Judge Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case Number: 22AHCV00146, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV00146, Date: 2023-08-30 Tentative Ruling

This action concerns an alleged easement across real property owned by Defendants that Plaintiff allegedly needs to access real property it owns. The operative First Amended Complaint alleges claims for breach of contract, trespass, nuisance, and related causes of action. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive damages and attorney fees. As the pleading does not support either form of relief, the motion to strike is granted.

Code Civ. Proc. §436 provides: “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

Grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Code Civ. Proc. §437.

Plaintiff Land Value Trust[1] holds title to certain real property in Duarte. It is the assignee of all legal and equitable claims held by its predecessor in interest, Land Value Holdings, LLC. FAC ¶¶2, 3. This property is referred to as the “009 parcel.” Plaintiffs trace the title of the 009 parcel from Arthur Gordon Maddock to W&A Builders, who subdivided the lot and granted Plaintiff’s parcel a twenty-foot driveway easement. FAC ¶5-7.

Defendants Victor Tufenkdjian and Leticia Bandera hold title to residential real property in this subdivision. Plaintiff’s property is located behind Defendants’. FAC ¶¶12, 13.

Since January 15, 1981, all owners of 9.587 acres of property, including Plaintiff, held a twenty-foot easement to access their property via a driveway built on the northern edge of Defendants’ property. FAC ¶¶18, 20, and Exhibits B and I thereto.

On August 2 and 24, 2020, Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest tried to communicate with Defendants regarding obtaining the code to the gate that was located on the easement. Defendants allegedly failed to reply, necessitating this action. FAC ¶¶21, 22, 37, 57, 67, 83.

Plaintiff cannot trim any shrubbery on its property because of Defendants’ blockage. FAC ¶22.

A pre-existing easement was allegedly breached by Defendants, causing damage to Plaintiff. FAC ¶31. Plaintiff was unable to perform weed abatement due to lack of access, causing it to suffer fines, fees, costs, and interest. FAC ¶38. Plaintiff is attempting to sell the property; but the blocked access has caused the property’s market value to decline. FAC ¶41. Plaintiff is being wrongfully excluded from its own land. FAC ¶42. Because of Defendants’ wrongful interference, Plaintiff was unable to discover illegal roads that Southern California Edison constructed on its property, causing significant damage. FAC ¶44.

By failing to provide the gate code, Defendants are dissuading potential purchasers of Plaintiff’s property. FAC ¶69.

Defendants also allegedly wrongfully injured and damaged underwood or potential trees on Plaintiff’s property during construction of a structure on Defendants’ property; and encroached on Defendants’ Plaintiff’s property without permission to build their structure. FAC ¶¶107, 108.

Civ. Code §3294 provides, “(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Subdivision (c) defines malice as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

The FAC contains the word “malice,” but not fraud or oppression. The allegations are essentially that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s easement with malice knowing they had no right to do so (FAC ¶51); that they blocked access to and built on Plaintiff’s property intentionally and with malice (FAC ¶73); and that they blocked Plaintiff’s access to its property in bad faith, willfully, intentionally, and with malice, knowing they had no right to do so (FAC ¶89). However, the only factual allegations alleged against Defendants are that on two occasions in 2020, Defendants were asked to provide Plaintiff’s predecessor with the code for the gate, and failed to do so.

The allegation in ¶70 that Defendants “maintain” a code-controlled gate without providing Plaintiffs’ access to it is viewed in light of the allegation that denial of entry occurred on two occasions in 2020. As for the allegations at ¶72 that Defendants maintained and erected structures on Plaintiff’s property without Plaintiff’s consent; and at ¶89 that Defendants “blocked and built on Plaintiff’s property,” what was “built” is assumed to mean the gate, as there are no other allegations of Defendants building on Plaintiff’s property. The 6^th cause of action alleges statutory damage to timber that occurred when Defendants encroached on Plaintiff’s property while in the process of doing construction on their own property. None of this constitutes conduct that rises to the level of what may be considered “despicable.”

Trial courts are empowered to determine at the pleading stage whether the facts as alleged are sufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63-64. Here, the facts do not rise to that level. The motion to strike punitive damages is therefore granted.

Attorney fees are only recoverable where provided by contract or statute. Code Civ. Proc. §§1021, 1035(a)(10). The FAC does not allege either. Plaintiff seems to argue in opposition that the recorded easement may be a basis for fees -- but that is neither alleged nor supported by any recorded document attached as an exhibit to the pleading. The opposition references CC&Rs, but the pleading contains no such allegation. Finally, Plaintiff urges that the “tort of another” doctrine may support the prayer for attorney fees. That doctrine has no application here, because this litigation was not necessitated by the tort of a third party. The motion to strike the prayer for attorney fees is well taken, and is granted.

Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive damages and attorney fees is granted. This order is without prejudice to any future motion for leave to amend that may be appropriate, if Plaintiff develops facts that would support punitive damages and/or attorney fees.

[1] The real party in interest/proper plaintiff is the trustee, Bernard Austin. See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group, 2023), ¶2.6.