Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV12390, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV12390    Hearing Date: September 14, 2022    Dept: 55

BORGEL v. THE GOLDIE APPEL ADMIN. TRUST                            22STCV12390 

Hearing Date:  9/14/22,  Dept. 55

#8:   MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Defendant MCM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.

RP:  Plaintiffs.

 

 

Summary

 

On 4/12/22, plaintiffs MELISSA BORGEL and RAWLES ASKEW filed a Complaint alleging that they were tenants living in untenantable conditions at residential property (roof ripped open and dust and debris including nails and asbestos), those conditions lasted unrepaired for 5 months, and the bedroom ceiling collapsed on them while sleeping in bed, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ repeated complaints to the owner and manager defendants.

The causes of action are:

1. NEGLIGENT BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY;

2. INTENTIONAL BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY;

3. NUISANCE (NEGLIGENT);

4. NUISANCE (INTENTIONAL);

5. NEGLIGENCE;

6. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS;

7. BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT - WRONGFUL CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION;

8. NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF STATUTORY DUTY;

9. INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF STATUTORY DUTY.

 

 

MP Positions

 

Moving parties request an order striking allegations re “defendants” and punitive damages from the Complaint, on grounds including the following:

 

·         Plaintiffs failed to define the term "defendants," making the Complaint uncertain where plaintiffs allege that "defendants" have knowledge of something, participated in or committed any of the acts alleged.

·         Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a punitive damages claim, which must instead be alleged specifically.

·         With respect to a corporation (like Defendant), the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or a direct act of oppression, fraud or malice, must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent.

·         Plaintiffs inadequately allege that Defendant had knowledge of substandard conditions described.

·         Due process requires that a defendant have “fair notice of not only the conduct the will subject [it] to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 712.  See also   Wiley v. Rhodes (1990) 223 Cal. App.3d 1470, 1474.)

 

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing parties advocate denying, or leave to amend, for reasons including the following:

 

·         Uncertainty is not an authorized ground for a motion to strike.

·         All defendants are sufficiently named in every cause of action.

·         Plaintiffs alleged ultimate facts supporting punitive damages, as required.

·         The Complaint sufficiently alleges untenantable conditions at the property (roof ripped open and dust and debris including nails and asbestos), and that those conditions lasted unrepaired notwithstanding plaintiffs’ repeated complaints.

·         The Complaint sufficiently alleges actions done by officers, directors and managerial agents of defendants, and with the authorization or ratification of defendants.

·         Case law related to due-process notice of punitive damages for defaults, is inapplicable to pleading punitive damages.     

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is denied.

Twenty days to answer.

 

            “Defendants” Reference

 

A motion to strike on the ground of uncertainty is procedurally improper, but instead a demurrer is the prescribed procedure. Allerton v. King (1929) 96 Cal. App. 230, 234;  B.F.G. Builders v. Weisner & Coover Co., (1962) 206 Cal. App. 2d 752, 759 (“A motion to strike is not a proper substitute for a special demurrer.”).

Also, the ground of uncertainty does not lie as to which defendant committed the alleged conduct, where the pleading alleges that all defendants were responsible. Dillard v. County of Kern (1943) 23 Cal. 2d 271, 279  (“The complaint charges all the defendants and their agents and servants with having negligently operated . . . the truck. Liberality in pleading compels the conclusion that the demurrer should not have been sustained. Defendants were in a superior position to know….”).  Alleging conduct of defendants and each of them was sufficient to charge each with liability.  Lee v. Escrow Consultants, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 915, 925.

 

 

            Punitive Damages

 

Ultimate facts regarding lessor’s and manager’s long-known roof being ripped open, and eventual roof collapse on lessees while sleeping, are sufficiently alleged  (e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 10 – 16).  An open or collapsing roof is a condition risking probable harm to the people inside.

Depending on the circumstances, tenants may recover punitive damages related to breach of the warranty of habitability.  Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 916–917, 922;  and Rivera v. Sassoon (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1046-47 (allowing punitive damages, and stating:  “The building and health code violations found on the property included hazardous electrical wiring, seepage of raw sewage under the buildings due to broken plumbing, infestation of rats, termites and other vermin, broken and deteriorated doors and windows, lack of hot and cold running water, lack of heat, leaking roofs and leaking plumbing fixtures.”).

A tort involving negligence, together with conduct or omissions that one knows or should know probably will result in harm, can support an award of punitive damages.  Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286-88 (defendant's inattention to danger showed a complete lack of concern for the likelihood of personal injuries at defendant’s premises). “To support an award of punitive damages on the basis of conscious disregard of the safety of others, a plaintiff ‘must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.’ ” Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867 (citing Taylor v. Sup. Ct. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–96).

Additionally, managerial agents’ participation is sufficiently alleged with typical, general allegations (e.g., Complaint, ¶ 9).

Alleging that persons acted "with the permission and consent" of all defendants including corporate defendants is sufficient to plead corporate employer liability for punitive damages. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806 (“it was alleged that the misrepresentations were made by persons who acted ‘with the permission and consent’ of all the defendants. For the purpose of meeting a general demurrer, this was a sufficient allegation that the corporations had authorized their agent's acts; a corporation is liable for punitive damages when it authorizes the wrongful act.”);  Kisesky v. Carpenters’ Trust (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d  222, 235 (allegations of agents acting in scope of employment with employer’s permission and consent were sufficient).  See also generally  Scannell v. County of Riverside (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 614 (insufficiency where a complete failure to plead acts done with the knowledge or under express direction or ratification of officer, director or managing agent);  United W. Medical Ctrs. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 500, 505 n. 2 (dicta re sufficiency being questionable where a complete failure to allege authorization, ratification, or conduct by managerial agent).  

Further, the due process required at the pleading stage, is ultimate facts. 

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255.  Accord Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1055;  Blegen v. Sup. Ct.  (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962.