Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 21STCV37648, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37648 Hearing Date: September 8, 2022 Dept: 55
SU
MIN LEE v. REFLUX 21STCV37648
Hearing Date: 9/8/22,
Dept. 55
#12: MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendant
RP:
Plaintiff
Summary
On 10/12/21, Plaintiff SU MIN LEE filed a Complaint.
On 2/2/22, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint.
On 6/27/22, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint, alleging: “Defendants
violated the Pregnancy Disability Leave and the California Family Rights Act by,
inter alia, refusing the reinstate Plaintiff to her prior position or a
comparable position, and by terminating her employment before she was scheduled
to return to work.” (Second Amended
Complaint, ¶ 17.)
The cause of action is: 1) WRONGFUL
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY.
MP
Positions
·
Plaintiff’s operative complaint states
nothing but an alleged violation of public policy based on Defendant’s
ostensible failure to reinstate Plaintiff following her pregnancy.
·
There are no other facts to consider
malice, fraud or oppression.
·
The only change in Plaintiff’s SAC is
paragraph 22, which states, again, as a matter of conclusion, that Defendant
acted “with willful and wanton disregard...”
RP Positions
Opposing party advocates an order not striking
allegations, on bases including the following:
·
Punitive damages are proper for Wrongful
Termination in Violation of Public Policy.
·
Sufficient facts were pled to show the
requisite malice and oppression, by denying completion of maternity leave for
no given reason (SAC ¶¶ 19-22).
·
Plaintiff has properly pleaded her case
for discrimination based on her protected pregnancy status.
Tentative
Ruling
The motion is denied.
Twenty days to file an Answer.
The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that
Defendant deprived Plaintiff of her full three months of maternity leave, and
provided no justification, which constitutes a conscious disregard for employee
rights, beyond just wrongful termination (SAC ¶¶ 12 -14.)
Specific facts are not required. “In order to survive a motion to strike an
allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to
such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”
Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255. Accord
Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th
1004, 1055; Blegen v. Sup. Ct.
(1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962.
Punitive damages are available in actions based on
FEHA or violations of public policy. Commodore
Home Systems v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220; Wilson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 267, 273; Bihun v.
AT&T Info. Systems (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 996, overruled on other grounds by Lakin
v. Watkins Associated Ind. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664; Roberts v. Ford Aerospace &
Communication Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 798; Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
895, 911-12; Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1128, 1158-59; Myers v. Trendwest
Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1435 ("A court can award
Civil Code section 3294 punitive damages in an FEHA case."). “[W]rongful termination, without more, will
not sustain a finding of malice or oppression.”
Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc.
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717. Cf. Turman v. Turning Point of
Central Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 64 (“Appellant persists that
the punitive damages allegations are adequately pled, relying primarily on the
underlying facts associated with the cause of action for gender discrimination.
However, as pled in this complaint, such facts do not rise to the level of
malice, oppression or fraud necessary under Civil Code section 3294 to state a
claim for punitive damages.”).