Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV08549, Date: 2025-03-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV08549, Date: 2025-03-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV08549 Hearing Date: March 26, 2025 Dept: 61

DEJANEE STAFFORD, AN INDIVIDUAL vs CITY OF COMPTON, et al.

Tentative

Defendant City of Compton’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, within 20 days of this Order, as to the eleventh cause of action for negligent hiring and retention. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED.

Moving party to give notice.

Analysis

I. DEMURRER

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”) “In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant City of Compton (Defendant) demurrers to the complaint of Plaintiff Dejanee Stafford (Plaintiff) on the grounds that the statutory causes of action alleged under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) are not pleaded with sufficient particularity. (Demurrer at pp. 11–14, 16.) Defendant argues that the eleventh cause of action for common law negligent hiring and supervision cannot be pleaded against a public entity. (Demurrer at pp. 14–16.) And Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead compliance with the Tort Claims Act. (Demurrer at pp. 16–17.)

Defendant’s argument as to the insufficient particularity of the facts alleged against them is without merit. Defendant notes that liability against a public entity requires reliance on a statutory basis to upset the general immunity to which public entities are subject, and that “fact[s] essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) But other than to invoke this authority, Defendant offers no argument for the proposition that Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pleaded. The facts supporting Plaintiff’s claims of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, are found in paragraphs 13 through 22 of the Complaint, in which Plaintiff describes her supervisor’s unfavorable treatment of women, verbal warnings from other coworkers that this supervisor had a problem with women, how she was threatened with termination for complaining about his behavior, and finally terminated after taking medical leave, during which this same supervisor voiced complaints about her taking of protected leave. (Complaint ¶¶ 13–22.) Defendant identifies no respect in which these claims are insufficiently pleaded.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege submission of a government claim under the Government Claims Act. (Demurrer at pp. 16–17.) But “[a]ctions brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California's own statutory scheme to combat employment discrimination, have . . . been held exempt from the claim—presentation requirements of the general tort claims act.” (Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 710.) Plaintiff’s claims here are all FEHA claims, or else overlap entirely as a factual matter with Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. As such, Plaintiff’s filing of the complaint with the California Civil Rights Department provided the same function as the filing of a government claim, i.e. “to give the public entity an opportunity to settle a claim before suit is brought, to permit early investigation of the facts, to facilitate fiscal planning for potential liabilities, and to avoid similarly caused injuries or liabilities in the future.” (Garcia, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 712.)

However, Defendant’s argument against the eleventh cause of action for the common law claim of negligent hiring and retention is persuasive, as Plaintiff alleges no statutory basis upon which to hold Defendant liable as a public entity for this common law tort. “A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person,” except as otherwise provided by statute. (Gov. Code § 815, subd. (a).) “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code § 815.2, subd. (a).) Immunity applicable to that employee for the act also immunizes the public entity employer. (Gov. Code § 815.2, subd. (b).) Plaintiff here pleads no statutory basis to plead direct or vicarious liability upon Defendant under this common law theory, and offers no argument in opposition to support the theory.

The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the eleventh cause of action for negligent hiring and retention. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED.