Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV19260, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV19260 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: 55
AGUILAR
v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 22STCV19260
.
Hearing Date: 2/16/23,
Dept. 55.
#9: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY
PROCEEDINGS.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendants
RP:
Plaintiff
Summary
On 6/13/22, Plaintiff MANUEL AGUILAR filed a Complaint
alleging that, on 4/19/21, Plaintiff purchased a new 2021 Ford Explorer having serious
defects and nonconformities to warranty including engine, electrical, emission,
structural, and transmission system defects, and
co-Defendant PUENTE HILLS FORD breached its duty to
Plaintiff to ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare, and
repair the vehicle.
The causes of action are:
1. VIOLATION OF
SONG-BEVERLY ACT - BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
2. VIOLATION OF
SONG-BEVERLY ACT - BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
3. VIOLATION OF THE
SONGBEVERLY ACT SECTION 1793.2
4. NEGLIGENT REPAIR.
MP
Positions
Moving parties request an order compelling arbitration
and staying this action, on grounds including the following:
·
Plaintiff entered into a Retail
Installment Sales Contract agreeing to arbitrate all claims relating to the
condition of this vehicle.
·
Equitable estoppel prevents Plaintiff from
avoiding the Arbitration Provision where his claims are intimately founded in
and intertwined with the sales contract providing it.
·
Defendants Ford, and Puente Hills Ford,
may enforce the Arbitration Provision as third-party beneficiaries.
·
The FAA expressly applies.
·
A subject arbitration provision states:
Any claim or dispute,
whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation
and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or
dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns,
which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or
condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or
relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not
sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral,
binding arbitration and not by a court action.
RP
Positions
Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons including
the following:
·
Defendant is neither a non-signatory nor
an intended third-party beneficiary to the Retail Installment Sales Contract
between the selling dealership Ford of Montebello, and Plaintiff, which agreement
does not mention Ford Motor Company.
·
Distinguishably, in Felisilda v. FCA US
LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, the arbitration motion was by the contracting dealership
and not the manufacturer, and in this case Plaintiff did not sue the
dealership.
·
Plaintiff’s claims are not intimately
intertwined, nor is Defendant a third-party beneficiary.
Tentative
Ruling
The motion is granted.
Plaintiff and defendants shall arbitrate the
controversies between them, including the entire Complaint, in accordance with
their agreement to arbitrate.
This entire case is stayed until such arbitration has
been completed.
The subject arbitration provisions apply to the
alleged vehicle conditions and to related third parties, such as Ford, as
beneficiaries (e.g., motion, 2:26).
Applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration,
without an applicable arbitration agreement, a nonsignatory may compel
arbitration when the claims against the nonsignatory are founded in, and
inextricably bound up with, the agreement’s obligations, as determined by
examining the facts of the complaint. Felisilda
v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 496-97 (“Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to
arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle—even against third
party nonsignatories to the sales contract—they are estopped from refusing to
arbitrate their claim against FCA.”).
Intended third-party beneficiaries may enforce
arbitration provisions. Macaulay v.
Norlander (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8;
Michaelis v. Schori (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 133, 139
(agreement expressly included arbitration of claims as to signatory’s
employees).
Ford need not be named in the agreement to be a
third-party beneficiary. See, e.g.,
Loduca v. Polyzos (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 334, 341 (parties not named in contracts may qualify as
beneficiaries if agreements reflect that intent); Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins.
Co. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1040 (beneficiary may recover if one of
a class of parties for whose
benefit the agreement was made), disapproved on other grounds by Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182; H.N.
and Frances C. Berger Foundation v. Perez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 37,
46 (party does not need to be named in
the agreements in order to be a third party beneficiary, but there must be
language, or extrinsic evidence, of the intent to benefit plaintiff, or a class
of individuals including party).
Parties may agree that arbitrators have jurisdiction
to decide whether the arbitration provisions are enforceable. Parada v. Sup. Ct. (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1566.
Where the Federal Arbitration Act applies, state
procedural rules nevertheless govern the determination of a motion to compel
arbitration. Vivid Video Inc. v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc. (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 434, 440. “Even when the
Federal Arbitration Act applies, state law governs such matters as who is bound
by and who may enforce an arbitration agreement.” Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 605, 614 n. 7.
Where a court has ordered arbitration, it shall stay
the pending action, until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to
arbitrate, or another earlier time, and the stay may be with respect to an
issue that is severable. CCP
§1281.4; Cruz v. PacifiCare Health
Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 303, 320;
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
188, 192; Heritage Provider Network, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152, 1154 n. 12.
Finally, opposing party’s request for judicial notice
is denied entirely. The federal
appellate decision and California trial court ruling are irrelevant here. “California
Supreme Court interpretation of federal law [is] binding when there is ‘no
contrary United States Supreme Court decision’ on the issue….” Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 489, 498. “On federal
statutory issues, intermediate appellate courts in California are absolutely
bound to follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court, unless the
United States Supreme Court has decided the same question differently.” Truly Nolen of Amer. v. Sup. Ct.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 487, 507. Trial
court rulings are not binding precedent.
E.g., Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 726, 738. Rulings in other
trial court cases are irrelevant absent some additional showing like the
elements of claim or issue preclusion. Drummond
v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 439, 448.