Judge Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case Number: 22AHCV00947, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV00947, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jane Doe KW alleges that she suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of Defendant Kenneth Cronquist, who was employed by Defendant Maranatha High School as a vice principal and cross-country coach. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Maranatha knew of complaints against Cronquist and did not address the complaints. The Complaint states six causes of action: (1) childhood sexual abuse, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) negligent failure to educate, warn or train, (4) failure to report suspected child abuse, (5) negligent supervision of a minor and (6) negligence.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further response to Requests for Production of Documents on January 31, 2024. Maranatha filed an opposition on February 26, 2024. Plaintiff filed a reply on March 1, 2024. The hearing on this motion was continued to its current date of April 12, 2024 for scheduling purposes.

At issue is the sufficiency of Maranatha’s compliance with Requests for Production Nos. 1-2, 5-10, 13, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 27, 31, 34, 36-39, 43-44, 46, propounded and served on Maranatha as Requests for Production, Set One on August 25, 2023. The motion is GRANTED. However, the Court notes that request Nos. 17 and 34 appear to be identical.

Counsel for Plaintiff, Andrew I. Chung, declares that he sent a meet and confer letter on January 5, 2024 to Counsel for Maranatha. (Chung Decl. ¶ 4, see Exh. 3.) Maranatha’s counsel responded on January 18, 2024. (See Exh. 4.) Parties engaged in telephonic meet and confer sometime after January 18, 2024 and were unable to reach a resolution. (Chung Decl. ¶¶ 5,6.)

“Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” (CCP § 2017.010.) A party responding to requests for inspection must either provide a statement of compliance, represent that it lacks the ability to comply, or object. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210.) When a party propounding demands for inspection deems responses to the responses to be incomplete or evasive, or deems objections to be without merit, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further response. Such motion must set forth facts showing good cause for the discovery, be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, and include a separate statement. Such motion must also be made within 45 days of verified responses or supplemental responses, or on or before any specific later date the parties have agreed to in writing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(a)-(c).)

Code Civ. Proc. Section 2031.310(h) provides for the imposition of monetary sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes such a motion unless the court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust.

Code Civ. Proc. Section 2017.010 permits a party to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter . . . if the matter is either itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) According to a leading treatise, “For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as ‘relevant’ to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Sup.Ct. (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 (citing text); Lipton v. Sup.Ct. (1996) 48 CA4th 1599, 1611 (citing text); Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 CA4th 1006, 1013 (citing text)]” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2022), ¶8:66.1.)

Case law has established that several areas of an individual’s life are entitled to privacy, among them are privacy in one’s financial records, medical records, and employment records. This privacy interest is not absolute and must sometimes yield if a balancing of interests so requires. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 sets forth the process. First, a legally protected privacy right must be identified, in which the party has a reasonable expectation to privacy and the threatened invasion of which is serious rather than trivial. If these facts exist, courts must balance the invasion of that privacy with the competing interests. “Privacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests. . . . Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest. Legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially beneficial activities of government and private entities.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37-38.)

Even though relevance is quite broad, it is not without limits. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424.) Though the holding in Obregon does not directly concern the merits of the objections, it described the discovery requests there as “very broad” and stated that “their full scope does not appear reasonably related to the issues in the case.” (Id. at 431.) “When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an intent to harass and improperly burden.” (Ibid, bolding added.) When that is the case, the burden is on the propounding party to “explain why interrogatories of such breadth are proper.” (Id. at 432.)

At issue here are Requests for Production Nos. 1-2, 5-10, 13, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 27, 31, 34, 36, 37-38, 39, 43-44, 46. In response to all the RFPs at issue, Defendant Maranatha did not produce any documents, citing relevance, overbreadth, vagueness, ambiguity and privacy concerns. The objections will be discussed by category rather than by RFP number.

Request for Production 1: KENNETH CRONQUIST’s complete personnel file(s) and/or student teacher file from YOU.

Request for Production 2: Any and all DOCUMENTS regarding KENNETH CRONQUIST’s employment with YOU or the SCHOOL.

