Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV01229, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01229    Hearing Date: January 31, 2024    Dept: P

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

          I.        INTRODUCTION

          This is an action for childhood sexual assault (CSA). Plaintiff Jane Roe (Roe) alleges that in 2004-2007, while she was in elementary school, she was sexually assaulted by Defendant Victor Martinez (Martinez), her teacher.

          Roe alleges that she was a student at various elementary schools operated by Defendant Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD) at the time the CSA occurred. She alleges that she told her school counselor, Defendant Kelly Montgomery, about the abuse but that the abuse was not investigated by either Montgomery or PUSD. The second amended complaint contains eleven causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) negligent supervision, (3) negligent hiring and/or retention, (4) negligent failure to warn, train or educate, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) sexual battery, (7) sexual assault, (8) gender violence, (9) violation of penal code § 288, (10) violation of penal code § 647.6 and (11) violation of civil rights.

          Before the Court is PUSD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the complaint. PUSD moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 11^th causes of action.

PUSD filed the instant motion on January 3, 2024. Plaintiff Jane Roe filed an opposition on January 18, 2024. PUSD filed a reply on January 24, 2024.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Leave to amend is granted.

          II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

          Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice:

          Plaintiff Roe requests judicial notice of 18 cases: 1. Doe v. Benicia Unified (Solano County), 2. Doe Y.G. v. Doe 1 (Los Angeles County), 3. Jane BWK Doe v. Barstow Unified (San Bernardino County), 4. Jane Doe v. Amador USD (Amador County), 5. Jane Doe MW v. Oakland Unified (Alameda County), 6. Jane Doe v. Barstow Unified (San Bernardino County), 7. Jane Doe v. LG-Saratoga Union High School District (Santa Clara County), 8. Jane Doe v. Oakland Unified (Alameda County), 9. John Doe 2 and John Doe 3 v. Tamalpais Union High School District (Marin County), 10. John Doe CF v. Fremont Unified School District (Alameda County), 11. John Doe v. Roseville City School District (Placer County), 12. John Doe v. Tamalpais Union High School District (Marin County) , 13. John Doe v. Tamalpais Union High School District (Marin County) – second case, 14. John Does 1-5 v. Mountain View Whisman School District (Santa Cruz County), 15. John Roe v. Union High School District (Santa Clara County), 16. Reza Afshar v. Orchard School District (Santa Clara County), 17. Robin Richie v. Oroville Union High School District (Butte County) and 18. Y.T. v. Sylvan Unified School District (Stanislaus County).

          To the extent that these are records of various California courts, the request is granted. Accordingly, judicial notice is taken of Exhs. 1-18.

III.     LEGAL STANDARD

          Code Civ. Proc. §438 provides for a motion for judgment on the pleadings. When made by a plaintiff, a motion may be made on the ground that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. When the moving party is the defendant, the motion may be made on either one of two grounds: the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.

          “A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings ‘is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’ (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)” Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735.)

          Code Civ. Proc. §439(a)(2) mandates that five days before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the parties meet and confer in person.  

          IV.     ANALYSIS

          As briefly summarized in the introduction, the gist of the complaint as to Defendant PUSD is that it knew of the abuse and did not report it or otherwise investigate or reprimand the allegedly abusive teacher. Based on that simple set of facts, the pleading sets forth 11 causes of action. PUSD argues that  the first, second, third, fourth and eleventh causes of action do not contain sufficient facts.

          A. AB 218 Does Not Violate the California Constitution

           Here, PUSD urges that (1) AB 218 violates the gifts clause of the California Constitution and that necessarily, the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 11^th causes of action fail as a result. Accordingly, the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 11^th causes of action will be discussed together, as the same argument is advanced.

          PUSD urges that AB 218 violates the gifts clause of the California Constitution. (Motion, p. 10: 11-14.) The Government Claims Act requires that before a suit is filed against a public entity, a plaintiff must first file a claim for damages with the public entity itself. (Cal. Gov’t Code § 905.) AB 218 changed Government Code Section 905, to carve out a retroactive exception to the Government Claims Act for claims of sexual abuse. It is this retroactive application that PUSD alleges is non-compliant with the California Constitution. Because this created “liability on a public entity for a past occurrence where there is no enforceable claim,” which in turn might result in the award of public money if Plaintiff prevails, PUSD alleges that it is an impermissible gift. (Motion, p. 13: 17-18.)

The California Constitution limits the spending and allocation of public funds. It specifically limits the “gift of public money” which includes “all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim, even if there is a moral or equitable obligation” (Cal. Const. Art. XVI, sec. 6.) In support of its argument, PUSD cites several cases where laws permitting retroactive payment/liability were deemed unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court, as to Cal. Const. Art. XVI, sec. 6. (Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 327-328 [personal injury], Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21 [nonpayment of a contract], Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, 273-274 [jury fee payment] and Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517 [automobile accident liability].)

