Judge: Maren Nelson, Case: 23STCV05448, Date: 2023-09-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV05448 Hearing Date: September 29, 2023 Dept: 17
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
MARVIN
PIETRUSZKA, M.D., et al. vs. KORUON
DALDALYAN, M.D., et al. |
Case No.:
23STCV05448 Hearing
Date: September 29, 2023 |
Defendant’s motion to deny arbitration pursuant to CCP
section 1281.2(c) is GRANTED.
On 3/10/2023, Plaintiffs Marvin Pietruszka M.D., Compremed
Medical Group, Inc., and Bridgetone Holdings, LLC filed suit against Koruon
Daldalyan, M.D., and Del Carmen Medical Center (collectively, Defendants). On
5/23/2023, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging: (1)
fraud and deceit by intentional misrepresentation; (2) fraud and deceit by
negligent misrepresentation; (3) fraud and deceit by suppression of facts; (4)
constructive fraud; (5) breach of duty of loyalty/violation of California Labor
code section 2863; (6) breach of assert purchase agreement; (7) conversion; (8)
injunctive relief; (9) violation of the unfair competition law; (10)
constructive trust; (11) an accounting; and (12) breach of lease.
Now, Defendant moves for an order that Plaintiff has waived
its right to arbitration. Alternatively, Defendant moves for an order denying
arbitration pursuant to CCP section 1281.2(c).
Discussion
Defendant argues that Plaintiff
Compremed has waived its right to arbitration, and even if it has not,
arbitration should be denied pursuant to CCP section 1281.2(c).
In determining whether the right to arbitrate
has been waived, a court can consider: “(1)
whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether “the
litigation machinery has been substantially invoked” and the parties “were well
into preparation of a lawsuit” before the party notified the opposing party of
an intent to arbitrate;
(3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed
for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a
counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) “whether
important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery
procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place”; and (6) whether the delay
“affected, misled, or prejudiced” the opposing party.’ ” (St. Agnes Medical
Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196.)
Here, Defendant submitted the
following evidence to show that Compremed has substantially invoked the
litigation machinery and has taken actions substantially inconsistent with the
right to arbitrate:
-
March
10, 2023 – Plaintiffs file the Complaint alleging twelve (12) causes of action,
including a cause of action for the alleged breach of the Asset Purchase
Agreement. (See, Comp., ¶¶ 93-97; Ex. 3 to Comp.)
-
April
19, 2023 – Plaintiffs issue a Subpoena to JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA seeking loan
applications and other financial information pertaining to the funding of the
Asset Purchase Agreement. (Ex. I to the Sparks Decl.)
-
April 24, 2023 – Plaintiffs issue a Subpoena
for the deposition of Kanwar Basra. (Ex. J to the Sparks Decl.)
-
On
May 22, 2023, Dr. Daldalyan propounds discovery on Plaintiff Compremed. (Exs.
K, L and M to the Sparks Decl.)
-
May
23, 2023 – Plaintiffs file a First Amended Complaint again alleging twelve (12)
causes of action, including a cause of action for the alleged breach of the
Asset Purchase Agreement. (See, FAC, ¶¶ 92-96; Ex. 3 to FAC.)
-
June
6, 2023 – Plaintiffs take the deposition of Kanwar Basra. (Ex. N to the Sparks
Decl.)
-
June
29, 2023 – Plaintiffs file a Case Management Statement demanding a jury trial.
(Ex. O to the Sparks Decl., § 5, p. 2.)
-
June
29, 2023 – Plaintiffs post jury fees. (Ex. P to the Sparks Decl.)
-
July
14, 2023 – Plaintiffs through their counsel participate in a Case Management
Conference where a jury trial is scheduled. Plaintiffs do not object to the
setting of the jury trial nor do they inform the Court that they intend to
demand arbitration of any claims.
-
July
21, 2023 – Plaintiff serves a Demand for Arbitration of a cause of action for
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement. (Ex. Q to the Sparks Decl.) A comparison
of the Demand for Arbitration with the First Amended Complaint reveals that
Paragraphs 1-12 and 14 through 17 of the Demand for Arbitration are virtually
identical to Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 9- 12, 14-18 and 93-96 of the First Amended
Complaint and seek the same relief.
-
July
28, 2023 – Plaintiff files a Request for Dismissal of the sixth cause of action
for Breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
-
July
31, 2023 – Plaintiff vigorously opposes a Motion to Quash the Subpoena issued
to JP Morgan Chase Bank arguing that the loan and bank account information are
directly relevant to the claims for breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
As such, Compremed has filed a Complaint and First Amended
Complaint alleging a cause of action for breach of the Asset Purchase
Agreement. Plaintiff has served a Subpoena upon JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA for
loan and bank records pertaining to the funding of the Asset Purchase
Agreement, and opposed the Motion to Quash the Subpoena. Plaintiff also
demanded a jury trial.
