Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 20STCV09398, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV09398    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: 55

DREAM MOTOR CARS, INC. v.   ATLANTIC CASUALTY INS. CO.   20STCV09398

Hearing Date:  12/15/22,  Dept. 55

#5:   MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AMENDED COMPLAINT.

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

MP:  Defendants ARIES PREPARED BEEF COMPANY and FRED JOE SCHOLDER.

RP:  Petitioners DREAM MOTOR CARS, INC., AMIR FATEMI and FATEMI GHAZALEH; Respondent ATLANTIC CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.

Summary

On 3/9/20, petitioners filed a Petition.

On 6/20/22, petitioners filed a First Amended Petition, requesting declaratory relief regarding insurance benefits, after petitioners allegedly sustained property damage and personal injury in a multi-vehicle accident in August 2019, involving a car owned or driven by the Lunas respondents, added as DOE amendments on 8/16/21, after the petitioners' depositions were taken.

MP Positions

Moving parties request an order striking damages allegations barred by the two-year Statute of Limitations, in the First Amended Complaint, on grounds including the following:

·         The amended complaint's claims against defendants Aries and Scholder, for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiffs, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in California Civil Procedure Code section 335.1.

·         Plaintiffs' amended complaint -- the first pleading which attempted to state a cause of action against Aries Prepared Beef Company or Fred Joe Scholder-- was not filed until June 20, 2022, almost three years after the automobile accident occurred.

·         Plaintiffs' amended complaint merely added Aries and Scholder as defendants, and did not identify them as substitutes for previously named "Doe" defendants.

·         The original petition did not allege any charging allegations against the "Doe" defendants mentioned in the caption.

·         A defendant can only be substituted in for a "Doe" if the plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of that defendant's identity when the original petition was filed, but the original petition specifically identified Aries and Scholder by name, and alleged both their involvement in, and their culpability for, the automobile accident.

·         At the Case Management Conference held on October 2, 2020, almost a year before the "Doe" amendments were filed, the Court ordered that any "Doe" defendants who had not  yet been named or served were dismissed.

RP Positions

Opposing parties advocate denying, or continuing for hearing with petitioners’ motion for leave to amend the Complaint, for reasons including the following:

·         No statute of limitations ran.

·         Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on March 9, 2020 as a result of a multi-vehicle accident that occurred on August 23, 2019.

·         Plaintiffs filed Doe Amendments naming, inter alia, Aries and Scholder as defendants to this action. Plaintiffs filed these Doe Amendments on August 16, 2021, prior to the statute of limitations deadline, such that there is relation back to the date of the original Petition.

·         The question is whether Plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge and information to name Aries and Scholder as defendants in this lawsuit – which, at the time of filing the Complaint, they did not. This matter was initially filed as an insurance coverage dispute between Plaintiffs and defendants Atlantic, Wilshire, and Khazaie. During the course of discovery, Plaintiffs obtained information indicating that additional defendants, including Aries and Scholder, were liable for the injuries they allegedly sustained.

·         The Lunas also claim that this Court, in an October 2020 status conference order, ruled that all parties remaining unnamed or unserved were to be dismissed. The argument ignores the fact that the Court since approved a stipulation to continue trial that expressly acknowledges that new Defendants have been added, and based on the existence of new parties, states that all previous court-ordered deadlines running from trial are vacated.  Also, “unnamed (DOE) defendants shall not be dismissed or severed prior to the conclusion of the introduction of evidence at trial, except upon stipulation or motion of the parties.” (Gov. C. Section 68616(h).)

Tentative Ruling

The motion is denied.

Although the initially sued DOE defendants 1 through 5 are not named as such in the amended pleading caption, judicial notice of the DOE amendments filed 8/16/21 shows that moving parties are the same DOE defendants sufficiently alleged in charging allegations against them to be responsible for the accident  (e.g., First Amended Petition, 5:2-14). 

Charging allegations against DOE defendants to the effect that each is responsible is some manner for alleged occurrences supporting causes of action, are sufficient, and no more specificity is required.  Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933, 941-42.  Accord  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1143. 

Further, the initial Petition did not fully show that moving defendants caused the collision, in alleging indirect colliding—i.e., that they collided with another car, after the first vehicle ran through a stop sign, which caused the other car to spin into Petitioner’s car  (Petition, 3:2-10). 

An intervening act makes proving causation more complicated. “The proper classification of an intervening act as a concurrent cause or as a superseding cause presents a question of fact, which sometimes may be resolved on motion for summary judgment, but less often can be resolved on demurrer.”  Bigbee v. Sup. Ct. (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 451, 456  (“We think  the allegations of the second amended complaint are sufficient to pass the test of general demurrer.”)

Alleging DOE defendants’ liability is not required until sufficient information has been gathered such as via discovery procedures.  If claims were pled before obtaining justifying support, via investigating and discovery, complainants could be exposed to liability for malicious prosecution.  Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596.  A plaintiff properly can file a DOE amendment, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 474,  where the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the defendant's connection with the case or with the injuries, even if the plaintiff knew the defendant’s identity.  McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 942.  “‘Section 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until [she or] he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable.’”  GM Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 580, 595.  “[S]ection 474 does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading.”  GM Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 580, 596.  Accord  McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 937, 943. 

The filing of a valid DOE amendment means that the amendment relates back to the time of the original Complaint’s filing, for purposes of analyzing the Statute of Limitations. Woo v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 169, 176.     To preclude relation back via a DOE amendment based upon delay in identifying a DOE defendant, opposing parties must show that plaintiffs were dilatory, and that defendants were prejudiced by the delay.  Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal. App. 4th 933, 943. 

Finally, it is error to dismiss DOE defendants without an applicable procedure or basis, such as procedural defenses like lack of diligence in serving them.   Pierce v. San Mateo Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1021  (“we conclude only that the trial court erred in dismissing the case in its ‘entirety’ given the Doe defendant allegations.”).  A case management order may include dismissal or severance of unserved defendants from the action.  CRC Rule 3.728(8).  “Unnamed (DOE) defendants shall not be dismissed or severed prior to the conclusion of the introduction of evidence at trial, except upon stipulation or motion of the parties.”  Gov. C. §68616(h).  See also  2 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Courts § 316(9) (2021).  “At the final status conference, the court will consider severing for trial all unserved or recently served fictitiously named parties.”   L.A.S.C.L.R. 3.25(f)(4).