Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV10476, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV10476, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV10476 Hearing Date: January 13, 2025 Dept: 61

GERSAIN CHAVEZ, et al. vs BALCACERES BROS. TOWING, INC., et al.

Tentative

Defendants Lakia Jackson’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is DENIED.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

Analysis

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendant Lakia Jackson (Defendant) moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages against her on the grounds that insufficient facts are alleged to plead malice or oppression. (Motion at pp. 3–7.) Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) The terms are defined as:

1. “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

2. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

3. “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

The Complaint adequately pleads the existence of malice and oppression on the part of Defendant. It is alleged that Defendant collided with Plaintiffs in her vehicle because she was driving while intoxicated. (Complaint ¶ 17.) It is alleged that Defendant had a custom or habit of drinking or taking drugs to intoxication, and of driving after that fact, despite knowledge of the dangers involved. (Complaint ¶ 57.) It is alleged that Defendant became intoxicated on the night in question, knowing that she would later drive. (Complaint ¶ 58.) It is alleged that while driving the car, Defendant drove erratically and without regard to the safety of others, and collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle without making any attempt to stop or slow down. (Complaint ¶ 59.) Similar allegations have been held sufficient to support claims for punitive damages. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 86.)

The motion is therefore DENIED.