Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV00803, Date: 2024-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00803    Hearing Date: April 18, 2024    Dept: P

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LINCOLN MOTEL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I.        INTRODUCTION

          This is a personal injury case arising from a fall at Defendant Lincoln Motel. Plaintiff Rick Eugene Lomas alleges that on May 21, 2021, he slipped and fell in his motel room. The complaint contains two causes of action: (1) negligence and (2) premises liability.

          Before the Court is Defendant MO-OHMI Inc. dba Lincoln Motel (Lincoln)’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, filed on December 15, 2023. No opposition has been filed as of the time of posting this tentative.

          Defendant Lincoln moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) it did not owe Plaintiff a duty to warn or fix the alleged dangerous condition, (2) the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious and (3) it was not necessary for Plaintiff to encounter the alleged dangerous condition.

          The motion for summary judgment is granted.

II.      LEGAL STANDARD

          Summary judgment is appropriately granted where it is shown that an action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(a).) A cause of action has no merit if one of the following exists: (1) one or more necessary elements cannot be established; (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense. (CCP § 437c(o).)

          The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.¿ (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)¿ A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either: (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p).) A motion for summary judgment should be granted where all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c).) 

A defendant has met “his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “[T]he burden [then] shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

          Unopposed declarations must be accepted as true. (CCP § 437c(e).) However, affidavits must be liberally construed in favor of the opposition and strictly construed against the moving party in determining the existence of a "triable issue" of fact. (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

III. ANALYSIS

          A. Undisputed Material Facts

Pursuant to the separate statement, Plaintiff Rick Eugene Lomas alleges he slipped and fell on May 21, 2021, in his room at the Lincoln Motel. (UMF 1.) Plaintiff alleges he slipped because the floor had been mopped without warning. (UMF 3.) However, Plaintiff allowed motel staff to mop his room and watched them mop. (UMFs 5-6.) After staff left his room, Plaintiff slipped and fell. (UMF 7.) Plaintiff alleges he was injured as a result. (UMF 8.)

          B. Negligence or Premises Liability?

A negligence cause of action requires duty, breach of the duty, causation, and damages. (Antiglio v. Corning, Inc. (1998) Cal.4th 604,614.) In general, one does not have an affirmative duty to act unless a “special relationship” exists between the defendant and plaintiff. Special relationships include parent-child, doctor-patient, common-carriers, and innkeepers. (Ericson v. Federal Express Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1300.) Premises liability is a specific form of negligence alleged against property owners. (See Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corporation (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619, citations omitted.)

Under both causes of action, Plaintiff seeks redress for the same alleged negligence: a wet floor in his motel room. (See Complaint p. 4-5.) Defendant Lincoln Motel is a property owner.

          The Court concludes that the complaint is more properly construed as one cause of action for premises liability.

          C. Premises Liability

          Property owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the premises to avoid exposing people to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Id.) Property owners are not liable for “injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care.” (Florez v. Groom Dev. Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 347, 355; see also Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc., 99 Cal.App.2d 484, 486 [holding that a government entity could not be held responsible for a dangerous condition of its property because there was no evidence the entity had notice of the dangerous condition.]) “To impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to the defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier ‘must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises.’” (Girvetz v. Boys’ Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829-830.)

Citing Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447, Defendant urges that there is no liability for a dangerous condition that is so open and obvious that the condition itself is a warning. (See Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447, internal citations omitted [“[g] enerally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.”])

Here, Defendant urges that Plaintiff knew of the alleged dangerous condition, citing Plaintiff’s discovery responses. (Motion p. 10.) In his response to Special Interrogatory 53, Plaintiff states “Responding Party slipped and fell on a slippery floor that had just recently been cleaned, mopped and/or waxed by Defendant’s employees and/or staff.” ( See, e.g., Defendant’s Evidence Exh. C. p. 30-highlighted text.) At deposition, Plaintiff testified “the ladies that come in, they clean the room, they knocked on the door, and I let them in” and that he saw the cleaning ladies mop the floor. (Defendant’s Evidence Exh. D. p.44: 12-14, p. 50: 16-23.) 

Defendant urges that because Lomas saw the staff mopping, the danger of a wet floor was obvious, and Lomas could reasonably be expected to see the wet floor. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities p. 6: 6-13.) Lomas was aware of the alleged dangerous condition. (UMFs 5-6.) Because Lomas knew the floor was recently mopped, Lincoln did not have a duty to warn Lomas of the wet floor. (Knight v. Contracting Engineers Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 435, 447.)

Without evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact as to duty to warn, the cause of action for premises liability cannot be established.

Alternatively, Lincoln urges that because Lomas observed the staff mopping, the wet floor was an open and obvious dangerous condition. (UMFs 5,6.) Generally, if the dangerous condition is open and obvious, there is no liability. Only if the eventual harm was foreseeable can there be liability. (See Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 121-122 [necessity of Plaintiff encountering the harm made the injury foreseeable]; Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assocs. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 111, 122.)

          Defendant urges that Plaintiff’s injury was not foreseeable. Defendant urges that “PLAINTIFF could have simply waited outside his Motel Room until the floor dried. Alternatively, PLAINTIFF could have carefully walked into his Motel Room and sat on the bed or sat in a chair at his desk until the floor dried.” (Memorandum of Points and Authorities p. 7: 7-9.) Defendant cites Miller v. Desilu Productions, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 160, 164-165, internal citations omitted, for the proposition that “there is no obligation to protect the invitee against dangers which are known to him, or which are so apparent that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and be fully able to look out for himself.”

          The Court finds that no triable issue of material fact exists as to duty to warn. As duty to warn is an element of premises liability, summary judgment is appropriate. Alternatively, the wet floor was an open and obvious condition for which Plaintiff’s harm was not foreseeable.

The Court grants summary judgment.

IV.     CONCLUSION

          Defendant Lincoln Motel’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Counsel for Defendant Lincoln Motel is ordered to give notice.

Dated: April 16, 2024                                                                                                                                                            

JARED D. MOSES, JUDGE