Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 22STCV33867, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33867    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 55

INFERNO CALIFORNIA, INC. v. NILE NIAMI,                        22STCV33867.

Hearing Date:  2/15/23,  Dept. 55.

#6:   MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT NILE NIAMII’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Plaintiff

RP:  Defendant

 

 

Summary

 

On 10/19/22, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to make a loan on a real property investment and they failed to pay back a loan secured by a Gulfstream corporate jet.

The causes of action are:

(1) FRAUD;

(2) BREACH OF CONTRACT.

 

 

MP Positions

 

Moving party requests an order granting judgment on the pleadings as to affirmative defenses, without leave to amend, on grounds including the following:

 

·         Plaintiff is entitled to make this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses. C.C.P. Section 438(c)(2)(B) and Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1257-58.

·         The affirmative defenses fail to state any facts and contain only conclusions.

·         An affirmative defense is considered “new matter” and is subject to the same rules for pleading “ultimate facts” as if set out in a complaint and must avoid mere legal conclusions. See C.C.P §431.30(b), Bradbury v. Higginson (1914) 167 C. 553, 557.

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing party advocates denying, or allowing leave to amend, for reasons including the following:

 

·         Plaintiff failed to meet the burden to demonstrate that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Niami. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 438(c)(1)(A).

·         Niami’s affirmative defenses cannot be considered in a vacuum. Affirmative defenses are made based on the complaint’s allegations. Plaintiff made a series of vague, contradictory allegations, and Niami responded based on the allegations against him. So the practical effect of the MJOP is to shift the burden and cost of adequately pleading causes of action onto the defendant.        

·         Plaintiff failed to ask the Court to enter judgment in its favor.

·         Plaintiff failed to address or rebut Niami’s general denial.

·         An affirmative defense is not susceptible to a motion for judgment on the pleadings if it “minimally advise[s] the opposing party of the nature of the defense even if defective as conclusory.” FPI Dev., Inc. v. Nakashima, 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 385 (1991).

 

 

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is granted, with 20 days’ leave to amend the Answer.

The Answer is even more conclusory than answers filed generally, as illustrated by this excerpt:

 

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Ratification)

10. The complaint, and alleged claims for relief therein, is barred in whole or in

part because Plaintiff ratified all the acts and omissions about which Plaintiff now

complains.

 

The Court finds a reasonable possibility of successful amendment, because completely missing facts could be corrected by alleging ultimate facts.

An answer must aver facts as carefully as is required for complaints.  FPI Dev., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367; 384.  “Affirmative defenses must not be pled as ‘terse legal conclusions,’…” but rather as facts averred in as much detail as is required in complaints.  In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 813.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings involves the same type of procedures that apply to a general demurrer. Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App. 4th 1056, 1061,  disapproved on other grounds by  Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798, 815 n.8;  Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1064.  A court did not err granting judgment on the pleadings as to affirmative defenses.  Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1258.

A general demurrer may be made on the ground that an answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.  Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880.  “Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.”  South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 732.

Requirements of statutory motions for judgment on the pleadings (e.g., Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1063) differ from non-statutory ones (e.g., Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal. App. 4th 644, 650).

“In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.”  Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 870, 876.