PUSD urges that Plaintiff Roe did not have an enforceable claim at the time of the abuse, because she did not submit a government claim at the time. (Motion, p.15: 1-3.) More specifically, PUSD urges “Plaintiff never presented a government claim to the District, there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 that all of the elements of a cause of action against the District were satisfied.” (Id.)

In opposition, Roe urges that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause, as the changes to Government Code Section 905 clearly serve a public purpose. (Opposition, p. 8: 26-27.) In support, Roe cites case law for the proposition that “in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 730, 745-46.) Specifically, “the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift.” (Id.) The determination as to what is a public purpose is left to the legislature. (Id. at 746.)  The public purpose need not be stated directly but may be inferred from the manner in which the legislation was enacted. (Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization  (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604.)

Roe argues that “District confuses cases concerning the allocation of money for claims that previously did not exist, which may violate the gift clause if there is no important public purpose at issue, with the giving of money for claims that did exist but have since expired.” (Opposition p. 10: 24-26.) Citing Chapman v. State, Roe urges that similarly, AB 216 did not create liability where previously there was none but rather removed a hurdle to recover for wrong acts. (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 696.) This argument is well taken, as liability for the sexual abuse did exist at the time it occurred, AB 216 simply removed the claim presentment hurdle. (See Opposition p. 12: 5-10.) Roe also attempts to distinguish cases cited by PUSD on factual bases. Roe also cites cases where removing hurdles for childhood sexual abuse victims to file claims was cited as a public purpose. (Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 422; Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) Roe urges that the public purpose has been demonstrated by the legislative history and plain language of Government Code Section 905, as the Legislature acknowledged the special nature of childhood sexual abuse cases, by exempting prospective claims from the Government Claims Act and then, through AB 218, by exempting retrospective claims. (Opposition p. 17: 1-7.)

Roe then cites several cases where ‘public purpose’ was broadly defined. (See, e.g., Veterans’ Welfare Bd. v. Jordan (1922) 189 Cal. 124, 145 [resettlement as a public purpose]; County of San Diego v. Hammond (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 709, 724 [financial aid to certain groups as a public purpose].) Further, “The language of the retroactivity provision of section 340.1 indicates a clear legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as expansive a period of time as possible.” (Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) Additionally, “the law is clear that vested rights are not immune from retroactive laws when an important state interest is at stake.” (Id.)

The Court finds that the public purpose justification is valid and that the Legislature’s judgment in this regard should be respected.  Accordingly, the Court finds that AB 218 and the changes to Government Code 905 are not unconstitutional. (See Scott, supra, at 1605.)

Roe responds that the alleged sexual abuse was clearly actionable when it occurred, and that PUSD’s argument regarding the claims requirement focuses on the wrong consideration.  (Opposition, p. 12-28.) The Court agrees. Once the Legislature determined that the claims requirement does not apply to these revival claims, it cannot be used as a shield to prevent the bringing of the action. 

          The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that she may assert both a claim for generalized negligence, as well as a specific claim for negligent supervision, a specific claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision and a specific claim for negligent failure to warn against each defendant.  Each claim will require slightly different elements to be proven. This does not constitute an impermissible “splitting” of a cause of action. 

          B. Civil Rights

          The Unruh Civil Rights Act is provided by Civil Code Section 51 et seq. Civil Code Section 51(b) provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state…  are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (CC § 51(b).) The Unruh Civil Rights Act is intended to remedy traditional wrongs by business establishments. (Frantz v. Blackwell, 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 96; Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449.) A public entity is not a business establishment for purposes of the act unless it engages in behavior constituting sufficient “businesslike attributes.” (Qualified Patients Ass'n v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 764-765; Taormina v. California Department of Corrections (S.D.Cal.1996) 946 F.Supp. 829, 833-834.)

          The facts alleged here are with respect to Pasadena Unified School District, a public entity. Plaintiff Roe asserts that the conduct of Pasadena Unified School District was in violation of her civil rights under the Unruh Act. However, as PUSD is a public entity, it cannot be held to account under the Unruh Act without further identification as to how the public entity is behaving like a business. (Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 808 [holding that a public entity City is not a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act], see also Qualified Patients Ass’n, supra; Taormina, supra.) As the complaint does not identify how PUSD is behaving for all intents and purposes like a business and thus qualifies as a business under the Unruh Act, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Act.

          To the extent that this could be solved on amendment, the Court notes the possibility that Roe could elucidate sufficient behavior on part of PUSD as to businesslike attributes. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with respect to the 11^th cause of action, with leave to amend.

V.       ORDER

          PUSD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as to the 1^st cause of action for negligence, the 2^nd cause of action for negligent supervision, the 3^rd cause of cause for negligent hiring, and the 4^th cause of action for failure to warn. The motion is GRANTED as to the 11^th cause of action, with 20 days’ leave to amend.

          PUSD is ordered to give notice.   

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT