agency has the ‘type’ of information or records sought to be disclosed.” (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) Courts have described that as a “relatively low threshold” for discovery, but have also noted that section 1045’s protective provisions, governing in camera review, offset that low threshold. (Id. at p. 83–84.)

Plaintiffs Does 1 through 4 (Plaintiffs) bring a motion seeking the production of certain categories of documents from Defendant City of Los Angeles (Defendant). The documents sought fall into the following categories:

· Requests No. 1 and 2, which seek personnel complaint investigations into officers involved in the LAPD Centurions hell week training in the years 2006, 2007, and 2009, involving allegations of physical abuse, harassment, false statements, or sexual harassment, or the use of force that was confirmed to be out of policy;

· Requests No. 3–8, which sought documents related to investigation of hazing, assault, battery, or abuse related to the LAPD Centurions football team, plus correspondence related to such complaints;

· Requests No. 9–11: documents or information responsive to Plaintiff’s prior discovery responses to which Defendant objected on the grounds that responding would require a Pitchess motion.

(Motion at pp. 2–7.)

Plaintiffs submit a declaration of counsel outlining the underlying allegations of the Complaint, related to Plaintiffs’ being subject to a rookie-hazing ritual at the hands of dozens of LAPD officers at the end of their initial training for the LAPD Centurions football team. (Howard Decl. ¶¶ 4–84.) Plaintiffs argue that good cause supports requests related to officers’ prior misconduct, because such documents will show Defendant’s prior knowledge of the unfitness of certain officers and their proclivity for abuse, and thus Defendant’s negligence in supervising them. (Howard Decl. ¶¶ 85–86.) Information related to subsequent investigations, meanwhile, will show that Defendant failed to take responsive action, and thus ratified the misconduct. (Howard Decl. ¶¶ 80–81.)

Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff’s requests are not well-framed for a Pitchess motion, because they do not identify the officers for whom documents are sought, as required under Evidence Code § 1043, subd. (b)(1). (Opposition at pp. 2–4.) Defendant argues that the requests are overbroad and seek documents beyond the scope of a Pitchess motion, because they are not limited to records within an officer’s personnel file. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause for any of the requests. (Opposition at pp. 5–8.) Finally, Defendant argues that if this court permits the Pitchess process to proceed to an in-camera review of records, then it must place certain limitations on the scope of production. (Opposition at pp. 8–9.)

The requests adequately identify the scope of the materials sought and the officers whose records are requested. This much is required under Evidence Code § 1043, which states that a Pitchess motion shall include “[i]dentification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard.” (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(1).) Although Requests No. 1 and 2 are directed to all officers who participated in the “hell week” practices of given years, they are also directed to the 128 specific officers that Plaintiffs identify in the appendix attached to the declaration of counsel. (Howard Decl. Appendix A.) Plaintiffs in reply confirm that the first two requests seek only documents related to these specific, identified individuals. (Reply at p. 6.)

To the extent that the other requests do not identify particular officers, they provide adequate notice of the documents they seek — namely, documents reflecting investigation of misconduct related to the Centurions hazing rituals. Plaintiffs cannot reasonably be expected to know ahead of time which officers’ personnel files contain complaints related to this alleged misconduct, and the Pitchess process does not require clairvoyance on the part of plaintiffs seeking responsive documents. A plaintiff “need not know what information is located in personnel records before he obtains the discovery. Such a requirement would be impossible. The required threshold showing does not place a defendant “in the Catch–22 position of having to allege with particularity the very information he is seeking.” (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 721.) Here, Plaintiff’s identification of the categories at issue is sufficient to allow Defendant to discern the officers involved, and for Defendant to provide notice to those affected of the requests.