However, Defendants have only
recently filed their answer to the FAC on 9/15/2023, trial is not until
11/14/2024, no written discovery has been propounded by Plaintiffs, and
Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that the APA was subject to an enforceable
arbitration agreement. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seek to arbitrate all
claims.
As such, the Court finds
insufficient evidence to conclude that Plaintiffs have acted so inconsistently
with an intention to arbitrate, or have so substantially invoked the litigation
machinery that they have waived their right to arbitrate.
This leaves the question of whether
or not the Court should in its discretion decline to allow arbitration to move
froward under CCP section 1281.2(c).
Defendants argue that arbitration
would lead to risk of conflicting ruling because the APA claim and the claims
here arise out of the same transactions.
CCP section 1281.2(c)
provides that a court shall order the petitioner
and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(c) A
party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or
special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a
pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding
initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel
arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the
petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate
disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made
pursuant to Section 1295.
After review, the Court exercises
its discretion under section
1281.2 (c) in order to avoid the possibility of conflicting rulings on
common issues of law and fact.
Here, the claim for the alleged
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement at issue in the Demand for Arbitration
arises out of the same series of related transactions at issue in this action. Plaintiff
argues that there is no risk of conflicting rulings because the breach of APA claim is limited to
the narrow question of whether or not Daldalyan complied with his alleged
obligation under the APA to purchase assets for $2 million. Compremed alleges that Daldalyan did not
issue any payment for the assets, and this is the issue to be resolved under
this cause of action. However, the Court agrees with Defendant that
there is a strong likelihood for conflicting rulings on common issues of law or
fact if Plaintiff is permitted to proceed with its Demand for Arbitration and
this case is also litigated.
For example, an
arbitrator could conclude that Defendant did not breach the Asset Purchase
Agreement by failing to make any payment because he made a good faith effort to
obtain a loan whereas this Court could conclude that Defendant defrauded
Plaintiff by misrepresenting that he would qualify for a loan for at least $1
million, and did not make a good faith effort to obtain a loan. Moreover,
Plaintiffs assert a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty here, which is
a relationship directly implicated by the Asset Purchase Agreement, as thus
requires interpretation of the APA. While Plaintiffs insist in opposition that
the breach of APA claim is limited to the question of whether or not Defendant
made the payments owed under the APA, Plaintiffs offer no substantive
explanation as to how the other causes of action are not implicated given that
they concern alleged misrepresentations made by Defendant as to his ability to
comply with his obligations under the APA.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the
Court has no authority to issue this ruling because the Court has no petition
to compel arbitration before it. However, Plaintiffs have no pending motion to
compel arbitration. Thus, under Plaintiffs logic, the Court’s hands could be
tied indefinitely from denying arbitration as long as Plaintiffs did not move
to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs offer
no explanation as to what available option Defendant otherwise has to seek the
relief sought here. The purpose of section 1281.2 is to provide Courts with
discretionary control over cases where there is arbitration and litigation
involved. There is nothing which indicates that the Court must adopt the narrow
and formalistic approach of Plaintiffs that only where a formal petition to
compel arbitration has been expressly filed may the Court exercise its powers
under section 1281.2. Here, Plaintiffs
has submitted a Demand for Arbitration, and thus is seeking in a de facto sense
to compel arbitration.
Moreover, Plaintiff argues that
questions of arbitrability should be left to the arbitrator. However, section
1281.2 is a discretionary power held by trial courts, not arbitrators, and thus
an arbitrator does not have the power to grant the relief sought here.
Moreover, this discretionary power does not concern a determination as to
whether or not the relevant claims are subject to an arbitration agreement—the
power delegated to an arbitrator—but rather if for some other statutorily
recognized reason, a claim which is otherwise subject to an arbitration
agreement should not proceed in arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court finds a high
risk of conflicting rulings if Compremed were to arbitrate a breach of contract
claim based on the Asset Purchase Agreement, while this action, which is based
on the same facts and transactions as the breach of contract claim, were
litigated here. Accordingly, pursuant to CCP section 1281.2 the Court declines
to order arbitration of that cause of action.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
motion to deny arbitration pursuant to CCP section 1281.2(c) is granted.
It is so
ordered.
Dated:
September , 2023
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on
this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org.
If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case
number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion
submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. For more information,
please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.