Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: 23STCV04990, Date: 2023-09-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV04990 Hearing Date: September 1, 2023 Dept: 55
VINITSKY
v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, 23STCV04990
Hearing: 9/1/23,
Dept. 55.
#2: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; MOTION TO STRIKE.
Notice: Okay
Opposition
MP:
Defendant
RP:
Plaintiff
Summary
On 3/6/23, Plaintiff HOPE VINITSKY filed a Complaint alleging: On or about December 18, 2020, Plaintiff
travelled to Culver City Chevrolet, met with the salesperson and asked him to
show a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt EV, and was satisfied by the representations made by
the salesperson and the manufacturer through publications, that the vehicle’s
range on a charge was 259 miles.
However, the vehicle had defects including with the EV battery module, insufficient
distance on a charge, potential high voltage battery fire and front seatbelt
pretensioner. After Plaintiff’s repeated
presentations of the vehicle authorized repair facilities, the manufacturer has
been unable to conform the Vehicle to its express warranties and it remains defective.
The causes of action are:
1. FRAUD CONCEALMENT AND
MISREPRESENTATION;
2. NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
3. BUSINESS &
PROFESSIONS CODE §17200
4. SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER
WARRANTY ACT – BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY;
5. SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER
WARRANTY ACT – BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY;
6. SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER
WARRANTY ACT – CIVIL CODE §1793.2(b).
MP
Positions
Moving party requests an order granting judgment on
the pleadings as to the First, Second and Third Causes of Action, and granting
the motion to strike as to punitive damages, on grounds including the
following:
·
Plaintiff does not have factual or legal
grounds for the “fraud” claims asserted in Counts I, II, and III of the
Complaint.
·
Plaintiff failed to plead the alleged
“fraud” with particularity.
·
Plaintiff did not identify a
representation by or from GM, nor did she allege facts showing when, where, or
how GM made any representation, much less a misrepresentation, about her Bolt.
·
Without viable “fraud” claims, Plaintiff
has zero grounds to demand punitive damages from GM. Even if Plaintiff asserted
viable “fraud” claims, the allegations do not satisfy the statutory standards
required to pursue punitive damages.
RP
Positions
Opposing party advocates denying, or leave to amend, for
reasons including the following:
·
Plaintiff pled specific facts sufficient
to state a claim that Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff into leasing the
Subject Vehicle, based on a theory of concealment. The Complaint sufficiently
alleges GM concealed or suppressed the material fact that the Vehicle was
equipped with a defective battery that had shorter range and can cause
fire. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-25.) GM long was aware of the problems with the
vehicle prior to Plaintiff’s lease of the Subject Vehicle on December 18, 2020.
(Complaint, ¶ 13.)
·
The person who authored GM’s promotional
advertisements is within the knowledge of Defendant. Similarly, the person who
authored its recalls is also within Defendant’s knowledge.
·
Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that GM
negligently misrepresented the defective qualities of the battery in the
Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff, including its range and that it was safe.
(Complaint, ¶ 8.) GM was aware of the problems with the battery as early as
2017. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) GM had no
reasonable grounds to represent the vehicle’s battery range as 259 miles and
that it could not catch fire given the information it had regarding the battery
defect. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-23.) Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendant’s
representations related to the battery because GM was the manufacturer of the
vehicle. Defendant was in a superior position of knowledge. Plaintiff was
harmed by leasing a vehicle that Plaintiff would not have leased had she known
the true facts about the battery and its defects. (Complaint, ¶ 27.)
·
Omissions by a dealership may be imputed
to the manufacturer. Daniel v. Ford Motor Company (2015) 806 F.3d 1217, 1226-27.
·
Plaintiff’s Complaint adequately pleads a
section 17200 claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that Defendant
misrepresented the battery range and safety of the Subject Vehicle through its
advertisements and publications, concealed the battery defect when it had a
duty to disclose it, Plaintiff was unaware of the defect, Plaintiff would not
have leased the Subject Vehicle had she been aware of the defect and she was
harmed by the lease. Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Defendant for
repair but Defendant admitted that it cannot repair the defective vehicle.
(Complaint, ¶ 24.)
·
As for punitive damages, Plaintiff’s
Complaint sufficiently alleges that GM intentionally concealed the fact that
the Subject Vehicle was equipped with a defective battery, which Defendant now
admits has no repair. Defendant had a
duty to disclose information about the battery defect because it possessed
exclusive and superior knowledge of the same. GM actively concealed these
important facts from Plaintiff or prevented them from discovering these facts
by failing to disclose the defects in any manner and by representing that the
defects could be repaired, even though it knew the defects could never be
repaired. The concealed facts, had they been known, would have been material to
Plaintiff’s decision to lease the Subject Vehicle, and if she would have known
such facts, she would not have bought it. (Complaint, ¶ 27.)
Tentative
Ruling
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
The motion to strike is denied.
The Complaint well pleads concealment or fraud in
support of the causes of action and punitive damages, regarding the
salesperson’s in-person representation of miles on a charge while acting as the
agent of the manufacturer, concealment of a fire hazard, and misrepresenting
and concealment done via manufacturer advertisements that Plaintiff relied on
(e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 6, 8 and 12).
The rule of specifically pleading how, when, where, to whom, and by what means,
misrepresentations were communicated, applies to affirmative
misrepresentations, not to concealment. Alfaro
v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009)
171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1384.
“[W]here a fraud claim is based upon numerous
misrepresentations, such as an advertising campaign that is alleged to be
misleading, plaintiffs need not allege the specific advertisements the
individual plaintiffs relied upon; it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
provide a representative selection of the advertisements or other statements to
indicate the language upon which the implied misrepresentations are
based.” Morgan v. AT&T Wireless
Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1262 (finding sufficient allegations that
defendant made misleading statements of referenced facts in advertisements and
press releases).
The elements of a claim for Unfair Business Practices
are:
Bus. &
Prof. Code § 17200; Paulus v. Bob
Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 676.
“[F]raudulent”
in section 17200 does not mean common-law fraud, but only that members of the
public likely would be deceived. Puentes
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 638, 645.
Motions to strike punitive damages may be granted if the
alleged facts do not support conclusions of malice, fraud or oppression. Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif.,
Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63. Fraudulent
acts of concealment may support awards of punitive damages. Werschkull v. United Cal. Bank (1978)
85 Cal.App.3d 981, 1004. “‘Although
punitive damages may not ordinarily be given for breach of contract, whether
the breach be intentional, willful or in bad faith…, such damages may be
awarded where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a
contract.’” Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las
Palmas Ctr. Assocs. (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220, 1239 (quoting Glendale
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.
App. 3d 101, 135). “In order to survive
a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts
showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.
App. 4th 1253, 1255. Accord Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1055; Blegen v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 125
Cal.App.3d 959, 962.