Judge: Marcella O. Mclaughlin, Case: 37-2022-00035618-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - April 11, 2024

04/12/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-72 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Marcella O McLaughlin

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Civil - Unlimited  Breach of Contract/Warranty Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2022-00035618-CU-BC-CTL YOUSIF VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for Attorney Fees, 12/12/2023

Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $38,938.40 ($31,053.50 in attorneys' fees and $7,884.90 in costs).

A. Plaintiff's evidentiary objections (ROA 106) are overruled.

B. 'To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method.' Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 CalApp.5th 682, 691. The lodestar is the product of a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours. Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744.

Here, the lodestar request is $36,081. This amount is based on 106.9 hours of work – including the instant fees motion – and equates to a blended hourly rate of approximately $337.52 ($36,081 divided by 106.9). Although the blended hourly rate is not per se unreasonable, '[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.' Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.

C. The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the 'reasonable hourly rate,' i.e., the rate 'prevailing in the community for similar work.' PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. The relevant 'community' is that where the court is located. Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.

In this case, GM does not challenge any of the requested hourly rates. Moreover, the court finds that the requested rates – which range from $250 per hour to $650 per hour – are reasonable for lemon law attorneys practicing in San Diego County with similar skills and experience. See Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 ('The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.').

D. Turning to the second half of the lodestar analysis, the court must determine the actual time expended and then 'ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.' Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104. 'Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved.' Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.

GM argues the billing entries are unreasonable due to the use of 'templates.' However, GM has not Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3064963  17 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  YOUSIF VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED]  37-2022-00035618-CU-BC-CTL cited any authority suggesting that such a practice is improper. In any event, GM should not be surprised that plaintiff's counsel undertook additional work given that GM refused to respond to basic written discovery and failed to produce a person most qualified without court intervention. See ROA 51.

The court, however, believes that certain billing entries reflect time spent unreasonably and/or on duplicative efforts. First, the court deletes the time spent by attorneys reviewing documents and performing other administrative tasks. Second, the court disallows the time expended by attorney Quinn as she billed just 3.4 hours on this matter. Some courts refer to timekeepers such as this as 'transitory billers,' and there is strong indicia here of inefficiency. No showing has been made as to why Ms.

Quinn's usage was necessary given that there were already four attorneys working on the case. See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39 ('[I]t is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.').

In sum, the court finds that a reasonable and proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded is $31,053.50, which consists of (1) $7,318.50 for Mr. Barry's services (11.9 hours at $615 per hour); (2) $3,825 for Mr. Hayes' services (9 hours at $425 per hour); (3) $1,760 for Mr. Kim's services (6.4 hours at $275 per hour); and (4) $18,150 for Mr. Lara's services (72.6 hours at $250 per hour).

E. The request for a multiplier of .25 is denied.

The classic situation justifying an upward adjustment of the lodestar figure was seen in a trilogy of California Supreme Court cases from the 1970s. See Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584; Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25. The litigation in Serrano revolved around California's system for financing public schools. The plaintiffs succeeded in overturning the existing system, but the litigation resulted in no fund of money from which attorney fees might be paid, nor did it result in any monetary recovery by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were also under no obligation to pay their attorneys for their efforts and (critically for our purposes) there was no clear statutory authority for shifting attorney fees to the defendant. Accordingly, application of a multiplier was appropriate.

However, two decades later, the Court of Appeal in Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128 declined to award a multiplier and distinguished Serrano as follows: '[T]he present case is in essence a personal injury action, brought by a single plaintiff to recover her own economic damages. Weeks and her attorneys had a fee agreement by which her attorneys were assured of a portion of any recovery. In addition, because of the availability of attorney fees under the FEHA, the attorneys had reason to assume that the amount of Weeks's recovery would not limit the amount of fees they ultimately received. Thus, the risk that Weeks's attorneys would not be compensated for their work was no greater than the risk of loss inherent in any contingency fee case; however, because of the availability of statutory fees the possibility of receiving full compensation for litigating the case was greater than that inherent in most contingency fee actions.' Weeks, 63 Cal.App.4th at 1174.

The court find that this case is a lot more like Weeks than Serrano, and therefore declines to award the requested multiplier. The action was neither novel nor complex. It was a garden-variety lemon law case prosecuted by a firm that specializes in lemon law litigation. Moreover, although Mr. Barry's firm took the case on a contingency basis, there is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Barry's representation of plaintiff precluded his firm from representing other litigants. Finally, given the fee-shifting provisions in the Song-Beverly Act, the case was not risky from the standpoint of Mr. Barry's firm having a source for payment.

F. The request for $7,884.90 in costs is granted. Code Civ. Proc. § 1218(a). No motion to tax has been filed. See CRC 3.1700(b)(1); see also Oak Grove School Dist. v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698.

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