Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV01773, Date: 2024-08-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV01773, Date: 2024-08-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01773 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 61

JEFF SELZER, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MIDEB NOMINEES, INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Mideb Nominees, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena to Diversity Law Group, P.C. is DENIED.

Plaintiff to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (a).) A party may bring a motion under this section. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1).)

Defendant Mideb Nominees, Inc. (Mideb) moves to quash a subpoena issued by Plaintiff Jeff Selzer (Plaintiff) to third party Diversity Law Group, P.C. (Diversity), seeking discovery requests, responses, and certain categories of documents exchanged in the case, Rudrud v. Mideb Nominees, Inc., et al., LASC Case No. 22STCV11720. (Whang Decl. Exh. 1.) Mideb objects that the document requests in the subpoena seek “any and all” documents of the type listed, and claims that the subpoena is overbroad. (Motion at p. 6.) Defendant argues that the discovery infringes on third party privacy interests. (Motion at pp. 6–7.) Defendant argues that Rudrud’s claims are irrelevant to these proceedings. (Motion at pp. 8–9.) Mideb argues that the documents that Plaintiff seeks through the subpoena are properly sought through party-discovery from Defendants. (Motion at pp. 9–10.)

Mideb’s motion is defective in a number of respects. It relies at length upon a standard of good cause and narrow tailoring set forth in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 346, which articulates the standard applicable to subpoenas issued in criminal proceedings under Penal Code § 1326, not subpoenas under Code of Civil Procedure § 1987. Subpoenas in the civil context need only be supported by “good cause” and framed with reasonable particularity. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 218, 224.)

Mideb also misstates good cause for the subpoena at issue here, as it concerns the same wrongdoers and substantially similar facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Rudrud’s lawsuit, for which Plaintiff seeks the discovery materials here, was similarly founded on FEHA harassment by Defendant Michael Hellen at Mideb and wrongful termination based on Rudrud’s initiation of a romantic relationship with Plaintiff. (See 22STCV11720 Complaint ¶¶ 13–20.) Plaintiff alleges that he was harassed and retaliated against for raising objections to Hellen’s harassment and for his romantic relationship with Rudrud. (Complaint ¶¶ 15–20.) The two cases thus rely on a similar factual basis, and good cause supports the requests here.

Nor is there merit to Mideb’s objection to the manner of the subpoena’s framing. The requests seek written discovery responses in the manner in which they are sent and retained, or else seek documents (medical records excluded) according to subject matter, such as those relating to Plaintiff’s Rudrud’s, or Hellen’s termination of employment. (Whang Decl. Exh. 1.) Thus the requests are not overbroad or ill-framed.

Mideb is correct that the requests may implicate privacy concerns. Rudrud’s case involves her employment and allegations of sexual harassment, meaning that the documents requested may concern private personnel records or the parties’ sexual histories. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 [describing right to privacy as to sexual history]; El Dorado Savings & Loan v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342, 345 [personnel records], overruled on other grounds in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.) .) In the constitutional context, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.)

However, both Rudrud and Hellen have been served with the subpoena and this motion through their counsel, and neither have offered any objection to the disclosure of the materials sought. Mideb was a party to the Rudrud action and presumptively knows the materials that the subpoena seeks, but has offered only conclusory invocations of abstract privacy rights, without any description of the offending documents likely to be revealed. Given the factual proximity of the two cases, disclosure of the documents is warranted over the objections asserted by Mideb.

Mideb argues that the documents may be sought from Defendants, rather than a third party. (Motion at pp. 9–10.) But Plaintiff in opposition offers a persuasive account of his attempts to secure discovery from Defendants, only to be met with boilerplate objections, the false promise of supplemental responses, or else representations that responsive documents are not in their possession. (Hashemi Decl. ¶¶ 6–12, Exhs. 3–12.) Mideb does not contest this narrative of events in its reply. Plaintiff thus may justly seek these documents from a third-party source.

The motion to quash is therefore DENIED.