Judge Lynne M. Hobbs, Case Number: 24STCV18946, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 24STCV18946, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV18946 Hearing Date: December 9, 2024 Dept: 61

TIMOLIN LANGIN, AN INDIVIDUAL vs INGLEWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

TENATIVE

Defendants Inglewood Unified School District and Leonardo Lopez’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Complaint are SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action for retaliation, with leave to amend within 20 days. The motions are otherwise OVERRULED and DENIED.

Moving party to provide notice.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) In particular, as is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

Defendants Inglewood Unified School District (District) and Leonardo Lopez (Lopez, or collectively “Defendants”) demurrer to each cause of action alleged in Plaintiff Timolin Langin’s (Plaintiff) Complaint. They argue that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for FEHA Race Discrimination fails because Plaintiff does not allege facts suggestive of discriminatory motive. (Demurrer at p. 14.) They argue that there is no protected activity alleged to have been the foundation for her FEHA Retaliation claim. (Demurrer at pp. 15–16.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s non-FEHA claims fail because she alleges that she served a “pre-dispute settlement offer” rather than a compliant government claim. (Demurrer at pp. 17–19.)1

1. FEHA Claims

To establish a discrimination claim under FEHA, an employee must prove the following elements: “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 378.)

And “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under this section [FEHA], a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's action.”(Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 244, internal quotation marks omitted.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for FEHA racial discrimination fails because she alleges merely that the decisionmaker who decided to transfer her was Latino, while the person who succeeded her at her position was white. (Demurrer at p. 14.) This argument misreads the facts alleged and the applicable law. First, Plaintiff alleges not merely that her boss and replacement were not the same race as her, but that her white replacement was “significantly” less qualified than Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Second, replacement of a qualified employee by someone outside that employee’s protected class has been held sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA. (See Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003 [holding element of discriminatory motive established in an age-discrimination case when “the employee was replaced in his position by a significantly younger person”].) Thus Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged discriminatory motive.

Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff fails to allege protected activity for the purposes of her retaliation claim also fails. “Protected activity” is alleged “not only when the employee opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be unlawfully discriminatory under the FEHA, but also when the employee opposes conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith believes to be discriminatory, whether or not the challenged conduct is ultimately found to violate the FEHA.” (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 381.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that she repeatedly complained about her involuntary transfer (Complaint ¶ 29) and that she “reasonably believed” this issue, among others she complained of, “violated the FEHA at the time she complained of them.” (Complaint ¶ 51.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not describe the dates of her complaints or who she complained to, but Plaintiff states that these complaints occurred after her transfer, and were made by phone and in writing to “her union, her supervisors, and the District’s Human Resources department.” (Complaint ¶ 29.) Plaintiff has thus alleged protected activity.

The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action for FEHA discrimination and retaliation, and as to the fourth cause of action for failure to prevent FEHA violations.

2. Labor Code Retaliation

Defendant’s argument against the third cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code § 98.6 and § 1102.5 takes no issue with the substance of these claims. Defendant instead argues that these claims, alongside all others outside the FEHA, fail because Plaintiff did not submit a government claim in compliance with Government Code § 900 et seq. (Demurrer at pp. 17–19.)

A written government claim is a prerequisite to any suit for damages against a public entity in California. (See Gov. Code § 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 [“[W]e have observed that “submission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’”].)

Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the satisfaction of this element is as follows:

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Within the statute of limitations period afforded by law, Plaintiff filed the charges raised herein with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) pertaining to Defendants’ conduct and requesting her Right to Sue Letter. The CRD issued Plaintiff her Right to Sue Letter the same day. Attached to this Complaint, as Exhibit C, is a true and accurate copy of Plaintiff’s revised Right to Sue Letter. Plaintiff now timely files this action against Defendant. Ms. Langin also sent the District a pre-dispute settlement offer to the District and California’s Government Claims Program. The State did not respond to Ms. Langin’s offer within 46 days of the date of her letter. Ms. Langin now timely files her claims with this Court.

(Complaint ¶ 36.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s serving of a “settlement offer” upon the District and California Government Claims Program does not constitute the service of a government claim. (Demurrer at pp. 17–19.)

Plaintiff in opposition presents the declaration of her counsel and numerous exhibits to show that Plaintiff served a settlement letter upon the District on January 30, 2024, and served a second notice on February 14, 2024, to both the District and California’s Government Claims Program. (Opposition at pp. 8–10.)

It is clear that Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the government claims act, as she was required to do. Plaintiff alleges only the serving of a settlement offer, without attaching either the first or second claimed notice to the Complaint. “The plaintiffs have the burden of pleading and proving compliance with the claim presentation requirement.” (Bohrer v. County of San Diego (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 155, 160.) Plaintiff’s attempts to supply information omitted from the Complaint through evidentiary presentations submitted in opposition to a demurrer does not satisfy the requirement that such information be pleaded.

On the other hand, Defendants offer little reason to believe that the Complaint cannot be amended to allege a substantially compliant government claim. Defendant argues that the settlement offer cannot constitute a government claim merely because it was pleaded as a “settlement offer.” (Reply at pp. 7–10.) But Defendant offers no authority or reasoning as to why a document called or captioned a settlement offer cannot also be deemed a government claim when the substantive requirements of that claim are served. (See Gov. Code § 910 [describing required contents of a government claim]; see also Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 37 [holding that letters sent by plaintiff’s attorney did not constitute a compliant government claim because they did not describe the circumstances of the plaintiff’s employment or the acts constituting the alleged breaches of contract].) It is appropriate to note that procedurally irregular government claims may be salvaged by application of the doctrine of “substantial compliance,” which “excuses strict compliance when there has been actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” (Malear v. State (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 213, 224, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The closest Defendants come to offering any substantive argument on the insufficiency of the settlement offer is the contention that the settlement agreement was captioned “CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED” with mislabeled citations to Evidence Code §§ 1152 and 1154, which they contend deprived it of the character of a public record.

(Demurrer at p. 18; Christensen Decl. Exh. A.) But Defendants do not explain why such a designation would impede the ordinary functions of a government claim, which are generally explained to be “to afford prompt notice to public entities” which “permits early investigation and evaluation of the claim and informed fiscal planning in light of prospective liabilities.” (Sparks v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 794, 798.) Moreover, the sections cited would not make the letters confidential in any meaningful sense, as those sections prohibit the admission of such materials in court proceedings to prove a party’s liability or the invalidity of a claim, not to prove compliance with the procedural requisites of litigation. (Evid. Code §§ 1152, subd. (a); 1154.)

Finally, in response to Plaintiff’s argument that a second claim was made on February 14, 2024, Defendant simply denies that this happened. (Reply at p. 9.) Because this argument would not be grounds for sustaining a demurrer against an allegation to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that leave to amend on this claim would be futile.

Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the third cause of action for retaliation under the Labor Code, with leave to amend. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED.

Defendants’ motion to strike targets only the prayer for punitive damages and allegations against Defendant Lopez. (Motion at pp. 13–20.) But both Lopez and the prayer for punitive damages were dismissed on November 4, 2024. The motion is therefore DENIED as moot.