Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV19260, Date: 2023-08-29 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 22STCV19260    Hearing Date: August 29, 2023    Dept: 55

AGUILAR v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,                                 22STCV19260 .

Hearing Date:  8/29/23,  Dept. 55.

#6:   MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Plaintiff

RP:  Defendants

 

 

Summary

 

On 6/13/22, Plaintiff MANUEL AGUILAR filed a Complaint alleging that, on 4/19/21, Plaintiff purchased a new 2021 Ford Explorer having serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including engine, electrical, emission, structural, and transmission system defects, and

co-Defendant PUENTE HILLS FORD breached its duty to Plaintiff to ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare, and repair the vehicle.

The causes of action are:

1. VIOLATION OF SONG-BEVERLY ACT - BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY

2. VIOLATION OF SONG-BEVERLY ACT - BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

3. VIOLATION OF THE SONGBEVERLY ACT SECTION 1793.2

4. NEGLIGENT REPAIR.

 

 

MP Positions

 

Moving parties request an order reconsidering the 2/16/23 order compelling arbitration and staying this action, on grounds including the following:

 

·         The Second District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Ford Motor Warranty Cases distinguishes and disagrees with Felisilda.

·         The thorough analysis is directly applicable to the facts in the instant matter, and overcomes Felisilda because:

o   Here, unlike in Felisilda, the selling dealership is not a party to this litigation;

o   the sales agreement in this case is virtually identical to the one considered there; and, most importantly,

o   the reasoning in Ford Motor Warranty Cases is far superior, deeper, and more persuasive than that of Felisilda.

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing parties advocate denying, on bases including the following:

 

First, Plaintiffs’ motion is untimely.

Second, once the motion to compel arbitration is granted, there is no jurisdiction to reconsider.

Third, Plaintiff’s motion assumes that a change of law has occurred because, after this Court’s granted Ford’s motion to compel arbitration, Division 8 of the Second District Court simply disagreed with Felisilda’s holding on equitable estoppel in Ochoa (see Ochoa v. Ford Motor Co. (April 4, 2023) __ Cal.Rptr.3d __, 2023 WL 2768484). In order to satisfy California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, there must be a material and controlling change in law that this Court relied on. Ochoa does not change the law, nor is it controlling. Felisilda remains good law, and, at this point, only the California Supreme Court can resolve the conflict and actually change the law.

Fourth, on July 19, 2023 the California Supreme Court granted review of the Ochoa decision that forms the basis for Plaintiff’s reconsideration request. (See –Ford Motor Warranty Cases --- P.3d ----2023 WL 4630837.)….

Fifth, even if a conflict in two appellate opinions constitutes a change of law, there is still no reason for this Court to reconsider its order compelling this case to arbitration. Under stare decisis principles, this Court can—and should—still choose to follow Felisilda. As demonstrated in detail below, this Court should follow Felisilda because it is the better-reasoned decision. The entire predicate for the Ochoa decision is a set of brief, out-of-context statements from 1963 appellate opinions that predate the UCC and the Song-Beverly Consumer Act. Ochoa’s reliance on these older, inapposite decisions allowed it to completely disassociate the claims against Ford from the underlying sales contract for a Ford vehicle. Felisilda’s approach correctly accounts for post-UCC and post-Song-Beverly authorities that hold that a manufacturer’s warranties are part of the sales contract.

Sixth, Plaintiff mistakenly asserts that it makes a difference that Ford did not sign the sales contract. But as emphasized below, the presence of a signatory as a named defendant is irrelevant to the equitable estoppel analysis. Ochoa does not change this. This Court rejected that point before, and if anything, even Ochoa confirms that the “Ford was not a signatory” argument does not matter.

 

(Opp., pp. 2-3.)

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is denied. 

The motion points out a split of authority, which fact mandates no different result in the trial court.  Where there is a split of authority, trial courts have discretion to choose between the decisions.  Auto Equity Sales, Inc.  v.  Sup.  Ct.  (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.  Where there is a split of authority, “[a]s a practical matter, a superior court ordinarily will follow an appellate opinion emanating from its own district even though it is not bound to do so.”  McCallum v. McCallum  (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 308, 316 n.4.

Applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, without an applicable arbitration agreement, a nonsignatory may compel arbitration when the claims against the nonsignatory are founded in, and inextricably bound up with, the agreement’s obligations, as determined by examining the facts of the complaint.  Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (3rd Dist. 2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 496-97  (“Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle—even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract—they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against FCA.”).  But see  Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2nd Dist. 2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 306 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, 619  (“We disagree with Felisilda that ‘the sales contract was the source of [FCA's] warranties at the heart of this case.’ ”).