Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV13824, Date: 2023-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13824    Hearing Date: March 3, 2023    Dept: 55

GARCIA v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,                                      22STCV13824

Hearing Date:  3/3/23,  Dept. 55.

#7:   MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS SET ONE AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 2031.320(b) AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS LLC and ERSKINE LAW GROUP, PC. IN THE AMOUNT OF $ 1,791.65.

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

MP:  Plaintiff

RP:  Defendant

Summary

On 4/26/22, Plaintiff ARTURO GARCIA filed a Lemon Law Complaint alleging that he purchased a new 2017 Chevrolet Silverado having manufacturing defects, including vehicle shaking and vehicle hesitating to start, which Defendant's authorized dealerships were unable to repair.

MP Positions

Moving party requests an order compelling Defendant to serve further responses to certain document requests, and imposing monetary sanctions, on grounds including the following:

·         As detailed in the Separate Statement, Defendant General Motors LLC should be required to provide further responses, as to items 13-16 and 34-35 of Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents.

·         Defendant's failure to provide substantive responses and verifications to these document is without substantial justification.

·         Defendant's counsel has not responded to Plaintiff's Meet and Confer letter dated September 8, 2022.

RP Positions

Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons including the following:

·         Defendant already produced all documents relevant to Plaintiff’s own claims. 

·         This breach of warranty case is about Plaintiff’s Silverado and GM’s repairs of that Silverado under warranty. Complaints by other vehicle owners are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that GM failed to repair his Silverado within a reasonable number of attempts.

·         GM objected to Plaintiff’s requests to the extent that they sought admissions about (1) topics, and issues beyond and/or unrelated to the components of the subject vehicle about which Plaintiff made allegations in the Complaint; (2) information and documents that were protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or Section 2034.010 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (3) information and documents that were confidential, proprietary, competitively sensitive, and/or trade secret.

·         Request for Production Nos. 13-16 seek documents concerning not just Plaintiff’s repairs and complaints, but other consumers’ complaints and vehicles. Plaintiff has asserted breach of warranty claims, not product liability claims.

·         Nos. 13-16 impermissibly put the onus on GM to determine the scope of the so-called “conditions, defects or nonconformities” that Plaintiff has alleged.

·         Nevertheless, GM is willing to supplement its document production to include other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s complaints concerning the alleged defects, for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle  (opposition, 5:21).

·         Request for Production Nos. 34-35 seek all technical service bulletins.  GM is willing to produce available TSBs, as they relate to the pending claims and defenses of this matter, upon Plaintiff’s reasonable request. However, Plaintiff has refused to narrow the scope of these requests to information relevant to this instant matter  (opposition, 6:7).

·         The requests demand production of some confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information that may contain trade secrets, and shown by an opposing expert declaration.

·         Plaintiff’s meet-and-confer letter did not try to resolve any disputes. Plaintiff’s letter also did not address Request for Production Nos. 34-35.

·         Sanctions may not be awarded if the responding party acted with substantial justification. Plaintiff served facially overbroad requests that exceed the scope of the parties’ claims and defenses. Plaintiff ignored GM’s efforts without truly engaging GM in any “meet and confer” process.

Tentative Ruling

The motion is granted as to compelling document request numbers 34 (service bulletins) and 35 (recalls), denied as to numbers 13 (repurchases from other customers), 14 (complaints from other customers), 15  (reports of other customers) and 16 (complaints from other customers), and denied as to sanctions (the Court finding substantial justification).

Defendant’s responses already agreed in part to produce documents in response to numbers 34 and 35.  Additionally, the Court compels Defendant to serve further responses identifying all documents withheld as to requests 34 and 35, so that compliance and objections can be soundly evaluated.  “Even where a party deems a demand to be objectionable, he [she, or it] still must identify those items which fall into the category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.”  Standon Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 898, 901 n.3.

As for requests numbers 13-through-16, and whether documentation from other car purchases, beyond Plaintiff’s, is discoverable, there is no governing California case on point. 

Plaintiffs may rely on opinions that did not involve any issue about scope of discovery in automobile defect cases.  E.g.,  Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334, 346  (in support of punitive damages, based on concealment, plaintiffs needed evidence that, prior to purchase of the vehicle, the defendant manufacturer was aware of a defect it was either unwilling or unable to repair);   Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc.  (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 996  (“the trial court had to impose terminating sanctions once it was learned during trial that Bentley still had failed to comply with discovery orders and directives and Bentley's misuse of the discovery process was even worse than previously known.”);  Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (“Ford asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ford's in limine motions to exclude evidence of other vehicles and of the nonwarranty repair. We have already concluded the court did not abuse its discretion….”). 

Another oft-cited opinion, while addressing penalties based upon evidence of automobile repair policies, did not address discovery, or plaintiff’s evidence of actual handling of other consumers’ individual complaints.  See  Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105  (“evidence would permit a jury to infer that Isuzu impedes and resists efforts by a consumer to force Isuzu to repurchase a defective car, regardless of the presence of an unrepairable defect, and that Isuzu's decision to reject Oregel's demand was made pursuant to Isuzu's policies rather than to its good faith and reasonable belief….”).

Similarly, defendants may rely on an unhelpful opinion, which did not address whether discovery regarding other vehicles is proper, but distinguishably ruled that a plaintiff failed to show prejudice by not having such discovery available for trial.  See  MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045  ("He also argues courts have found relevant discovery requests seeking a car manufacturer's warranty policies and procedures, policies on buyback requests, and other customer complaints. Yet he does not show that, in this case, had the trial court compelled responses to his requests or denied the protective order, it is reasonably probable the jury would have found Mercedes-Benz willfully failed to repurchase or replace his car.").  Another opinion involved trial, not discovery, and addressed no evidence of other customers, but did mention evidence types in relation to the plaintiff customer, only.  See  Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 185, 186  (Civil Code Section 1794 civil penalty for a willful violation may be shown if, “evidence showed … [the manufacturer] failed to investigate the repair history of the car,” “if the manufacturer reasonably believed the product did conform to the warranty, or a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been made, or the buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or refund,” or, if there was a “lack of a written policy,” ).  [Emphases added.]

An opinion, addressing a judgment after a jury trial (although not discovery), indicates that proof as to manufacturer’s ongoing, general policies, as they affect other consumers, generally, can be relevant to support findings regarding penalties, as indicated by the following opinion excerpt:

Additionally, the jury could conclude that Isuzu's policy, which requires a part be replaced or adjusted before Isuzu deems it a repair attempt but excludes from repair attempts any visit during which a mechanic searches for but is unable to locate the source of the problem (see fn. 11, ante), is unreasonable and not a good faith effort to honor its statutory obligations to repurchase defective cars…. Finally, there was evidence that Isuzu adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act…. This latter evidence would permit a jury to infer that Isuzu impedes and resists efforts by a consumer to force Isuzu to repurchase a defective car, regardless of the presence of an unrepairable defect, and that Isuzu's decision to reject Oregel's demand was made pursuant to Isuzu's policies rather than to its  good faith and reasonable belief the car did not have an unrepairable defect covered by the warranty or that a reasonable number of attempts to effect a repair had not yet occurred.

Oregel v. Amer. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105.  [Emphases added.]

An opinion addressing penalties, sometimes cited by defendants, did not address whether policies or other purchases would be discoverable or admissible at trial  See Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186  (“MBNA was entitled to an instruction informing the jury its failure to refund or replace was not willful if it reasonably and in good faith believed the facts did not call for refund or replacement.”)