Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV05584, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV05584, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV05584 Hearing Date: October 2, 2024 Dept: 61

DANIEL GALLOWAY, et al. vs DO LAB, INC., et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Do Lab, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint is DENIED.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

DISCUSSION

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendant Do Lab, Inc. (Do Lab) moves to strike the prayer for punitive damage contained in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) on the grounds that the pleading fails to state facts supporting an allegation of the existence of malice, oppression, or fraud, or else of corporate direction or ratification of the conduct alleged. (Motion at pp. 7–14.)

Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) The terms are defined as:

1. “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

2. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

3. “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

Do Lab here argues that Plaintiffs Daniel and Mary Galloway (Plaintiffs) cannot establish that Do Lab acted with malice or oppression because the only facts alleged are that Plaintiffs’ daughter was steered away from the medical tent at Do Lab’s festival by employees acting in contravention of Do Lab’s stated policy that festival patrons could access the medical tent without fear of repercussions. (Motion at p. 10.) Do Lab also argues that no facts are pleaded to establish that it acted with ill will. (Motion at pp. 8–9.)

Do Lab’s argument misreads the FAC. The operative facts alleged are that Do Lab administered a music festival with the knowledge of the dangers of drug overdose, high outdoor temperatures, and dehydration, Do Lab arranged for inadequate staffing and training of its medical staff, and made it difficult for patrons in need to access the geographically remote medical tent, even implementing a policy for its largely volunteer staff to “keep people out of the medical tent.” (FAC ¶¶ 18–23.) It is alleged that Plaintiffs’ daughter, Kelly Galloway, died after twice being steered away from the medical tent by insinuations of negative penal repercussions. (FAC ¶¶ 37–47.)

Contrary to Do Lab’s argument, FAC does not allege that Do Lab had a policy of free access to the medical tent without repercussions. This “repercussions” language is alleged with respect to the advertisements and promotions published by Do Lab. (FAC ¶ 17.) The only policy alleged in the FAC is that which Do Lab is alleged to have trained upon its staff: “keep people out of the medical tent.” (FAC ¶¶ 23a, 67d.) This fact is alleged in addition to other facts related to the festival’s maladministration, such as the understaffing and undertraining of festival personnel, and the geographically remote location of the medical tent in relation to the festival campgrounds. (FAC ¶¶ 22, 28–29.) Given allegations of prior festivals put on by Do Lab at which patrons died or requiring emergency transport to hospitals (FAC ¶¶ 17–18, 20), Plaintiffs adequately allege despicable conduct and a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others, sufficient to support allegations of malice or oppression.

The FAC also alleges that the negligent acts leading to the death of Kelly Galloway were directed or ratified by an officer or managing agent of Do Lab, namely Defendant Jason “Dede” Flemming. (FAC ¶¶ 57, 63.)

The motion is therefore DENIED.