Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV01259, Date: 2023-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV01259 Hearing Date: April 17, 2023 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
|
Plaintiff, vs. BLISS
HOLDING GROUP, INC., dba CHISEL & TOOL; and DOES 1-0,
Defendants. |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION Date: April
17, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: P |
I. INTRODUCTION
This action stems from a contract to construct an ADU
(back house) on property owned by Plaintiff Alan Chan. Chan contracted with
Defendant Chisel & Tool to perform the work. Chan alleges that problem
arose early on, he refused to accept the work, and Chisel & Tool abandoned
the project.
The construction agreement contains an arbitration
provision requiring that disputes be settled by arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association. In February 2023, Chisel & Tool filed a demand for
arbitration with the AAA. In March 2023, Chan filed his answer. Problems arose
and Chan filed the present lawsuit. Chisel & Tool now moves for an order
compelling Chan to arbitrate pursuant to the written agreement.
II. LEGAL
STANDARD
Code
Civ. Proc. §1281.2 provides that upon petition of a party to an arbitration
agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate and a
party’s refusal to submit to arbitration, the court shall order the parties to
arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement exists, unless it
determines that the right to arbitrate has been waived, that grounds exist for
revocation, or that a party to the agreement is also party to a pending
litigation arising out of the same facts and there exists a possibility of
conflicting rulings on a common issue of fact or law. In such a situation, the court may (1) refuse
to enforce the arbitration agreement and order intervention or joinder of all
parties in a single action, (2) order intervention or joinder as to all or only
certain issues, (3) order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to
arbitration and stay the action pending outcome of arbitration, or (4) stay
arbitration pending outcome of the litigation.
III. ANALYSIS
A moving party’s burden under Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2 is
to show the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate and a party’s refusal
to submit to arbitration. This is the unusual case where there is no dispute
regarding the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate. Chisel & Stone
has met its burden of establishing the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities
Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413. A
copy of the contract is attached to both the Complaint and the motion.
Paragraph 11.1 of the contract contains an arbitration provision. While Chisel
& Stone presents no evidence that Chan has refused to arbitrate, the filing
of this lawsuit itself is arguably evidence of such refusal. In opposition to
this motion, Chan makes no argument that Chisel & Stone waived its right to
demand arbitration or that grounds exist for revocation of the agreement. Consequently,
to the extent it is not redundant based on the already-commenced arbitration, the
motion to compel arbitration is granted.
The true controversy here is not whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate, but what the rules of arbitration should be. The
construction contract provides at ¶14.1 that in an arbitration or litigation
the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable fees and costs. However,
AAA has informed the parties it has determined this is a consumer dispute and
therefore falls under Code Civ. Proc. §1284.3, which precludes arbitrators from
requiring consumers to pay the fees and costs of an opposing party if the
consumer does not prevail, including fee and costs of the arbitrator. Because
¶14.1 conflicts with this section, AAA has told the parties it will not
arbitrate unless and until either (a) the parties both waive ¶14.1’s fee
shifting provision or (b) there is a court order addressing this provision.
Chan refuses to sign a waiver because AAA has made clear
that doing so will give the arbitrator discretion to award fees and costs. In
other words, AAA is asking Chan to waive his statutory rights under Section
1284.3.
Chisel & Stone has apparently refused to sign a
waiver because it would prefer to have the fee-shifting provision enforced. It disagrees
with AAA’s conclusion that this is a consumer agreement, arguing that it is
instead a construction agreement and therefore does not fall under Section
1284.3.
Neither party cites any legal authority pursuant to which
this Court may rule on an issue that is before the arbitrator, and the Court is
aware of none. In fact, once a controversy has been submitted to arbitration a
trial court retains only “vestigial jurisdiction” to make certain other orders
pertaining to arbitration. Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 482, 487. “It is the job of the arbitrator, not
the court, to resolve all questions needed to determine the controversy. [Citations.]
The arbitrator, and not the court, decides questions of procedure and
discovery.” Id. at 487-488.
This is especially true where, as here, the arbitration
language delegates arbitrability to the arbitrator, as ¶11.1 does.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s)
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
To reiterate, the true controversy here is not whether to
arbitrate but what the rules of arbitration should be. Having agreed in writing
to have arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association, the
parties must now comply with the rules set forth by that agency.
IV. CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the
written agreement is granted. This action is stayed pending completion of
arbitration.
Defendant is ordered to give notice.
Dated:
____________ ___________________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT