Judge: Malcolm Mackey, Case: BC704125, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC704125    Hearing Date: December 8, 2022    Dept: 55

ARELLANO v. OPTUMCARE MED. GRP.                                            BC704125

Hearing Date:  12/8/22,  Dept. 55

#6: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OF PLAINTIFF’S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AND DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS.

 

Notice:  Okay

Opposition

 

MP:  Defendants

RP:  Plaintiff

 

Summary

 

On 4/27/18, Plaintiff CRYSTAL RUSSELL filed a Complaint.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint for violation of The California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. 

Allegedly, Plaintiff, and represented, aggrieved employees, experienced defendants’ violations in Los Angeles, including failure to properly pay wages for all overtime and regular hours work, failure to properly calculate overtime compensation, unlawful meal and rest period policies, failure to pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees, failure to maintain required records, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to timely pay wages during employment, and failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures and/or losses incurred in discharging their duties.

On 10/16/20, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, granted on 11/26.

 

 

MP Positions

 

Moving parties request an order compelling arbitration, on bases including the following:  

·         Plaintiff signed a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement requiring her to submit all claims, including her Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claim, to individual arbitration.

·         On August 16, 2016, Plaintiff began her employment as a Medical Assistant  for Defendant Optum Services, Inc. (“OSI”). OSI is a subsidiary of Defendant Optum, Inc. (“Optum”), which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Defendant UnitedHealth Group Incorporated (“UnitedHealth”).

·         Before the start of her employment, Plaintiff was sent an offer letter for the position of Medical Assistant. (Weedman decl.,” ¶¶3-4, Ex. A.) The four-page Offer Letter informed Plaintiff that a copy of the Employment Arbitration Policy for UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and its subsidiaries, was enclosed. The letter explained that the Arbitration Agreement was “a binding contract” and other aspects.

·         On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff logged into UnitedHealth Group Incorporated’s computer system, with her secure, unique password, and individual employee ID number, to acknowledge receipt of an electronic copy of the Arbitration Agreement. (Weedman Decl., ¶¶3-4, 8.) On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff electronically executed the Arbitration Agreement, which unambiguously requires Plaintiff and UnitedHealth, and its subsidiaries, including OSI and Optum, to arbitrate any disputes that may arise related to Plaintiff’s employment.

·         The Arbitration Agreement states “Acceptance of employment or continuation of employment with UnitedHealth Group is deemed to be acceptance of this Policy.” (Weedman Decl., ¶ 2-4, 8; Ex. B).

·         The Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable, because it is not one-sided in that Defendants also are required to arbitrate any claims it may have against Plaintiff. Further, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Viking River, the representative action waiver is not unconscionable, and the Arbitration Agreement meets the factors outlined in Armendariz v. Found Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000).

·         Since the decision in Viking River came out on June 15, 2022, Defendants have not taken any action that would constitute a waiver of its right to compel arbitration. The law did not recognize Defendants’ ability to enforce the arbitration agreement with respect to Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana.

 

 

RP Positions

 

Opposing party advocates denying, for reasons including the following:

First, no arbitration agreement exists between the Parties. Plaintiff never signed the

contested Employment Arbitration Policy…, and, in the absence of a contract consenting to arbitrate, there is no basis to compel arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. (2010) 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773-74…; Davis v. TWC Dealer-Group, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 662. Here, Defendants cannot (and did not) produce an executed agreement between the parties. Indeed, Employee Relations Vice President, Susan Weedman, provided testimony regarding the blank signature line on the Arbitration Agreement, stating “[t]he fact that the employee’s name is not also displayed in the box does not mean that the employee did not enter his or her name when agreeing to the Arbitration Agreement – this is simply how the Arbitration Agreement prints out.” (Declaration of  Susan Weedman, ¶¶ 6-8) Yet she could not also produce one that was later signed by the Plaintiff. As there is no meeting of the minds to arbitrate any claim, the Court’s inquiry should end here. 

 

Second, even if the Agreement was signed, it is both procedurally and substantively

unconscionable. These terms include a reference to AAA arbitration rules, which are not attached to the Agreement and were never provided to the Plaintiff. The Agreement also drastically limits Plaintiff’s discovery rights, permitting only “one interrogatory” per party. Of course, the Agreement permits Defendants to pool resources to defend against the claims, but prevents Plaintiff from joining with any other aggrieved employees. These unconscionable terms permeate the Agreement, making it unsuitable for severance.

 

Third, even if the Court is inclined to grant Defendants’ request, the Court should deny

the request to dismiss Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Viking River does not compel dismissal of representative PAGA claims, and the California Supreme Court has taken up this very question in Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. G059860, 2022 WL 1073583 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2022), review granted (July 20, 2022)….

 

Lastly, Defendants’ clear and unmistakable conduct to not only fully engage and

participate in discovery but to take full advantage of all aspects of discovery (e.g., law and motion, propound and respond to discovery, take depositions, including Ms. Russell’s on March 15, 2022) and proceedings in court demonstrates their intent to waive their right to arbitrate. Plaintiff and the State of California would be severely prejudiced if the Court granted this relief so late in the process, and after the expenditure of considerable resources.

(Opposition, pp. 7 – 8.)

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

The motion is granted. 

Plaintiff and defendants shall arbitrate the controversies between them, including the entire Complaint, in accordance with their agreement to arbitrate. 

The PAGA representative action is dismissed.

 

            Dismissal

The Iskanian opinion correctly decided a PAGA waiver is unenforceable as to non-individual claims, without any FAA preemption, but arbitration can be compelled as to individual plaintiffs’ waived claims, and the remaining claims of representative actions should be dismissed, due to lack of standing upon plaintiffs’ removal from the action and into arbitration.  Viking River Cruises v. Moriana    (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1924-25  (opinion after granting petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California).  There is a rule against PAGA waivers and predispute arbitration agreements, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act.  Contreras v. Sup. Ct. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461, 471-72.  See also  Winns v. Postmates Inc. (2021) 66 Cal. App. 5th 803, 815 n. 4  (California cases never overruled Iskanian, although the Viking opinion was then anticipated to address Ikanian).

A case can be dismissed on the grounds that all issues are susceptible to arbitration by agreement and plaintiff did not attempt to exhaust arbitration. 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 66 Cal. App. 4th 1199, 1208;  Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters (1971) 4 Cal.3d 888, 899. 

 

            Pending Decision

The Court exercises its discretion to decide and not delay the ruling pending a related decision--  Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. G059860, 2022 WL 1073583 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2022), rev. grt’d (July 20, 2022).  A trial court would not abuse discretion in delaying litigation pending an appeal of a case involving the same issues.  California Canning Mach. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 606, 608;  Reed v. Sup. Ct (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 448, 455.

 

            Assent

Moving parties’ evidence competently shows that Plaintiff assented to the arbitration agreement, including details of a computer procedure whereby Plaintiff would have needed to enter a password, and to select a button indicating agreement, as to which no signature is required. 

"Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate .... 'The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was  attributable.' ”  Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.

 

            Unconscionability

 

                        Take-It-Or-Leave-It

Plaintiff’s evidence is too general and conclusory to show employer communication of a requirement to accept the arbitration agreement.  If a plaintiff’s evidence shows that a moving party communicated that an arbitration agreement was nonnegotiable, then the moving party needs to establish that it had made opposing party aware of an ability to negotiate, or that by law opposing party such a right.   Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corp.  (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 704, 710.

Alternatively, employer-required arbitration agreements are not necessarily unconscionable.  "[A] compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis."  Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1127.  Accord  Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc.  (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1292.

 

                        Discovery

The agreement allows for sufficient, various discovery methods.

"‘[A]dequate’ discovery does not mean unfettered discovery....'"  Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004)118 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.  An AAA provision allowing arbitrators to control the extent of discovery did not constitute substantive unconscionability.  See Roman v. Sup. Ct.  (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1476.  An arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable if it makes no express provision for discovery rights.  Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523,  abrogated on other grounds by  Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal. App. 4th 373, 387.

 

                        Incorporated Rules

The arbitration agreement made easy the access to the incorporated AAA rules, by providing Plaintiff with the Internet address. For valid incorporation of arbitration rules by reference, in an arbitration agreement, the reference must be clear and unequivocal and called to the attention of the other party, who must consent thereto, and the incorporated document must be known or easily available.  Wolschlager v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co.  (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.  Accord  Shaw v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 44, 54 (whether incorporation of terms is enforced depends on the particular facts).  “Whether a document purportedly incorporated by reference was ‘readily available’ is a question of fact.”  Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 895.

Further, the opposition shows nothing about the AAA Rules content that creates any substantive unconscionability.  Cases that have held that the failure to provide a copy of the arbitration rules support finding procedural unconscionability have involved an unconscionability claim that somehow depended upon the incorporated arbitration rules.  Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246.

 

                        Explaining Arbitration Agreement

 

Opposing parties’ evidence lacks factors indicating that any further explanations of the arbitration agreement were needed.  Distinguishably, surprise caused by provisions buried in a long contract, language not fully explained, or misleading captions, indicates procedural unconscionability.  Thompson v. Toll Dublin, LLC (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1373.  Circumstances indicating that employees' agreeing to arbitration likely was not free and informed can constitute procedural unconscionability.  Sanchez v. Western Pizza Enterprises, Inc.  (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 154, 174-75 (low-wage employees likely feeling pressure to agree, and lack of information, constituted procedural unconscionability),  abrogated on other grounds by  Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 348, 366.

 

            Waiver

The Court finds that defendants did not waive the ability to move to compel arbitration, mainly because new law enabling the motion to compel individual claims and to dismiss representative claims, was not decided until mid-2022-- Viking River Cruises v. Moriana    (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1924-25.    No established test determines waiver of arbitration, but courts may consider whether (1) a party's actions are inconsistent with arbitrating, (2) litigation proceedings were substantially invoked and parties were well into lawsuit preparations before party notification of intent to arbitrate; (3) a party requested arbitration close to trial or delayed for a long period; (4) a party seeking arbitration filed a cross-action without requesting arbitration; (5) important intervening steps occurred such as discovery procedures unavailable in arbitration; and (6) delay prejudiced, affected or misled parties opposing arbitration.  Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 19, 30-31.  Appellate courts may reverse the trial courts’ arbitration-waiver findings only if the record establishes a lack of waiver as a matter of law.   Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 436, 453.

 

            Co-Defendants’ Enforcement

Moving parties’ evidence well shows that the defendants consist of a corporation and subsidiaries, and that the arbitration agreement expressly references subsidiaries as being intended beneficiaries of the agreement.  Intended third-party beneficiaries may enforce arbitration provisions.  Macaulay v. Norlander (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8;  Michaelis v. Schori  (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 133, 139 (agreement expressly included arbitration of claims as to signatory’s employees).

 

            Governing Law

The Court disregards trial court rulings in other cases, referenced in the opposing papers, which are not binding precedent.  E.g., Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 738.  Rulings in other cases are irrelevant, absent some additional showing like the elements of claim or issue preclusion.  Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 439, 448.

If both parties wish to submit on the court’s tentative ruling, please call Department 55 at 213-633-0655.