Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 19STCV41715, Date: 2023-04-14 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 19STCV41715    Hearing Date: April 14, 2023    Dept: 55

JONES v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES                                                 19STCV41715

Hearing Date:  4/14/22,  Dept. 55

#5:   MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Defendant

RP:  Plaintiff

 

Summary

 

On 11/20/19, the Clerk filed the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging that Los Angeles Sheriff deputies committed misconduct, when Plaintiff was singled out because he is an African-American, there was no probable cause for arresting him, or putting him in handcuffs, and pointing a gun at him.

The causes of action are:

1. UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - FOURTH AMENDMENT

2. DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

3. VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

4. VIOLATION OF CAL. CIVIL CODE § 52.1 (B) - BANE ACT

5. WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF CELL PHONE IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - FOURTH AMENDMENT

6. VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - MONELL LIABILITY.

 

 

MP Positions

 

Moving party requests an order granting summary judgment, or adjudication, on the remaining claim-- Fourth Cause of Action under Civil Code § 52.1(b) for violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights-- for reasons including the following:

 

• Issue 1: As A Preliminary Matter, Plaintiff’s Civil Code § 52.1 Claim Based On

Purported Violations Of His Fourth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights During

The Brief Investigatory Stop and Detention Of Plaintiff, Is Properly Analyzed

Under The Fourth Amendment, Not The Fourteenth.

 

• Issue 2: The Brief Investigatory Detention of Plaintiff Was Supported By

Reasonable Suspicion To Believe He Had Committed A Burglary Based On The

Third Party’s 911 Call Reporting That She Believed She Was Witnessing Plaintiff

Burglarize a Mail Truck.

 

• Issue 3: The Only Force Used Against Plaintiff Was To Place Him In Handcuffs,

Force Which Undisputedly Did Not Cause Him Any Physical Injuries And, As

Such, Cannot Be Considered “Excessive” Force As A Matter Of Law.

 

• Issue 4: Plaintiff Was Not Subjected To An Unreasonable Search Of His

Cellphone Because Plaintiff Consented To Providing Deputies With His Passcode

So That They Could Call His Supervisor To Verify His Employment.

 

• Issue 5: Plaintiff Was Only Detained For As Long As It Took Responding LASD

Personnel To Confirm That Plaintiff Was, In Fact, A Probationary Employee Of

The USPS.

 

• Issue 6: Plaintiff’s Civil Code § 52.1 Claim Further Fails Because The Only

“Threat” Plaintiff Alleges Was The Purported “Threat” By LASD Deputy Cano

Which Is Not Tied To Any Constitutional Violation.

 

• Issue 7: Notwithstanding That Plaintiff’s Rights Were Not Violated, There Is No

Evidence Of Specific Intent By Any Of The LASD Personnel Who Responded To

The Dispatch Of A Possible Burglary In Progress To Violate Plaintiff’s Rights,

Which Is A Required Element Of A Civil Code § 52.1 Claim.

 

(Motion, pp. 2 – 3.)

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing party advocates denying, on bases including the following:

 

Plaintiff, a U.S. Postal Service (USPS) employee was on his street delivering

mail wearing a USPS uniform hat, an ID badge and a USPS satchel or mail bag.

Since his residence was not far from where he was delivering mail, he asked his

brother to bring him some snacks from his home, which the brother did. After getting

the snacks from his brother, plaintiff resumed delivering mail. Just then plaintiff saw

a police vehicle and as he turned around, he saw his brother on the ground. Plaintiff

and his brother were instructed to drop to the ground and put their hands behind their

backs. Plaintiff froze and was in shock. He dropped his satchel and sat on the ground

with hands behind his back. Deputy Doe 1 told him, “If you move, “I’m going to blow

your fucking head off.” Plaintiff became more terrified. Deputy Doe 1 called for a

back-up, Seconds later, six or more officers pulled up. Plaintiff tried to show his

postal hat, badge, satchel, and mail (to be delivered) but all attempts to prove he was

working for the U.S. Postal Service were ignored. Plaintiff and his brother were

singled out as African Americans. All visible evidence proving that he was a postal

employee were dropped on the sidewalk as defendants proceeded to detain/arrest and

handcuff plaintiff and his brother.

 

 A female deputy (Doe 2) exited her vehicle and forcefully put her knee on

plaintiff’s back putting all her weight on plaintiff’s back. Plaintiff was handcuffed

tightly and under gunpoint Doe 2 instructed him to move, but he recalled Doe 1 telling

him not to move or he would be shot. Plaintiff did not want to move fearing being

shot. Just then Doe 2 tried to pull him up at an awkward angle and upon realizing

plaintiff could not get up, Doe 2 dropped him back down, snatched off the postal hat

and cap. Doe 2 then started emptying plaintiff’s pockets and after she was done, she

stood him up and pressed him against the side of the deputies’ vehicle. Doe 2

continued frisking plaintiff, took plaintiff’s badge out, and continued to search and

threw plaintiff in the back of the vehicle. Plaintiff was then questioned why he had a scanner. Plaintiff was also commanded to provide the password to his cell phone so

they could go through his phone without a warrant. After the officers spoke with

plaintiff’s post office supervisor, he was released.

 

As a result of the unlawful search and seizure of defendants, plaintiff was

terminated from his job with the U.S. Postal service and was off work for some time.

He was eventually rehired after tedious administrative procedure. He also sustained

injuries and experienced pain and emotional distress from the way he was maltreated

by defendants while lawfully earning a living. This unfortunate illegal search and

seizure caused physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress as well

as post-traumatic stress symptoms on plaintiff.

 

(Opposition, pp. 2 – 3.)

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is denied.

The Court determines that there are triable issues of material fact, as to each issue raised, given evidence in opposition to the proof referenced in moving party’s separate statement, including whether Defendant’s officers threatened and committed violent acts that injured Plaintiff intentionally or recklessly to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional or statutory rights including liberty, and whether a reasonably competent officer of ordinary prudence would believe there was a strong suspicion of Plaintiff’s guilt, based initially upon a citizen’s report of theft, in light of strong indicators that Plaintiff was innocently working for United States Posta1 Service  (e.g., attorney Edna Wenning decl., filed 3/28/23, ex. 1 (Plaintiff Adonis Jones depo., pp. 60 (“I am trying to explain to him that I work for the Post Office. I show him my I.D. badge which is around my neck, my postal hat.”),  64 (“he told me no more words out of my mouth or he will blow my fucking brains off….”),  69 (“She put a lot of like dead body weight into the middle of my back as if she was trying to hurt me….”),  70 (“she pulled me up by just one arm and like kind of dragged me up and realized I couldn't be pulled up like that, so she dropped me….”),  71  (“I said, "Ouch . That hurts . It is hurting more….”),  76  (“The last time I remember seeing him pointing his gun at me is while the handcuffs….”),  79  (“Like al1 identification that said United States Posta1 Service was just over1ooked in that moment.”),  85 (“They picked up my phone, asked me for my password to contact my supervisor to see if I was telling the truth. I gave them the name of my supervisor.”),  90 (“that was the only way to be let go unless I wanted to be taken to jail,…”),  94  (“So I was just sitting there until they finally decided to let my brother go and let me go….”),  95 (“I would say I was in the car for about 30, 45 minutes.”),  125 (“The pain to the back of my back or the middle of my spine where she placed her knee.”),  127 (“I also went to Kaiser for those mental issues that I am still facing….”),  128 (“Insomnia and I went to therapy for the incident and they diagnosed me with PTSD.”).

“[T]he role of the court in summary judgment proceedings is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there exists a triable issue of material fact.”  Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 1306, 1342.  Arguments that relate to credibility and weight of evidence cannot prevent triable issues of fact.  Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1333.

The elements of Civil Code Section 52.1 (Bane Act) are:

  1. Defendant’s actual, or attempted, threats, intimidation, or coercion; 
  2. interference with plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional or statutory right;
  3. by threatening, or committing, violent acts;
  4. plaintiff reasonably believed that defendant would commit violence against plaintiff or plaintiff’s property if plaintiff exercised a constitutional or statutory right;
  5. defendant injured plaintiff or plaintiff’s property to prevent plaintiff from exercising a constitutional or statutory right, or to retaliate against plaintiff’s exercise of such rights;
  6. plaintiff was harmed;  and
  7. defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm.

Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 882;  Venegas v. County of L. A. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 843 ("[I]n pursuing relief for those constitutional violations under section 52.1, plaintiffs need not allege that defendants acted with discriminatory animus or intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.");  CC §52.1(a)-(b);  CACI 3025.  See also  Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959  (Bane Act (Civ. C. §52.1) was intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, where the act of interference with a constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful, beyond just any tort, such as negligence);  Murchison v. Cnty. of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal. App. 5th 867, 896  (Bane Act includes officers’ acts in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory rights).

Finally, Defendant’s heavy reliance on federal opinions is not persuasive, especially as to the subject California statute.  Federal case law is not binding upon California courts, and may be only persuasive in some circumstances.  Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 46, 61.  Courts are not free to depart from California Supreme Court precedent by applying different federal law.   Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 326, 333.  State courts are not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court based upon federal statutory or state law, as distinguished from constitutional law.  Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 709, 717;  East Quincy Services Dist. v. General Accident Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal. App.4th 239, 246 n. 31.