Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV02823, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV02823, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02823 Hearing Date: October 9, 2024 Dept: 61

SUNNYSIDE CREMATION AND FUNERAL, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JAY HOON LEE, AN INDIVIDUAL, et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendants AASP, Inc., Jay Hoon Lee, Jae So Lim, Andy Lim, and Jennyfer Oh’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff to give notice.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendants AASP, Inc., Jay Hoon Lee, Jae So Lim, and Jennyfer Oh (Defendants) file the present, successive demurrer to the Complaint, after having retained counsel following this court’s overruling of their prior demurrer against the same pleading.

Defendants’ filing of a successive demurrer is improper. This court is “foreclosed from rendering a new determination on the viability of those claims [upheld against a prior demurrer] unless some new facts or circumstances [are] brought to [its] attention.” (Bennett v. Suncloud (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 91, 97.) Defendants do not mention this court’s order of June 24, 2024, overruling their prior demurrer, or attempt to show new or different facts justifying reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure § 1008.

Defendants’ demurrer also presents no new argument that would warrant dismissal of any of Plaintiff Sunnyside Cremation and Funeral, Inc.’s (Plaintiff) claims. The arguments offered here, as with Defendants’ prior demurrer, largely rest upon a straightforward denial of the truth of the allegations, a position this court cannot take in assessing the validity of the pleadings. (See Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) Defendants argue that the claims are barred by statute of limitations, despite express allegations that Plaintiff only discovered the misconduct from discovery in other litigation in 2023. (Complaint ¶ 11.)

Defendants argue that the second cause of action alleges only knowledge and benefit from tortious activity, without alleging “substantial assistance,” as is required to establish aiding and abetting liability. (Demurrer at pp. 7–8; see Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 343.) But Defendants neglect that substantial assistance is alleged. (Complaint ¶¶ 19–20.) And while Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot proceed on its contractual interference claims without specifically identifying all contracts that it contends were interfered with (Demurrer at pp. 8–9), Defendant identifies no authority for this proposition.

Defendants argue, as they did in the prior demurrer, that the trade libel claim is not sufficiently pleaded, because the specific libelous material is not alleged. (Demurrer at pp. 5–6.) “The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.” (Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1155.) But the Complaint alleges the words constituting the libel here. As noted in the prior demurrer, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants posed as a member of a congregation with which Plaintiff had a prior relationship and stated they had personally witnessed Plaintiff engaging in “fraudulent activities” — with those words in quotation marks, indicating a verbatim quotation from Defendants’ alleged email. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Plaintiff has specifically alleged the words constituting the libel. If Defendants contend that the additional context of the email is exonerating, that is properly a matter for trial or an evidence-based dispositive motion.

Defendants finally argue that it is not alleged that the email was false. (Demurrer at p. 6.) But the Complaint, again, alleges falsity and Defendants’ knowledge of the same. (Complaint ¶ 12.)

The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED.