Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 19GDCV01347, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19GDCV01347    Hearing Date: December 8, 2022    Dept: P

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

J&J FREIGHT SOLUTIONS, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; GOLDEN J GROUP, INC., a California Corporation; and QINYI YU, an individual,

 

                                            Plaintiffs,

vs.

 

JIANHUA LI, also known as Nick Li, an individual; NANYIN TAN, also known as Terry Tan, an individual; CTU CONNECTION, a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

 

                                            Defendants.

And related cross-action.

 

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Case No.: 19GDCV01347

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH THIRD PARTY SUBPOENA FOR BUSINESS RECORDS

 

Date:   November 29, 2022

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

            I.         INTRODUCTION

            Plaintiff J&J Freight Solutions, LLC is a trucking company. It was started by Jie Mei Huang. Huang’s husband Qinyi Yu formed Golden J Group, Inc., a sister company, that provides back up services to J&J in the form of assisting with port entry, trucking, repairing, warehousing, and repackaging services. Defendants Jianhua Li and Ninyan Tan are former employees. In this action, Plaintiffs allege that Li and Tan misappropriated their trade secrets to start a competing business, CTU Connection. In July 2020, a preliminary injunction issue preventing Defendants from using Plaintiffs’ trade secrets. In October 2021, Plaintiffs added EMC Transportation, Inc. as a doe, alleging that it is a shell corporation and conduit for CTU.

            At issue is Plaintiffs’ motion to compel compliance with a records-only deposition subpoena served on a third party whose name is filed under seal and who is referred to herein as Witness. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.

 

II.        LEGAL STANDARD

            “Discovery procedures are generally less onerous for strangers to the litigation.” Monarch Healthcare v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289. A non-party from whom records are sought does not need to file a motion to quash. Non-parties may simply object and place the onus on the party seeking discovery to make a motion to compel. Id. at 1288-1289.

            Code Civ. Proc. §2020.010:

(a) Any of the following methods may be used to obtain discovery within the state from a person who is not a party to the action in which the discovery is sought:

(1) An oral deposition under Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2025.010).

(2) A written deposition under Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 2028.010).

(3) A deposition for production of business records and things under Article 4 (commencing with Section 2020.410) or Article 5 (commencing with Section 2020.510).

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 2025.280, the process by which a nonparty is required to provide discovery is a deposition subpoena.

            Code Civ. Proc. §2025.280 (a) provides that service of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any deponent to produce any document or electronically stored information.

            Code Civ. Proc. §2020.030 provides that the provisions of Section 1985 apply to a deposition subpoena. Code Civ. Proc. §1987.1 permits a court, upon motion, to make an order directing compliance with a subpoena upon terms or conditions as the court shall declare. Section 1987.2 provides for an award of reasonable expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in making or opposing a motion under Section 1987.1.

 

III.      ANALYSIS

            A. Pertinent Procedural History

            Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in October 2019. In July 2020, they sought and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting Li, Tan, and CTU from “misusing or disclosing Plaintiffs’ trade secrets, confidential business information and other property, intellectual or otherwise, including Plaintiffs’ customer lists, driver lists including the earning statements, rate sheets, price sheets, vendor information, document templates, invoices and customer order and other business information shown on Exhibits 1 through 20 attached to the motion.” Further, the preliminary injunction enjoins Li, Tan, and CTU from, among other things, contacting, transacting, dealing, soliciting, or communicating in any way with any persons or entities identified on an exhibit list attached to the Preliminary Injunction Order. Witness is on the list. In February 2021, Plaintiffs filed doe amendments: Doe 1 – EMC Transportation, Inc.; Doe 2 – Jinqing Ye;           Doe 3 – Jianwen Huang; Doe 4 – Peng Xue; Doe 5 – Peinan Hu.

            The Second Amended Complaint, filed October 14, 2021, alleges that in violation of the preliminary injunction, Defendants created one or more shell companies, including EMC, to serve as Defendants’ alter egos in order to continue conducting business by illegally stealing Plaintiffs’ customers. A few days later, on October 19, 2021, Plaintiffs served the deposition subpoena at issue on Witness.

            According to Huang, Plaintiffs have had a business relationship with Witness, a freight forwarder, since 2013. Declaration of Jie Mei Huang, ¶2. Witness arranges transportation for its customers’ cargo and merchandise imported to the United States. J&J obtained a lot of business from Witness picking up cargo containers shipped by Witness’s customers in China to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach and delivering them to various destinations as Witness designated. Id. at ¶3. J&J considers Witness as its customer although the merchandise in the cargo containers might belong to Witness’s own customers, who may or may not be consistent shippers. Id. at ¶4.

            According to Huang, business from Witness suddenly came to a complete stop after Li and Tan formed CTU to compete with J&J. Id. at ¶6. Huang says she has had communication with her contact person at Witness, who confirmed that Witness is using CTU’s services and that this continued even after Huang made Witness aware of the Preliminary Injunction. Id. at ¶¶7, 8. This contact person provides a declaration in opposition denying that this is so. Witness Declaration, ¶13. The Witness Declarant states that Witness was unaware of the injunction until September 2021, when it issued a delivery order to CTU pertaining to a particular container number. Witness Declaration, ¶16. When the container was at customs inspection, CTU informed Witness that it could not transport the container because of a preliminary injunction order. Witness indicates this was a surprise but in order to get the container out of inspections and avoid excess storage and delay fees, Witness reached out to several trucking companies, including EMC, requesting help. EMC handled the request. Witness Declaration, ¶¶17-20.

            Plaintiffs have been attempting to obtain information to establish their claim that Defendants are violating the injunction by contacting and transacting business with persons and entities on the exhibit list attached to the order. Plaintiffs have sought information directly from Defendants. The current motion involves their attempts to obtain information from Witness, a third party who is on the exhibit list.

            On March 4, 2022, Witness responded to the subpoena by serving objections. Extensive meet and confer efforts followed. As a result of those efforts, and in reliance on a meet and confer letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel stating that the subpoena does not request electronically stored information, on July 29, 2022, Witness provided supplemental responses and produced two physical documents.

            B. Discovery At Issue

            A copy of the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records at issue is attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ motion. It seeks production of the following documents:

1. All documents that relate to all business that you have transacted with CTU, including without limitation all delivery orders, invoices, proofs of delivery, documents evidencing your payments to CTU, and all communications regarding the foregoing, including messages sent and received via WeChat, WhatsApp or any other social media platform, from January 1, 2019 to the present, including the first or initial communications between you and CTU.

2. All documents that relate to all business that you have transacted with EMC, including without limitation all delivery orders, invoices, proofs of delivery, documents evidencing your payments to CTU, and all communications regarding the foregoing, including messages sent and received via WeChat, WhatsApp or any other social media platform, from January 1, 2019 to the present, including the first or initial communications between you and EMC.

3. Documents sufficient to identify all persons who have used CTU’s trucking services by and through your services, whether the business is provided based upon your recommendation, by your referral, by your direct order, or by the request of such person(s), from January 1, 2019 to the present.

4. Documents sufficient to identify all persons who have used EMC’s trucking services by and through your services, whether the business is provided based upon your recommendation, by your referral, by your direct order, or by the request of such person(s), from January 1, 2019 to the present.

5. All communications between you and any customs broker or freight forwarder regarding CTU or EMC, including without limitation all delivery orders, emails, facsimiles, text messages, and any messages sent or received via WeChat or any other social messaging platform.

6. Documents sufficient to identify your customers who use CTU, EMC and/or their affiliates for their trucking needs.

 

            The subpoena specifies in the Attachment 3, ¶5 of the Definitions that “‘DOCUMENT(S)’ shall have the meaning ascribed to WRITING(S) in California Evidence Code §250, and include originals, copies and electronically stored versions of the WRITING(S), and include text messages and/or messages sent through WeChat, WhatsApp, or any other social medial platform.”

            Code Civ. Proc. §2020.410(a) provides that a deposition subpoena demanding only the production of business records “shall designate the business records to be produced either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item, and shall specify the form in which any electronically stored information is to be produced, if a particular form is desired.” Here, no particular form for producing ESI is stated.

            Code Civ. Proc. §2020.220(d)(1) provides that if a subpoena does not specify the form or forms for producing a type of ESI, the person subpoenaed shall produce the information in the form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form that is reasonably usable.

 

            C. Motion is Denied as to Categories 1 -4 and 6

            1. Witness’s Objection That Information Is Available From Another Source

            In Witness’s original response to the subpoena it objected to Categories 1-4 and 6 in part on the ground that the subpoena improperly sought documents from a non-party while the documents “can be readily obtained from the defendant [], a party to the case.” Exhibit 4 at pages 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 in response to Categories 1-4 and 6. Plaintiffs’ argument that Witness has failed to cite any legal authority supporting its position (Separate Statement at 5:16-22) lacks merit. While Witness’s initial set of objections does not cite §2020.220(i), the very first meet and confer letter does so. Exhibit 6 at page 2. Thus, Witness has provided authority for its objection. It is the following.

            Code Civ. Proc. §2020.220(i) provides the following rule as to ESI:

(i) The court shall limit the frequency or extent of discovery of electronically stored information, even from a source that is reasonably accessible, if the court determines that any of the following conditions exists:

(1) It is possible to obtain the information from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.

(2) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.

(3) The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought.

(4) The likely burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit, taking into account the amount in controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance of the issues in the litigation, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues.

            Plaintiffs are aware of this objection because they responded to it in meet and confer letters. Plaintiffs responded to this objection by stating that “the Subpoena does not seek ESI but physical documents such as delivery orders, invoices, payment records, etc.” Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7, April 15, 2022 meet and confer letter at page 2. Thereafter, Witness provided a supplemental response, additional meet and confer letters were exchanged, and on July 29, 2022, produced two physical documents. Exhibits 11 and 12. Further meet and confer letters followed, with Witness confirming that these were the only two physical documents responsive to the subpoena that it could find through reasonable efforts. Exhibit 17.

            To the extent this motion argues that Witness should be compelled to produce any electronically store information the motion is denied. Having instructed Witness that the only documents sought by the subpoena are physical documents, Plaintiffs cannot now accuse Witness of violating the subpoena by failing to produce ESI.

            2. Witness’s “Burdensome” Objection

            Witness’s objection that the documents may more easily be obtained from Defendants is also based on Code Civ. Proc. §2019.030(a)(1) [“The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method provided in Section 2019.010 if it determines [] The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”].

            The opposition brief is supported by a Witness Declaration who states at ¶24 that Witness uses an electronic commercial freight management system that organizes documents by customer identity and container number. Witness also states that in terms of physical documents it has about 6,000 folders with about 30,000 pages of documents but that these documents are “archived and piled over time.” Id. at ¶22. The Reply argument at 3:8-13 that Witness has identified some 6,000 responsive, easily-searchable documents is inaccurate for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs already told Witness the subpoena does not seek ESI; (2) the 6,000 documents are physical and, according to Witness, are not organized or easily searchable.       

            Plaintiffs argue vigorously that Witness’s business records are evidence of Plaintiffs’ misappropriation claim against Defendants. While that is possibly true it does not negate Witness’s objection that the documents may more easily be obtained from Defendants. This may be especially true since the physical documents exist are in a “pile” and not organized in such a way that responsive documents can easily be retrieved. The declaration of Witness’s principle, offered in opposition to this motion, avers that Witness does not index physical documents and that Witness has around 6,000 folders with about 30,000 pages of physical documents, which the principle spent 5-6 hours looking through, resulting in production of the two documents. The declarant further avers that Witness is a small business and this search required declarant to work overtime to make up the lost time and that further searches would be a heavy toll burden and would not result in a meaningful number of responsive documents being located. Witness Declaration, ¶29.

            Plaintiffs argue that Witness has the burden of establishing that the information is readily available from another source, citing Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550. Reply at 4:5-8. This is not a persuasive argument because Williams does not concern third party discovery and contains no discussion about an objection that the information is readily available from another source. Also, in their moving papers Plaintiffs fail to explain why a third party should be ordered to provide information that is available from the Defendants. In their reply brief Plaintiffs assert that at a recent deposition of CTU’s person most knowledgeable, CTU claimed that its laptops, iphones, and physical documents subject to production had all been stolen. Exhibit 22 to Reply. As this evidence is from a July 8, 2022, deposition and this motion was not filed until August 16, 2022, it is evidence and argument that could and should have been included in the moving papers. As it was not, it is not considered by the Court.

            Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §2020.430(c)(2), if the custodian provides copies the custodian is entitled to be paid reasonable costs. Evid. Code §1563(b)(1) sets the amount of such reasonable costs, which is $0.10 per page and $24 per hour for the custodian to search. Thus far, and not knowing how many of the 30,000 physical documents Witness looked through so far, the cost to Plaintiffs would seem to be $144 (6 hours at $24) for labor and $0.20 for the two copies. If a six-hour search turns up only two documents and is taxing to the company in other ways in that the person doing the search cannot attend to his or her work tasks and is forced to make up that work later, the “burdensome” objection appears to be well taken.

           

            D. Motion Is Denied As To Categories 5 And 6

            In these two categories, Plaintiffs seek communications between Witness and custom brokers of freight forwarders about CTU or EMC (No. 5) and documents identifying Witnesses customers who use CTU or EMC (No. 6).

            Witness’s objection that these two are overly broad as they contain no time restrictions is sustained.

            Witness’s objection that the information sought is beyond the scope of the underlying dispute is also sustained. Discovery is broad but it is broader as to parties than non-parties like Witness. While a non-party may be required to comply with a business records subpoena, the records Plaintiffs apparently seek to obtain by way of this subpoena go beyond what may normally be considered business records. Category 6, which essentially asks Witness to identify every document that references every customer it may have who uses Defendants’ services (“Documents sufficient to identify your customers who use CTU, EMC and/or their affiliates for their trucking needs”) is impermissibly broad.

            A short discussion about the scope of the preliminary injunction may be useful. To the extent Plaintiffs are seeking information sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants have violated the preliminary injunction, the scope of the subpoena is appropriately tailored to the pleading. But Plaintiffs seem to imply that what they seek is more than that. Plaintiffs indicate that they are trying to determine “co-conspirators” so that they may add new defendants to the pleading. Motion at 10:11-13. Plaintiffs argue that the information sought here is “necessary for Plaintiffs to identify the persons who are assisting CTU and EMC to circumvent the preliminary injunction and continue to cause harm to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs need the information to evaluate whether new defendants should be added to this case and to the complaint for contempt of court.” Separate Statement at 27:16-19.

            Witness is correct that the preliminary injunction does not prohibit it from doing business with CTU or EMC, or from referring customers to CTU or EMC. Interpreting the preliminary injunction otherwise would give it an improper reach. The only parties over whom the Court has jurisdiction and who are therefore subject to the preliminary injunction are Defendants. The accusation that Witness may have “jumped on board” in doing business with EMC or that it “may have involved itself in the dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants” improperly applies otherwise. Separate Statement at 28:18-25. Given that Plaintiffs have essentially argued in this motion that they need information from Witness in order to add new defendants, Witness is understandably and with good reason wary about providing such information.

 

            E. Sanctions

            Code Civ. Proc. §1987.2 provides that, “in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”

            Code Civ. Proc. §2025.480(j) provides, “The court shall impose a monetary sanction [] against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

            Plaintiffs ask for $10,861.25 in monetary sanctions against Witness. The request is supported by the Declaration of Mary Sun, who indicates that she bills at $450/hour and that she spent 22 hours on this motion, anticipates another two hours to draft a reply and appear at the hearing, and who paid $61.25 for a filing fee. That request is denied.

            Witness asks for $11,700 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §2023.010 on the grounds that Plaintiffs filed this motion without substantial justification and have abused the discovery process. This request is supported by the Declaration of Hsiwen Lo, who bills at $450/hour and spent 23 hours on opposing this motion and anticipates spending an additional three hours reviewing the reply brief and attending the hearing. This request is granted in part.

            The Court finds that this motion was neither made nor opposed in bad faith. Both sides had reasonable arguments to make regarding the scope of the subpoena. Accordingly, the Court declines to award sanctions to either side. 

IV.      CONCLUSION

            Plaintiffs’ motion to compel compliance with third party deposition subpoena for business records is denied.  Witness is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

           

 

           

Dated:                                                                        _______________________________

                                                                                          MARGARET OLDENDORF

                                                                                 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT