Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV03626, Date: 2023-04-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV03626 Hearing Date: April 12, 2023 Dept: 55
MENDOZA
v. FELIX CHEVROLET, LP 22STCV03626
Hearing Date: 4/12/23, Dept. 55
#: MOTION TO
COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES FROM DEFENDANT, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS –
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Plaintiffs.
RP:
Defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC.
Summary
On 1/28/22, Plaintiffs filed a Lemon Law Complaint alleging
that, on 9/3/18, Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with Defendant GENERAL
MOTORS (Defendant) regarding a 2018 Chevrolet Malibu, which had nonconformities
remaining unrepaired after a reasonable number of attempts.
MP
Moving parties request an order compelling Defendant
to provide further responses to and overrule Defendant’s objections to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production of Documents (Requests), and
awarding $2,685.00 sanctions, on grounds including the following:
·
Defendant provided inadequate responses to
Plaintiffs’ Requests seeking information regarding Defendant’s policies and
procedures for evaluating repurchase requests and technical service bulletins.
·
Plaintiff made two attempts to meet and
confer to request Defendant provide further responses to their Requests.
·
Defendant failed to provide a meaningful
response or further responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests.
·
Defendant should be compelled to provide
further responses to the Requests with a new set of the documents previously
produced with titles of the documents and an index of which request each
document is produced in response to.
·
Plaintiffs’ Requests fall into categories:
(1) Defendant’s policy and procedures regarding repurchases (requests nos. 16,
19-29, and 42); (2) the workshop manual for the Subject Vehicle (request no.
17); (3) technical service bulletins (requests nos. 30-31); (4) symptom and
repair codes for vehicles of the same make, model, and year of the Subject
Vehicle (request nos. 34-35); (5) and customer complaints from 2019 to present
(request no. 36). (Separate Statement, pp. 3-104).
·
The Requests are relevant to their claims
because category (1) documents could support a claim for civil penalties or
punitive damages and category (3) documents could support a claim for civil
penalties or punitive damages or refute an affirmative defense of misuse.
·
Defendant should be compelled to provide
further responses to the Requests to which Defendant objected with the identity
of any document to which the objection is being made.
·
Defendant’s objections should be overruled
because the categories (1) and (3) are relevant; categories (1)-(5) are
reasonably particularized and specific; categories (1)-(5) are not unduly
burdensome and oppressive; and Defendant has not established good cause for
asserting trade secret information or attorney-client or work product
privileges.
RP Positions
Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons
including the following:
·
Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant to produce
documents for 19 requests for production, going far beyond the scope of the
claims and defenses in this case, which concern only the specific Malibu that
Plaintiffs bought.
·
Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant to
produce documents about topics concerning other customers and other vehicles
that are not at issue here, and general policies and procedures that are
inapplicable.
·
Plaintiffs failed to properly meet and
confer.
·
Defendant has agreed to or has already
produced additional documents requested with regard to categories (1)-(3).
·
The breadth of Plaintiffs’ Categories
invites production of trade secret material.
·
Sanctions are not justified by any
discovery misconduct.
Reply Positions
·
Defendant’s corporate policies and
procedures are relevant because they could support a claim for civil penalties
or punitive damages.
·
Plaintiffs’ requests are narrowly tailored
and are not overboard because they limit the requests to the make, model, and year
of Plaintiffs’ vehicle and limit them to documents from 2018 to present.
·
Defendant has not shown an undue burden.
·
Defendant has not proved trade secret
protection because they did not move for a protective order and fail to provide
any facts to support their contention.
·
Defendant has not served supplemental
responses to after agreeing to produce additional documents subject to entry of
a protective order.
·
Sanctions are warranted because
Defendant’s refusal to produce documents was without merit.
Tentative
Ruling
The motion to compel is granted in part as to compelling
further responses to requests nos. 16-17, 19-29, 30-31, and 42, denied in part
as to requests nos. 34 to 36, and denied as to monetary sanctions (the Court
finding substantial justification as to some issues).
Objections
Where a party serves a
timely discovery response stating
attorney-client or work-product objections, without a privilege log or
facts justifying the objections, the appropriate procedure is to grant a motion
to compel further responses having particularized identification of documents
as to which the privilege is asserted, and the justifying facts. Best
Product, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188-89; People
ex rel. Lockyer v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1073-75
(“no obligation to produce a privilege log at all, unless ordered to do so by
the court upon a motion by a party seeking such a document.”). “[L]egislation
amended subdivision (c)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240 to
require the preparation of a privilege log ‘if necessary’ to ‘provide
sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits’ of a
claim of privilege or protected work product.” Bank of Amer., N.A. v. Sup.
Ct. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098.
“Even where a party
deems a demand to be objectionable, he [she, or it] still must identify those
items which fall into the category of item in the demand to which an objection
is being made.” Standon Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 898, 901
n.3.
Defendant’s objections are improper because they fail
to identify the items which fall into the category being objected to. Defendant
is ordered to provide further responses to requests nos. 16-17, 19-29, 30-31,
and 42 identifying the items which fall into each category which is being
objected to. Further, Defendant is ordered to provide further responses to
requests nos. 16, 19-29, and 42 with particularized identification of documents
as to which the attorney-client or work-product privileges are being asserted
and the justifying facts.
Motion
Granted in Part
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted in part as to
requests nos. 16-17, 19-29, 30-31, and 42 because such categories of documents
are relevant and Defendant has failed to prove its burden that the documents
are protected as trade secrets.
