Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV19244, Date: 2023-02-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV19244 Hearing Date: February 21, 2023 Dept: 55
URIAS
v. DEDICATION AND EVERLASTING LOVE TO ANIMALS,
22STCV19244
Hearing Date: 2/21/23, Dept. 55.
#3: MOTION TO
STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendant DEDICATION AND EVERLASTING
LOVE TO ANIMALS.
RP:
Plaintiff.
Summary
On 6/13/22, Plaintiff MARIA
URIAS filed a Complaint.
On 9/26/22, Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that, after Plaintiff reported
debilitating pain from a work injury as an animal caregiver, Defendant
repeatedly increased the workload, refused to allow Plaintiff any time off for
her doctor’s appointments, and terminated her employment due to her request for
accommodations.
The causes of action are:
1.
DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T CODE §§12940 ET SEQ.;
2.
RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T CODE §§12940 ET SEQ.;
3.
FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T CODE
§12940(k);
4.
RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T CODE §§12945.2 ET. SEQ.;
5.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T CODE §§12940
ET SEQ.;
6.
FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN A GOOD FAITH INTERACTIVE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF GOV’T
CODE §§12940 ET SEQ.;
7.
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY;
8.
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES (CAL. LABOR CODE §§201, 1194);
9.
FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION (CAL. LABOR CODE §§510, 1194; IWC WAGE
ORDER NO. 4-2001, §3);
10.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL PERIODS (FAILURE
TO PAY WAGES FOR MISSED MEAL PERIODS) (I.W.C. WAGE ORDER NO. 5-2001, CAL. LABOR
CODE §§512, 226.7);
11.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE REST PERIODS (FAILURE TO PAY WAGES FOR MISSED REST PERIODS)
(I.W.C. WAGE ORDER NO. 5-2001, CAL. LABOR CODE §§226.7);
12.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE ITEMIZED WAGE AND HOUR STATEMENTS (CAL. LABOR CODE §§226, ET
SEQ.);
13.
WAITING TIME PENALTIES (CAL. LABOR CODE §§201-203);
14.
UNFAIR COMPETITION (BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200 ET SEQ.
MP
Positions
Moving party requests an
order striking allegations regarding punitive damages, on grounds including the
following:
·
Plaintiff’s allegations consist solely of
conclusions of law without any specific facts regarding Defendant’s conduct,
apart from repeatedly claiming that she suffered hostility and mistreatment,
experienced severe back, neck, hands, and arm pain, stress and strain without
accommodation, had to reschedule doctor’s appointments and was transferred to a
different work location for longer than she expected.
·
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint makes
conclusory statements that Mr. Grillo, the President, and Mr. Estrada, the
supervisor, were managing agents, without specifying the degree of
policy-making decisions. There are no
facts regarding Mr. Grillo and Mr. Estrada’s conduct sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of California Civil Code section 3294.
RP
Positions
Opposing party advocates denying,
for reasons including the following:
·
Plaintiff adequately alleged that
Defendant terminated her employment and refused her rights under FEHA due to
her work injury and due to the fact that she refused to be an accomplice in
Defendant’s discrimination toward another female employee that was pregnant
(First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 27-36).
·
Grillo treated Plaintiff like a slave,
demanding that she do whatever he instructed (¶ 25), increased her workload and
took pleasure in overworking her whenever she dared to ask for help (¶ 26).
·
Plaintiff pled facts demonstrating that
not only did Grillo display his disregard for Plaintiff, but also did it to
another employee who he fired because she was pregnant (¶27).
·
Defendant retaliated when Plaintiff
injured her back, hands, and arms by refusing to accommodate any requests for
her changes in schedule or changes to her work duties (¶¶32, 34).
·
Defendant acted with malice because it
intended to cause Plaintiff injury by intentionally overloading her job duties
when she asked for help or refused to assist in any illegal activity.
Defendant's actions were also oppressive because it terminated Plaintiff's
employment after seventeen years while injured and continuing to work without
any accommodations.
·
Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to show
that Grillo, the President, and Estrada, the supervisor, were managing agents
such that Defendant was personally guilty of the malicious and oppressive
conduct. The complaint alleges that Grillo and Estrada directly supervised
Plaintiff as an animal caretaker as well as Grillo’s personal laborer ((¶¶19,
20, 26).
Tentative
Ruling
The motion is denied.
Twenty days to answer.
The First Amended
Complaint alleges employment law violations beyond wrongful employment
termination, including facts about a hostile work environment in relation for
protected conduct (see, e.g., First
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 28 – 29
(“complained about her stress and strain from performing the endless
jobs she was assigned while being yelled at and humiliated by GRILLO. GRILLO’s
response was to make light of her complaints. GRILLO laughed at PLAINTIFF when
she notified him that she was in pain.”)).
Further, acts by a
managerial agent are sufficiently alleged
(see, e.g., First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 43 (“DEFENDANTS ’s conduct
described herein was undertaken, authorized, and/or ratified DEFENDANTS ’s
officers, directors and/or managing agents,…”), and 47).
“In order to survive a
motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing
an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.
App. 4th 1253, 1255. Accord Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1055; Blegen v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 125
Cal.App.3d 959, 962.
Punitive damages are
potentially available in actions based on FEHA or violations of public
policy. Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 895, 912 (jury properly
found employer defendants intentionally discriminated and consciously
disregarded employee’s rights, by doing an adverse employment action based on
gender, because defendants tried to hide it with a false explanation.); Commodore Home Systems v. Sup. Ct.
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220; Wilson v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 267, 273; Bihun v. AT&T Info. Systems (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 976, 996, overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Ind.
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664; Roberts v.
Ford Aerospace & Communication Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 798; Weeks
v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1158-59; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1435 ("A court can award Civil Code section
3294 punitive damages in an FEHA case.").
“[W]rongful termination, without
more, will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression.” Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717. Cf.
Turman v. Turning Point of Central Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53,
64 (“Appellant persists that the punitive damages allegations are adequately
pled, relying primarily on the underlying facts associated with the cause of
action for gender discrimination. However, as pled in this complaint, such
facts do not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary under
Civil Code section 3294 to state a claim for punitive damages.”).
Supervisors’ loud, severe
verbal abuse of an employee may constitute intolerable working conditions. Thompson v. Tracor Flight Sys. (2001)
86 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 1171-72.
Alleging that persons
acted "with the permission and consent" of all defendants including
corporate defendants is sufficient to plead corporate employer liability for punitive
damages. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 798,
806 (“it was alleged that the misrepresentations were made by persons who acted
‘with the permission and consent’ of all the defendants. For the purpose of
meeting a general demurrer, this was a sufficient allegation that the corporations
had authorized their agent's acts; a corporation is liable for punitive damages
when it authorizes the wrongful act.”); Kisesky
v. Carpenters’ Trust (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d
222, 235 (allegations of agents acting in scope of employment with employer’s
permission and consent were sufficient).
See also generally Scannell
v. County of Riverside (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 614 (insufficiency
where a complete failure to plead acts done with the knowledge or under express
direction or ratification of officer, director or managing agent); United W. Medical Ctrs. v. Sup. Ct.
(1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 500, 505 n. 2 (dicta re sufficiency being questionable
where a complete failure to allege authorization, ratification, or conduct by
managerial agent).