Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 20STCV29246, Date: 2022-10-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV29246 Hearing Date: October 28, 2022 Dept: 55
SHASHA
ZHENG v. XIUYUAN HU 20STCV29246
Hearing Date: 10/28/22,
Dept. 55
#7: MOTION
FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendant/Cross-Complainant
RP:
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Summary
On 8/3/20, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant SHASHA ZHENG filed
a Complaint alleging: Starting August 2,
2017, the day after the parties stated date of marriage separation, Defendant/Cross-Complainant
XIUYUAN HU withdrew $13,314.16 total from bank accounts that Defendant orally
agreed were her separate property acquired outside of marriage, and Plaintiff
relied on Defendant’s representations as a knowledgeable law student, regarding
filing a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Marriage based on having no
community assets. Further, Defendant
inflicted emotional distress when he falsely emailed to Plaintiff’s employer
that Plaintiff had faked practicing her employing entity’s religion, and that
Plaintiff hacked Defendant's email and was engaged in espionage for the Chinese
government.
The Plaintiff’s causes of action are:
1. FRAUD
2. CONVERSION
3. UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
4. DEFAMATION
5. INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
On 2/1/21, Defendant XIUYUAN HU filed a
Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and counsel STEPHEN M. MARTIN, alleging that
MARTIN knew the statements in his press release pertaining to the Complaint are
false, and ZHENG and MARTIN are the authors or principals of agents who wrote
an article and recorded a YouTube video, containing defamatory statements about
HU, and ZHENG withdrew some of HU’s money from their joint account.
Cross-Complainant’s claims are:
1. LIBEL
2. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
3. CONVERSION
4. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
5. PRELIMINARY AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
MP
Positions
Moving party requests an order imposing terminating and
monetary ($5,261.65) sanctions against Plaintiff, on bases including the
following:
·
Plaintiff failed to comply with the
Court’s discovery order dated June 7, 2022.
·
Zheng provided unacceptably inadequate
supplemental responses that only created additional questions.
·
Zheng stated in her supplemental discovery
response that “a friend assisted her and had the August 11th document posted on
SINA WEIBO,” but she has refused to provide any identifying information of her
“friend” or produce any responsive documents relating to their communications
with the media. Zheng’s “friend” is at least a material fact witness and
potentially a co-cross-defendant.
·
Zheng has essentially copied and pasted
her previous inadequate discovery responses pertaining to her religious faith,
and retaliation against her former student Victoria Couch over disability
accommodations. As Zheng’s claim of IIED is entirely based on a letter Hu wrote
to her employer in 2018 which specifically questioned her religious faith and
retaliation of her former student Victoria Couch. Since Zheng contends that
such allegations are false and outrageous, she has put her religious faith and
retaliation of Victoria Couch over disability accommodations at issue.
·
Zheng had been criticized by her
supervisor in pertinent sections of her annual faculty evaluation for not
accepting Christ and building a Christian faith. See Hu’s Decl. ¶20. Hence,
Zheng must produce the pertinent sections of her annual faculty evaluations
touching upon her Christian faith or the lack thereof during the course of her
marriage with the Cross-Claimant.
RP
Positions
Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons
including the following:
·
Plaintiff properly responded to
interrogatories and document requests.
·
Objections were proper as to document
request number 27. Issues regarding
Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are not relevant.
Truth is not a defense to the Defendant’s attempt to inflict emotional distress
upon Plaintiff and possibly even cause her termination from employment.
·
Objections were proper as to document
request numbers 23, 24, 25 and 28. Issues
regarding Plaintiff’s former student Victoria Couch are not relevant to this
litigation. Any records relating to the student would be private education
records and the student would have to be notified of an opportunity to object.
Tentative
Ruling
The motion is denied.
There was no disobeying a discovery order. Specifically, the June 7, 2022 order
compelling further responses so that they contained elements specified in the
Discovery Act, did not include any order requiring detail about a friend or overruling
objections, but instead stated, “some of the discovery objections may have
merit.”
A way of seeking such an order compelling responses
could have been to file a timely motion to compel further supplemental
responses. Motions to compel further responses as to interrogatories and
document requests must be served 45 days from the date of the original, or
supplemental, responses. CCP
§§2030.300(c), 2031.310(c).
Where a party willfully disobeys a discovery order,
courts have discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidence or monetary
sanctions. E.g., CCP
§§2023.010(g), 2030.290(c); R.S.
Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486,
495.
“Mere speculation as to the possibility that some
portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not
suffice” for showing direct relevance as to private information sought in
discovery. Davis v. Sup. Ct.
(1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1017-20 (directing trial court to grant motion to
quash as to discovery request that was not narrowly drawn to enable the court
to evaluate the appropriate extent of disclosure). Absent showings of direct relevance,
compelling need, and unavailability of alternative sources, a trial court only
could find that a privacy interest prevails.
Ombudsman Services of No. Cal. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
1233, 1251, disapproved on other grounds by Williams
v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 557.
“In those situations where it is argued that a party
waives protection by filing a lawsuit, the court must construe the concept of
‘waiver’ narrowly and a compelling public interest is demonstrated only where
the material sought is directly relevant to the litigation.” Tylo v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 55 Cal. App.
4th 1379, 1387.
Under state law, school institutions cannot permit
access to student private records (i.e., information directly related to students
and maintained by educational institutions) absent written parental consent or
a court order, and, under preemptive federal law, schools may lose federal
funding, if ordered to disclose redacted records after an in camera inspection,
with limited exceptions (i.e., crime victims, crime determinations, legitimate
educational interest in student’s behavior, and disclosure to parent or
guardian re alcohol or controlled substance).
Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 104 Cal.
App. 4th 1393, 1396-98 (citing, e.g.,
Educ. C. §§48918, 49076, and 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)). See
also Poway Unif. Sch. Dist. v.
Sup.Ct. (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1507 (Like FERPA, Education Code section
49061(b) broadly defines pupil records, and prohibits release upon written
parental consent or a judicial order).
There is a privacy interest as to educational records
maintained, in the normal course of business by a school custodian, including
registration, schedules, transcripts and discipline. BRV, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2006) 143 Cal.
App. 4th 742, 754 ("A pupil record is one that ‘directly relates’ to a
student and is ‘maintained’ by the school.").
A third party must be notified (e.g., by letter or
e-mail), and given an opportunity to either consent or object, before discovery
responses revealing their private information, and the parties cannot waive
such rights of third parties. Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561-62; Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 374-75; DOE 2
v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1521.
There is a privacy interest as to one's personnel
files. BRV, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 742, 756; Teamsters
Local 856 v. Priceless, LLC (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1515, disapproved
on other grounds by Int’l Fed. of
Prof. and Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 42
Cal.4th 319, 336.
Discovery sanctions are not to be imposed for
punishment, but instead are used to encourage a fair disclosure of discovery to
prevent unfairness resulting from the lack of information. Electronic Funds
Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal. App. 4th 1161, 1183; McGinty v. Sup. Ct. (1994) 26 Cal.
App. 4th 204, 214; Midwife v. Bernal (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 57, 64, superseded on other grounds as stated
in Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 967, 971.