Request for Production 5: Any documents, memos, correspondence, emails or similar WRITINGS which contain, describe, set forth or evidence any complaints made against KENNETH CRONQUIST while KENNETH CRONQUIST was employed by YOU.

Request for Production 6: Any documents, memos, correspondence, emails or similar WRITINGS which contain, describe, set forth or evidence any complaints made against KENNETH CRONQUIST, regardless of date.

Request for Production 7: Any documents, memos, correspondence, emails or similar WRITINGS which contain, describe, set forth or evidence any response by KENNETH CRONQUIST or by YOU to any complaints made against KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 8: Any documents or WRITINGS which contain, describe, set forth, or evidence any investigation by YOU, or anyone acting on its behalf, into allegations of any improper behavior between KENNETH CRONQUIST and any student.

Request for Production 9: Any memos, emails, correspondence or similar WRITINGS generated by YOU in response to or as a result of KENNETH CRONQUIST leaving employment with YOU.

Request for Production 10: Any memos, emails, correspondence or similar WRITINGS regarding KENNETH CRONQUIST’s separation of employment with YOU.

Request for Production 13: Any and all photographs YOU have of KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 17: Any and all DOCUMENTS from any police department, County Sheriff’s department, district attorney, city attorney, or any other law enforcement agency regarding an investigation of KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 18: Any documents, investigative reports, police reports, photographs, audio recordings, video recordings and all other evidence from any criminal investigation of KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 21: Any and all DOCUMENTS regarding complaints made by any parents of students of the SCHOOL about the ABUSER.

Request for Production 24: Any documents, memos, emails, or similar WRITINGS which set forth or describe any warnings, reprimands, or counseling given to KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 26: All documents or WRITINGS, in unredacted form, which discuss, relate to any potential disciplinary action against KENNETH CRONQUIST when KENNETH CRONQUIST was employed with YOU.

Request for Production 27: All documents or WRITINGS, in unredacted form, which show that YOU performed any investigation into the alleged misconduct of KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 34: Any and all DOCUMENTS from any police department, County Sheriff’s department, district attorney, city attorney, or any other law enforcement agency regarding any investigation of KENNETH CRONQUIST.

Request for Production 36: Any written or recorded statements, interviews, or transcriptions or summaries of the same, or similar WRITINGS or materials provided by any administrator, teacher, staff member, or employee of YOU in connection with any investigation into alleged inappropriate SEXUAL MISCONDUCT by KENNETH CRONQUIST with any student.

Request for Production 37: Any written or recorded statements, interviews, or transcriptions or summaries of the same, or similar WRITINGS or materials provided by any student, former student, parent of a student, parent of a former student, or any other third-party witness in connection with any investigation into alleged inappropriate SEXUAL MISCONDUCT by KENNETH CRONQUIST with any student.

Request for Production 38: Any documents, materials, or WRITINGS, including letters, reports, summaries, files, emails, folders, or similar items, that were provided by YOU to any law enforcement official or agency or any representative of the District Attorney's office at any time regarding any investigation into alleged inappropriate SEXUAL MISCONDUCT by KENNETH CRONQUIST with any student.

Request for Production 39: A copy of any photos, including class photos, showing PLAINTIFF as a student at the SCHOOL.

Request for Production 43: Any and all employee rosters or similar WRITINGS which contain, set forth, list, or identify the names of administrators, teachers, coaches, employees, and/or staff assigned to the SCHOOL during the TIME PERIOD.

Request for Production 44: Any and all DOCUMENTS showing the identity of YOUR superintendents during the TIME PERIOD.

Request for Production 46: A copy of each school yearbook for the SCHOOL during the TIME PERIOD.

In Maranatha’s Responses to the Requests for Production, it objects that the discovery sought is not relevant. Plaintiff urges that she is entitled to Defendant Cronquist’s personnel and employee file, any complaints Defendant Maranatha received about him and the other requested documents as these documents form the crux of her case against Maranatha. (See Motion p. 6: 10-19.) The scope of discovery is broad by design. (CCP § 2017.010.) The Court agrees that the discovery requests seek relevant information.