Defendant’s objections to the non-Pitchess nature of the records are directed to place Plaintiffs in just such a Catch-22. Plaintiffs sought by normal written discovery the identification of officers and records with responsive information related to the alleged Centurion misconduct, and were met with objections that such information was contained in officer personnel files, which could only be obtained via Pitchess motion. (Motion at pp. 5–7.) But now that such inquiries are placed in a Pitchess motion, Defendant argues that they are not properly suited for the procedure. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) Defendant neglects that the Pitchess process is not limited to personnel records but also “information from those records.” (Evid. Code § 1043, subd. (a).) Requesting information derived from officer personnel records is therefore proper Pitchess procedure. Even if it were not, little harm is done by the inclusion of the requests here, because the ultimate result of the request through the Pitchess process is the addition of an extra layer of in camera judicial review prior to production.

Good cause supports the requests in large part. Defendant suggests that a showing of good cause requires a showing of “manifest necessity” and the consideration of multiple factors. (Opposition at pp. 5–8.) Defendant’s standard is incorrect. The “manifest necessity” language comes not from a Pitchess case, but from a case assessing the release of similar records pursuant to a Public Records Act request. (See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) The actual standard for a showing of good cause is “a relatively low threshold for discovery,” consisting of a showing of “the materiality of the information to the subject matter of the pending litigation,” and a statement of “reasonable belief that the [responding] agency has the type of information sought.” (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 655.) The multi-factor analysis described by Defendant applies to defendants seeking officer information for the support of their defense in criminal proceedings, not civil discovery. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1026–1027 [describing factors for criminal defendants].) The requests here are material to the subject matter of this lawsuit, i.e. ritual hazing conducted as part of induction into the LAPD football team.

However, the first and second requests are overbroad in this respect. While the other requests are related to misconduct related to the Centurion football team, the allegations of the complaint, or discrete correspondence related to its allegations, the first and second requests seek disciplinary records and investigation related to any incidents of false statements, abuse, harassment, or the use of force by any of the dozens of officers involved, regardless of their nexus to the Centurion football team. This is overbroad, because Plaintiffs do not allege individuated harassment or abuse by officers who happened to be members of the Centurion football team. The gravamen of the Complaint is their enduring of abuse pursuant to a regularly scheduled hazing ritual, conducted under the auspices of the Centurions and the LAPD. These requests for disciplinary records having no relation to the Centurions strike at a broad range of material having little relation to the subject matter of this lawsuit. Requests No. 1 and 2 are thus properly limited, not only to the specific officers contained in Plaintiffs’ Appendix A, but also by subject matter to complaints related to the Centurions.

Defendant is correct that the documents ultimately disclosed pursuant to this statute must be limited in their use by a protective order. This much is required by statute:

The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.

(Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).)

However, Defendant’s argument for further restrictions — such as the provision of only witness contact information and the redaction of ultimate investigatory conclusions — is not persuasive at this time. The authority cited by Defendant does not stand for the proposition that only witness contact information may be disclosed in the Pitchess process, but rather that the courts in those cases deemed only the contact information relevant to the proceedings pending before them. (See Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 828–829 [“(Petitioner has demonstrated the necessity for discovering the names, addresses and telephone numbers of citizens who have lodged complaints of excessive force against Officers Brogelman and Chryss, and of any witnesses interviewed by the department in connection with such complaints, but has made no showing that this information will be inadequate to enable *829 him to prepare his case.”]; see also City of Azusa v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 693, 696–697 [holding that trial court should have excised “medical records and other sensitive and personal material about individuals, including information about criminal records, suspected criminal activities, and evaluations of credibility” from Pitchess production].) Other decisions have explicitly recognized that different fact patterns may warrant the disclosure of different information, as relevance dictates. “The analysis of relevancy in the Pitchess context must be on a case-by-case basis, rather than on a one-size-fits-all approach.” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088.)1 Should any of the materials presented to the court for in camera review prove “so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit,” they will not be disclosed. (Evid. Code § 1045, subd. (b)(2).)

The motion is therefore GRANTED, with the limitation that Requests No. 1 and 2 are limited to the officers listed in Appendix A, and are limited to complaints or investigations against them relating to the Centurions football team.