Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV28389, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28389 Hearing Date: August 18, 2023 Dept: 55
JOHN
DOE v. SOUTHEASTERN CALIFORNIA CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, 22STCV28389
Hearing Date: 8/18/23,
Dept. 55.
#4: MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DISMISS ACTION.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendant NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION OF
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS.
RP:
Plaintiff
Summary
On 8/31/22, Plaintiff filed a Complaint.
On 12/30/22, Plaintiff, filed a First Amended
Complaint, alleging that he was born in March of 1981, and
while a minor, was a victim of childhood sexual molestation and assault done by
defendants’ employed teacher, at South Bay Junior Academy, caused by defendants’
failures and refusals, including with regard to hiring, retention, training and
supervision, by defendants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY
ADVENTISTS (SCC) and NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION OF SEVENTH
DAY ADVENTISTS (NAD).
The causes of action are:
(1) NEGLIGENCE;
(2) NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION;
(3) NEGLIGENT
HIRING/RETENTION;
(4) NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO
WARN TRAIN OR EDUCATE;
(5) CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(CIVIL CODE § 1573);
(6) BREACH OF FIDICIARY
DUTY;
(7) INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
MP
Positions
Moving party request an order quashing service of
summons and dismissing the action, on grounds including the following:
·
The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Specially Appearing Defendant NAD.
·
It is an out-of-state corporation that does
not, and is not registered to, do business in the State of California.
·
NAD does not have substantial and
systematic contacts in California.
·
NAD has not performed any act or
transaction that would subject it to being hauled into a California court.
·
The opposition lacks competent evidence and
a preponderance of the evidence to meet its burden of proof to support the
exercise of jurisdiction over NAD.
·
Each opposing exhibit is incompetent proof
or unsupportive, as specified at page 4 of the reply.
·
Permitting Plaintiff to conduct discovery
will waste time and money, because no evidence exists that will meet the burden
of proof required to exercise jurisdiction over NAD.
RP
Positions
Opposing party advocates denying, or a continuance for
discovery, for reasons including the following:
·
Plaintiff will present evidence of
Defendant’s “substantial and continuous” contacts with the State of California,
such that it should be subject to this Court’s jurisdiction based on general
jurisdiction principles.
·
Plaintiff will also show a connection
between the contacts with the State of California and this particular
controversy, consistent with principles regarding specific jurisdiction.
·
Moving Defendant did not contest jurisdiction
in an action in Riverside, in which discovery was produced, and is relied upon
herein.
·
Defendant exercises substantial control
over La Sierra Academy in Riverside, as stated in official filings.
·
The First Amended Complaint alleges that
Defendant NAD “controls and has decision making power over a school known as
SBJA and was the primary entity owning, operating and controlling the
activities and behavior of its employee and agent Pumphrey-Quave.” (FAC at ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges Pumphrey-Quave
was employed, retained, and/or allowed to be on-campus to supervise, mentor,
aide and/or teach children at SBJA…(and that) (i)n such capacity,
Pumphrey-Quave was under the direct supervision, employ, agency, and control of
the SCC and NAD (¶16.) Plaintiff alleges
that, as an educational institution for minors, where all the students are
entrusted to the teachers, counselors, advisors, mentors, coaches, faculty
members and administrators, SCC and NAD expressly and implicitly represented
that these individuals, including Pumphrey-Quave, were not a sexual threat to
children and others who would fall under Pumphrey-Quave's influence, control,
direction, and guidance.(¶71.)
Tentative
Ruling
The motion hearing is continued to 10/6/23 at 8:30
a.m. in Dept. 55.
Plaintiff may conduct discovery as to the
jurisdictional issues raised by the instant motion, and serve and file
supplemental opposing papers at least 10 days before the continued hearing
date.
The Court finds that the opposing documents from other
litigation that counsel was attorney of record in, are properly authenticated
as discovery responses, but are too thin in facts to show minimum contracts of
moving party, including as to the details of accreditation involvement with
in-state schools. The Court further
finds that the Internet documents are not competent proof of the factual
assertions contained therein. Additionally,
the Court finds that the opposition relies too heavily on the First Amended
Complaint, which is not admissible evidence.
“A trial court has the discretion to continue the
hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal
jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional
issues.” HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Sup.
Ct. (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1173.
Accord Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487. A “plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct
discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion
to quash”, but it lies within the sound discretion of the judge. Goehring v.
Sup. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 894, 911.
"In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for
jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely
to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing
jurisdiction." In re Automobile
Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 100, 127.
In opposition to a motion to quash based upon lack of
personal jurisdiction, complainants have the initial burden of to file evidence
to show minimum contacts. Muckle v.
Sup. Ct. (2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 218, 228.
“When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is
placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Aquila, Inc. v.
Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568. After minimum contacts with the forum state
are shown, defendants have the shifted burden to show that jurisdiction would
be unreasonable. Muckle, supra, at 228.
Attorneys with personal knowledge of discovery in the
litigation are competent to testify that they obtained information as discovery
responses. Luckman Partnership, Inc.
v. Sup. Ct. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
30, 34-35 (counsel properly authenticated interrogatory responses by declaring
personal knowledge that the documents were the party’s responses); Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. N. Y. Times
Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1183 (“declaration establishes that her
personal knowledge of the litigation rendered her competent to testify that
respondents had obtained the materials … through discovery.”); Barnick v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc.
(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 377, 380 n. 3 (attorney’s declaration sufficient to
authenticate the answers received to interrogatories).
As to online and social media, general authentication
rules apply, including the requirement of sufficient evidentiary foundation
supporting a finding that writings are what they purport to be. Kinda v.
Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 1268, 1283. Documents appearing to be Internet searches
of various web sites are inadmissible absent authentication demonstrating that
they actually depict what they purport to show.
McGarry v. Sax (2008) 158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 991. Printouts of web pages are
self-authenticating, and are not hearsay, if not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted. Ampex Corp. v.
Cargle (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1569, 1573 n.2 (citing Ev. C. §1552(a)).
A court held that an unverified complaint could not
serve as substantial evidence for meeting a plaintiff’s burden to show personal
jurisdiction in opposition to a motion to quash. See Sheard v. Sup. Ct. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 210-12. Complaint allegations are not evidence,
because pleadings are merely formal allegations. San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of
San Diego (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1736, 1744; Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
(2006) 145 Cal. App. 4th 220, 241.