The Court notes that Maranatha’s responses impermissibly attempt to limit the scope of discovery to complaints concerning sexual misconduct. (See Motion p. 7; see, e.g., Opposition Separate Statement p. 10: 25-28, p. 14: 21-25, p. 18: 16-19.) Maranatha does not cite any case law or statute for this narrowing of discovery. As discovery by nature is broad, the Court concludes that all complaints Maranatha received about Cronquist, sexual misconduct or otherwise, are relevant and discoverable.

In its opposition, Marantha urges that the only relevant information is information before 1985. (Opposition p. 6: 1-6.) However, the scope of discovery is broad by design and the Court declines to sustain an objection based on relevancy or otherwise limit the scope of discovery without clear explanation as to why the limitation is warranted.

To the extent that the Court considers this objection, the Court notes that the standard for overbreadth is ambiguity to the point of being unintelligible, which is not met here. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) The requests are clearly intelligible and understandable.

Maranatha urges that the information sought is privileged and/or private. (See, e.g., Motion Separate Statement, p.33: 24-26, Opposition Separate Statement p. 3: 13-17.)[1] In her motion, Plaintiff urges that pursuant to Hill balancing, her need for discovery outweighs any potential privacy interest Cronquist has in the records. (Motion p. 9: 6-18.) As an initial matter, the Court notes that an entity does not have privacy rights and cannot assert the privacy interests of others on that person’s behalf.

In support, Plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that discovery into private matters is allowed if the seeking party demonstrates the relevance and significance of the information sought. (See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 544; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 303.) She urges that the only way for her to find out what the school knew is through these personnel files. She also notes that Maranatha is the exclusive holder of these records. (Motion p. 10: 3-13.)

Plaintiff also cites Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259 for the proposition that discovery into personnel records is permitted. Marken concerned a high school teacher who brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a school district challenging said district’s planned disclosure of investigations revealing the teacher violated the sexual harassment policy. (Id. at 1255.) The Court of Appeals held that the district’s planned disclosure did not violate Marken’s right to privacy under the California Constitution. (Id. at 1274.) Specifically, “Under governing case law, summarized above, the public's interest in disclosure of this information—the public's right to know—outweighs Marken's privacy interest in shielding the information from disclosure.” (Id. at 1276.) Plaintiff cites two other cases where similar information was deemed discoverable. (See BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 757 [disclosure of misconduct report of a school district superintendent]; Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 591-593 [Church ordered to disclose of files pertaining to perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse.])

In its opposition, Marantha urges that “Plaintiff has not specifically articulated the category of documents sought, how each is directly relevant to a cause of action or defense, or how the information is essential to determining the truth of the matter in dispute and to a fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Opposition p. 7: 14-16.) Using Maranatha’s example of RFP No. 1, the Court concludes that “personnel file” is specific enough to let Marantha know what is being sought. The Court finds Marantha’s attempt to distinguish Plaintiff’s cited cases on factual differences unpersuasive.

As to Marantha’s argument as to the employee lists from January 1977 to December 31, 1990, the Court finds that contact information of employees is relevant to the action, as these other teachers and administrators could be potential witnesses. (CCP § 2017.010 [“[d]iscovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter…”]) The Court declines to order a Belaire-West opt out notice or a similar measure. (See Opposition p. 9: 2-11.)

Given the nature of the case, the need for disclosure and the inability to access these personnel records otherwise, the privacy objection is overruled.

To the extent that the Court considers this objection, the Court notes that it is not enough to state that complying with a discovery request is burdensome but that a party must provide some evidence of the specific burden they anticipate. In its opposition, Marantha does not appear to be pursuing this objection any longer.

Maranatha additionally urges that the certain of the requests are improperly compound. (See, e.g., Motion Separate Statement p. 33: 18.) The Court disagrees. (CCP § 2030.060(f).) None of the RFPs contain subparts or are improperly compound, as clarifying the type of documents sought does not make it compound. In its opposition, Marantha does not appear to be pursuing this objection any longer.

The Court finds that this motion was neither made nor opposed in bad faith. Plaintiff and Defendant made reasonable arguments about the scope of discovery.

[1] It appears to the Court that Maranatha is no longer pursuing the attorney-client privilege or work product privilege objections. The Court does not discuss these objections.