Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV11894, Date: 2024-09-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11894    Hearing Date: September 10, 2024    Dept: 61

HUGO A. CASTENEDA MERIDA, et al. vs AGOURA HILLS MARBLE AND GRANITE, INC., et al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc.’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint are OVERRULED and DENIED.

Plaintiffs to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

I. DEMURRER

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc. (Defendant) demurrers to the claims asserted in the Complaint of Plaintiffs Hugo Casteneda Merida and Joscelyn Martinez (Plaintiffs). Defendant argues that the claims are uncertain because Plaintiff Merida does not allege his place of employment or how he was exposed to Defendant’s products. (Demurrer at pp. 7–8.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege causation or how Defendant failed to warn. (Demurrer at pp. 8–9.) And Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for fraudulent concealment is not pleaded with requisite particularity. (Demurrer at pp. 9–10.)

To allege a toxic tort claim against multiple defendants, certain requirements must be met:

(1) Plaintiff must allege that he was exposed to each of the toxic materials claimed to have caused a specific illness. An allegation that he was exposed to “most and perhaps all” of the substances listed is inadequate.

(2) He must identify each product that allegedly caused the injury. It is insufficient to allege that the toxins in defendants' products caused it.

(3) He must allege that as a result of the exposure, the toxins entered his body.

(4) He must allege that he suffers from a specific illness, and that each toxin that entered his body was a substantial factor in bringing about, prolonging, or aggravating that illness.

(5) Finally, except in a case (unlike this one) governed by the principle of liability based on market share for a uniform product that we outlined in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 612, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, he must allege that each toxin he absorbed was manufactured or supplied by a named defendant.

(Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 80.)

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs plead causation. It is alleged that Plaintiff Merida worked as a fabricator and installer of stone products, including Defendant’s products, from 2012 to 2022. (Complaint ¶ 79.) It is alleged that while working with these products, he was exposed to toxic airborne dust and particulates emanating from Defendant’s products. (Complaint ¶ 80.) And they allege that Plaintiff suffered illness as a result to his exposure to Defendant’s products, including silicosis requiring a lung transplant.(Complaint ¶ 81.) Although Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not plead the locations of exposure or the precise dates or methods thereof, Defendant points to no authority suggesting such detail is needed at this stage.

Defendant’s argument as to the failure to warn is also unpersuasive, because it consists merely of a denial of the allegation that Defendant failed to provide adequate warnings. (Demurrer at p. 8.) The Complaint indeed alleges that Defendant failed to warn users of the hazards of its products. (Complaint ¶ 112.) Defendant’s contention that this claim “seeks to impose liability on Caesarstone USA solely based on the fact that Plaintiff allegedly suffered injury” is inaccurate. (Demurrer at p. 8.)

Defendant finally argues that the fraudulent concealment claim — related to Defendant’s alleged failure to disclose the hazards of its stone products — is not pleaded with the necessary particularity. (Demurrer at pp. 9–10.) Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allege corporate ratification of this concealment, but without “facts regarding . . . what authority each individual had to act on behalf of the corporation, when the facts were concealed, who were the facts concealed from, and when the Plaintiff allegedly was the subject of the concealment.” (Demurrer at p. 10.)

The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) It is well-established that “[t]o withstand a demurrer, the facts constituting every element of fraud must be alleged with particularity, and the claim cannot be salvaged by references to the general policy favoring the liberal construction of pleadings.” (Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772, 782.) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

However, “it is harder to apply the requirement of specificity to a case of simple nondisclosure. How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn't happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?” (Jones v. ConocoPhilips (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199, internal quotation marks omitted.) Likewise, “less specificity is required of a complaint when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy; even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 838, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.)

Defendants identify no defect of specificity in Plaintiff’s allegations. Contrary to their demurrer, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant concealed the hazardous nature of its products from both himself and his employers, during the period of time from 2012 to 2022 during which he worked with these products. (Complaint ¶¶ 164–166.) And although the Complaint does not plead the precise identities of the corporate officers responsible for authorizing or directing the concealment, Plaintiff is not properly charged with alleging facts related to Defendant’s internal corporate organization, as such matters necessarily lie more within the knowledge of Defendant itself. (See Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)

The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages and related allegations. (Motion at pp. 6–8.)

Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) The terms are defined as:

1. “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.2. “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

3. “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard” of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (“College Hospital”).)

“Fraud” is among the permissible bases that may support an award of exemplary damages. As noted in relation to Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraudulent concealment, the allegations here are sufficient to maintain a fraud claim. They are likewise sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

The motion to strike is therefore DENIED as to the prayer for punitive damages.