Judge: Lynne M. Hobbs, Case: 25STCV03363, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV03363 Hearing Date: June 3, 2025 Dept: 61
PROPERTY I.D. CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. vs EBONY MOSS, et al.
Tentative:
Plaintiff Property I.D. Corporation and All California Title and Escrow Company’s Motion to Compel Depositions Prior to Anti-SLAPP Hearing is GRANTED in part, and Plaintiffs may take the deposition of Defendant Meyer. The motion is DENIED as to Craig Byrnes.
Plaintiffs to provide notice.
Analysis:
I. MOTION TO PERMIT ANTI-SLAPP DISCOVERY
An anti-SLAPP motion was filed in this action on April 7, 2025. Plaintiffs Property I.D. Corporation and All California Title and Escrow Company (Plaintiffs) seek to compel the depositions of Defendant Irving Meyer and Craig T. Byrnes, who served as Meyer’s co-counsel in the underlying litigation on which the present malicious prosecution action is based. The anti-SLAPP statute provides for discovery pending a hearing on a special motion to strike as follows:
All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (g).)
Plaintiffs note that both Meyer and Byrnes have provided declarations in support of Meyer’s anti-SLAPP motion, attesting to the absence of malice in their prosecution of the underlying action and the probable cause that supported it. (Motion Exhs. 3, 4.) Plaintiffs accordingly seek to depose both to inquire into the matters they testify to.
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff “must plead and prove that the prior action “ ‘(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in [Sycamore Ridge's], favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice. (Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1398.) “Probable cause exists when a cause of action is, objectively speaking, legally tenable,” and depends upon “the plaintiff's knowledge and belief supporting its causes of action.” (Videotape Plus, Inc. v. Lyons (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 156, 161.) “For purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, malice is not limited to actual hostility or ill will toward the plaintiff. Rather, malice is present when proceedings are instituted primarily for an improper purpose.” Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1407, internal quotation marks omitted.)
Here, because probable cause relates to the information available to Defendant when he prosecuted the action, and because malice relates to the subjective purposes of that prosecution, good cause exists for the taking of the depositions that Plaintiffs propose, as these elements relate facially to the prima facie validity of their malicious prosecution claim, and concern elements related to Defendant’s awareness of the evidence, not matters already within Plaintiffs’ knowledge. Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs seek evidence available as a matter of public record is therefore erroneous. (Opposition at p. 3.) Moreover, although Defendant cites authority for the proposition that leave to conduct discovery may be denied when it appears the pending anti-SLAPP motion may be resolved on issues of law requiring no discovery (Opposition at pp. 4–5, citing The Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162.), he does not contend that any such issues exist here that would obviate consideration of the factual issues of probable cause and malice.
Defendant finally argues that the depositions will impinge on attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege. (Opposition at pp. 6–7.) It is true enough the inquiry into Meyer’s knowledge of the evidence through the prosecution of the underlying action will likely implicate confidential communications with his client and attorney work product, privileges which are not waived merely by defending a malicious prosecution action. (See Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 503.) But this does not mean that all such inquiry will necessarily trespass upon the privilege, or that this court may rule upon the propriety of deposition questions before they are asked.
The request for discovery is properly narrowed, however. Meyer is a defendant in this action, and Byrnes is not. Accordingly, the facts available to Meyer and his subjective motivation for bringing the case bears far more relevance to these proceedings than those same matters addressed to Byrnes.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED in part, and Plaintiffs may take the deposition of Defendant Meyer. The motion is DENIED as to Craig Byrnes.