Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV00704, Date: 2024-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV00704, Date: 2024-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV00704 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 61

WANDA STEWART, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MACY'S INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendants Macy’s Inc. and Marie Catudan’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED as to all of Plaintiff’s claims, save her non-individual PAGA claims, which are stayed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4.

Defendants to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate a controversy, a court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines the arbitration agreement exists, unless (1) the petitioner has waived its right to arbitrate; (2) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (3) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

“[T]he party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The role of the trial court is to sit as a trier of fact, weighing any affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, together with oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a determination on the issue of arbitrability.” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.)

Defendants Macy’s Inc. and Marie Catudan (Defendants) move to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Wanda Seward’s claims, other than her non-individual PAGA claims, based on an arbitration agreement contained in a new hire brochure, to which Plaintiff executed a signed acknowledgement. (Ripak Decl. Exhs. A, B.) The arbitration agreement covers “all employment-related legal disputes, controversies or claims arising out of or relating to employment or cessation of employment.” (Ripak Decl. Exh. A.)

Plaintiff in opposition argues that the agreement is unconscionable. “Unconscionability requires a showing of both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795.) Arbitration contracts presented to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are at least minimally procedurally unconscionable. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113.) The agreement here is one of adhesion presented to Plaintiff by Macy’s as a mandatory condition of employment, and as such the agreement possesses a level of procedural unconscionability.

Plaintiff argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it limits discovery. (Opposition at pp. 9–10.) However, discovery limitations are no per se unconscionable, because “[l]imited discovery rights are the hallmark of arbitration.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 689.) The discovery provisions contained in the agreement are as follows:

· An initial disclosure in which each party provides the other with copies of “all documents that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody or control and upon which the disclosing party will rely in support of the disclosing parties [sic] or defenses,” excluding privileged documents, and including a continuing obligation to supplement discovery as other documents become known;

· Each party may propound 20 interrogatories, which “may include a request for all documents upon which the responding party relies in support of its answers to the interrogatories”;

· Each party may take up to three individual depositions;

· The arbitrator may permit additional discovery on “showing of appropriate justification” and if the discovery is “not overly burdensome, and will not unduly delay the conclusion of the arbitration.”

(Ripak Decl. Exh. A at pp. 10–11.)

These provisions are not unconscionable. Similar provisions have been upheld against unconscionability challenges. And the arbitrator is permitted to allow further discovery upon a showing of appropriate justification, a power this court must assume will be exercised reasonably. (See Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 984.) The discretionary discovery clause here is readily “construed to allow the arbitrator to order additional discovery as needed to allow a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute.” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478.) As such, it is not unconscionable.

Plaintiff further argues that the provision requires discovery to be conducted within the 90 days following the selection of the arbitrator, which could pose scheduling problems. (Opposition at pp. 9–10.) But Plaintiff ignores that the arbitrator may allow additional time for discovery if good cause is shown. (Ripak Decl. Exh. A at p. 12.) If scheduling troubles arise, there is little reason the arbitrator would not permit a reasonable extension of deadlines.

There is no reason to find the arbitration agreement unconscionable, and therefore the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.