Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 20STCV09635, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV09635    Hearing Date: January 20, 2023    Dept: 55

PAREDES v. TRICOLOR CAL. AUTO GROUP, LLC             20STCV09635

Hearing Date: 1/20/23,  Dept. 55

#8:   MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Plaintiff.

RP:  Defendant TRICOLOR CALIFORNIA AUTO GROUP, LLC.

 

Summary

 

On 3/10/20, Plaintiff PEDRO DOMINGUEZ PAREDES filed a Complaint.

On 10/29/21, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that Defendant, doing business as “Ganas,” sold Plaintiff a 2009 GMC Sierra, in poor mechanical condition, and not really adequately inspected as part of its certification process, as advertised on its website.

The causes of action are:

1. VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, CIVIL CODE   § 1750, ET SEQ;

2. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION;

3. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION;

4, VIOLATION OF THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT, CIVIL CODE   § 1790, ET SEQ;

5. VIOLATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE   § 17200, ET SEQ.

6. VIOLATION OF VEHICLE CODE   § 11711.

 

MP Positions

 

Moving party requests an award of attorneys’ fees, on bases including the following:

 

·         The case was more than a simple Lemon Law case.  It dealt with the disclosure practices of a dealership that claimed it was not subject to California’s buy-here-pay-here laws.

·         Mr. Paredes would not have bought the vehicle for over 70% above the reasonable market value, if Defendant Ganas Auto had disclosed that information to him. (See Vehicle Code section 11950.)

·         The depositions were necessary to establish that Ganas Auto was a buy-here-pay-here dealership, and was not subject to the exception under Vehicle Code § 11713.18, and because Defendants maintained this position throughout the case up to trial, the Court should not strike or reduce the $23,564.00 in attorney’s fees attributed to depositions.

·         Plaintiff needed an expert to offer a valuation of the vehicle, and that he would need to rely on the valuations, it was reasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to incur time related to the retention and deposition of the expert. Accordingly, the Court should not strike the $8,137.60 in fees.

·         Defendants challenge $21,409.50 in fees they attribute to Plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion for summary adjudication. It is well-settled that a plaintiff may recover attorney fees for “unsuccessful” arguments. (See, e.g., Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 268, 273-74).

·         A .3 percent multiplier is justified.  Delay in payment of counsel is a recognized basis for a multiplier. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 822.)

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons including the following:

 

·         Request attorneys’ fees in the sum of $320,010.08 is unreasonable.

·         This action was a simple, garden-variety lemon law case, involving a used car with allegedly malfunctioning door locks and a “jerking” transmission.

·         The settlement that Plaintiff accepted was $15,000, plus Plaintiff’s return of the vehicle in exchange for a release of the amount of the loan balance.

·         Plaintiff could have received the same result, without incurring superfluous fees.

·         The case was overstaffed.

·         Challenged fees entries fall into three categories: (1) fees incurred in taking duplicative depositions, (2) fees incurred in connection with retaining an unnecessary valuation expert, and (3) fees incurred in unsuccessfully moving for summary adjudication. The amounts for each category are $23,564.00 (Deposition Fees), $8,137.60 (Expert Fees) and $21,409.50 (MSA Fees).

·         There is no basis for the Court to award Plaintiff a multiplier for working on a contingency basis. Instead, the Court should apply a negative multiplier of .66, to reduce Plaintiff’s requested fee award in an amount commensurate with the fact that only two out of the six claims he litigated allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is granted, as prayed.

 

            Depositions

The depositions were not duplicative, including because the similar topics highlighted were small excerpts from the deposition transcripts involving more content, and attorneys can explore the possibility of different answers from different deponents on the same topics.

“The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.”  Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State Etc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.  Discovery is allowed even if it is duplicative of other information already obtained.  Tbg Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 448;  Carter v. Sup. Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.

 

            Settlement Amount

Case law does not require attorney fee awards to be in proportion to awards in litigation.  Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1397.  Under the Song-Beverly Act, awards of attorney fees are limited to actual hours expended and reasonably incurred, and not based on the amount of the prevailing plaintiff's damages or recovery, or the fact of a contingency fee agreement.  Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112-1117. 

           

            Apportionment

 

The court lacks information to decide if attorneys’ fees were expended on some claims but not others.

Courts are not required to require moving parties to formally apportion their hours between claims for which attorney fees are compensable, or so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them, where there is a common legal, or factual, issue that links the claims.  Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133-34.  " 'Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff's various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.' " Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 159.  “[A]ttorney fees need not be reduced for work on unsuccessful claims if the claims ‘are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney's time into compensable and noncompensable units.’"  Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 328, 342. 

 

            Valuation Expert

The valuation expert is part of common attorney practice and may usefully help support a finding of damages.

“A judge may rule on the admissibility of the valuation methods used by experts, and if an expert uses a methodology not sanctioned by California law, the judge may exclude the expert's opinion.”  Examples of Permissible Testimony:, Cal. Judges Benchbook Civ. Proc. Trial § 8.88 (citing City of San Diego v Barratt Am. Inc. (2005) 128 CA4th 917, 936-37 (valuation expert opinion may be excluded in part or in whole in courts’ discretion)).

 

            Unsuccessful Motion.

Attorneys’ fees are allowed for unsuccessful motions.  Also, defendants similarly made an unsuccessful summary judgment/summary adjudication motion that was denied on 3/23/22.  Further, Plaintiff’s motion was partially successful, on 3/15/22--  The motion was denied as to the CLRA Cause of Action, but granted as to the 18th Affirmative Defense that Defendant had conceded.

Proof that parties were unsuccessful on particular motions is not tantamount to a demonstration that such expenses were unreasonably incurred. Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200. 

 

            Overstaffing

There was no overstaffing, considering the novelty and complexity of buy-here-pay-here laws applied in this case, which involved extra, time-consuming research efforts also by the Court.

Distinguishably, a court “ ‘indicated a fee reduction was warranted because it was unreasonable to have so many lawyers staffing a … case that did not present complex or unique issues, did not involve discovery motions, and did not go to trial.’ ”  Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 253.  “[I]t is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal. App. 5th 24, 39.

 

            Multiplier

The small multiplier is justified, because the novelty and complexity of buy-here-pay-here laws, and the delay in obtaining payment of attorneys’ fees.

“The award of a multiplier is in the end a discretionary matter largely left to the trial court.”  Hogar v. Community Development Com'n of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371.  “[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement for exceptional skill, novelty of the questions involved, or other factors. Rather, applying a multiplier is discretionary.”   Rey v. Madera Unif. Sch. Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242.