Relevance
The categories of documents are relevant because they
are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendant appears to concede that the documents in these categories are relevant
because they have agreed to produce responsive documents.
Trade
Secrets
The party asserting trade-secret objections has the burden
to establish their existence. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1390; Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter
Group) 2021 §8:129.1. Evidence Code Section 1061(b)(1) requires parties seeking
protective orders in criminal cases to submit an affidavit based on personal
knowledge listing qualifications to opine, identifying alleged trade secrets
and documents disclosing trade secrets, and showing qualifications of trade
secrets, and that section should be followed in a civil action. Stadish
v. Sup. Ct (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1144-1145. It is error
to delegate to parties the task of determining which items contain trade
secrets. Id. at 1144. See also
Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318 (“assuming
… courts may in appropriate circumstances issue an umbrella protective order
that allows the parties to designate as confidential documents produced in
discovery …, the declaration submitted in support of … motion for such a
protective order was entirely conclusory ….”).
The Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden
to prove trade secrets at this time because the declaration submitted in
support is not based on personal knowledge for the relevant time period. Specifically,
Defendant’s declaration of Huizen Lu, dated in 2018, clearly does not address
identified documents of all those requested in this case filed years later in
2023.
Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted in part
as to requests nos. 16-17, 19-29, 30-31, and 42 because such categories of
documents are relevant, and Defendant has failed to prove its burden that the
documents are protected as trade secrets.
Motion
Denied in Part
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is
denied in part as to nos. 34-36 because they are not relevant to Plaintiffs’
claims.
As for whether
documentation from other car purchases, beyond Plaintiffs’, is discoverable,
there is no governing California case on point.
Plaintiffs may rely on opinions that did
not involve any issue about scope of discovery in automobile defect cases. E.g., Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 334, 346 (in support of punitive damages, based on
concealment, plaintiffs needed evidence that, prior to purchase of the vehicle,
the defendant manufacturer was aware of a defect it was either unwilling or
unable to repair); Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
967, 996 (“the trial court had to impose terminating sanctions once it was
learned during trial that Bentley still had failed to comply with discovery
orders and directives and Bentley's misuse of the discovery process was even
worse than previously known.”); Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (“Ford asserts the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied Ford's in limine motions to exclude evidence of other vehicles and of
the nonwarranty repair. We have already concluded the court did not abuse its
discretion….”). Another oft-cited opinion, while addressing penalties based
upon evidence of automobile repair policies, did not address discovery, or
plaintiff’s evidence of actual handling of other consumers’ individual
complaints. See Oregel v. American
Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 (“evidence would permit
a jury to infer that Isuzu impedes and resists efforts by a consumer to force
Isuzu to repurchase a defective car, regardless of the presence of an
unrepairable defect, and that Isuzu's decision to reject Oregel's demand was
made pursuant to Isuzu's policies rather than to its good faith and reasonable
belief….”). Plaintiffs sometimes cite an opinion inapplicable to discovery,
which instead decided admissibility of former deposition testimony. See Berroteran v. Sup. Ct. (2019)
41 Cal. App. 5th 518, 536 (“the former testimony concerned Ford’s 6.0-liter
diesel engine, policies and procedures for warranty claims,… For all these
reasons, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Ford’s motion to
exclude the entire depositions ….”). Similarly, defendants may rely on an
unhelpful opinion, which did not address whether discovery regarding other
vehicles is proper, but distinguishably ruled that a plaintiff failed to show
prejudice by not having such discovery available for trial. See MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045 ("He also argues courts have
found relevant discovery requests seeking a car manufacturer's warranty
policies and procedures, policies on buyback requests, and other customer
complaints. Yet he does not show that, in this case, had the trial court
compelled responses to his requests or denied the protective order, it is
reasonably probable the jury would have found Mercedes-Benz willfully failed to
repurchase or replace his car."). Another opinion involved trial, not
discovery, and addressed no evidence of other customers, but did mention
evidence types in relation to the plaintiff customer, only. See Kwan
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185, 186
(Civil Code Section 1794 civil penalty for a willful violation may be shown if,
“evidence showed … [the manufacturer] failed to investigate the repair history of
the car,” “if the manufacturer reasonably believed the product did
conform to the warranty, or a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been
made, or the buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or
refund,” or, if there was a “lack of a written policy,” ). [Emphases
added.]
Finally, the Defendant’s reliance on other trial
judges’ rulings is unpersuasive.
Trial court rulings are not binding precedent. E.g.,
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 738. Rulings
in other trial court cases are irrelevant absent some additional showing like
the elements of claim or issue preclusion. Drummond v. Desmarais (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 439, 448.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is denied as to
requests nos. 34 to 36 as the categories are not relevant to their claims.
Sanctions
Additionally, monetary sanctions are mandatory as to
parties losing discovery motions, unless courts find substantial justification
or other injustice. E.g., Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona
Assocs., L.P. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557-58. “
‘[S]ubstantial justification” has been understood to mean that a justification
is clearly reasonable because it is well-grounded in both law and fact.” Doe
v. U.S. Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434.
There was substantial justification for each party as
each party prevailed on parts of their arguments in support of and in
opposition to the motion to compel.
The motion to compel further responses is granted in
part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to requests nos. 16-17,
19-29, 30-31, and 42, denied as to requests nos. 34 to 36, and denied as to
monetary sanctions.