Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV07710, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV07710, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07710 Hearing Date: February 26, 2025 Dept: 61

WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC.

Tentative

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED and DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file its answer within 30 days.

Plaintiff to give notice.

Analysis

I. DEMURRER

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”) “In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendant General Motors LLC argues that the fifth cause of action for fraud is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. (Demurrer at pp. 7–9.) There is a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d.) The “discovery rule. . . postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” (Ibid.) Courts “look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.” (Ibid.) The accrual of a cause of action in relation to the discovery rule is normally a question of fact. (Id. at p. 810.)

On a demurrer, the court must take as true statements such as that as plaintiff “did not discover, nor suspect, nor was there any means through which her reasonable diligence would have revealed, or through which she would have suspected,” the cause of an injury was the defendant in question. (Id. at p. 811.) However: “A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.” (Id. at p. 808.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (Ibid.)

Here, the alleged fraud would have occurred on November 9, 2019, the date Plaintiff William Zimmerman alleges he purchased the vehicle. (FAC ¶ 9.) Thus without the benefit of the discovery rule, the claim would have timed out on February 9, 2022.

Plaintiff has alleged delayed discovery sufficient to keep the claim within the limitations period. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges a series of repair attempts involving the alleged defect at issue, dating from February 2021 to April 21, 2022, in which, after each attempt, the technicians informed him that the defect had been repaired. (FAC ¶¶ 41–45.) Plaintiff thus alleges that the defect was not discovered because until shortly before the action, he believed it was subject to repair by Defendant’s authorized dealers. Defendant’s case citations for the proposition that such allegations are insufficient involve unpublished federal cases applying a different standard of pleading. (Demurrer at pp. 13–14.)

Thus the demurrer cannot be sustained on the grounds the claim is time-barred.

B. ELEMENTS OF CONCEALMENT

The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation or concealment, (2) knowledge of its falsity, (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance and (5) resulting damage. (Gil v. Bank of America, Nat. Ass'n (2006) 138 Cal. App. 4th 1371, 1381; Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 C.A.3d 369, 376.)

“‘The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.) The elements of concealment, as with ordinary fraud, must be pleaded with specificity. (See Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472.) Fraud causes of action must be pleaded with particularity, meaning that the plaintiff must allege “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his concealment claim because he does not allege who at General Motors specifically failed to disclose the information concerning the defects at issue. (Demurrer at p. 10.) Defendant relies upon standards of pleading applicable to statements of affirmative misrepresentation, which require the specific pleading of the corporate representative who made the representation at issue in a fraud claim. (See Tenet Health System Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838.) But while concealment claims are equally subject to requirements of specificity in pleading, it is not a plaintiff’s burden to plead the identity of the individual at a corporate defendant who did not disclose a material fact. Such a requirement would run contrary to the rule that “less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.)

Defendants argue that there was no transactional relationship between the manufacturer and Plaintiff such that Defendants owed a duty to disclose the alleged defect. (Demurrer at pp. 11–12; see Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312 [transaction giving rise to duty to disclose “must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large”].) But such a relationship exists here. Although Plaintiff does not allege that they purchased their vehicle from Defendant, it was Defendant that provided them with the warranty that they are here alleged to have breached. Thus a transactional relationship is alleged. The demurrer to the fraud claim is therefore OVERRULED.

Defendant’s arguments against the prayer for punitive damages in the separate motion to strike depend upon the resolution of their demurrer, as a viable claim for fraud would entitle Plaintiffs to seek punitive damages under Civil Code § 3294. (Motion at pp. 5–7.) The motion to strike is therefore DENIED.