Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV01307, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22AHCV01307    Hearing Date: December 20, 2023    Dept: P

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

VIKAS KATHEPALLI,

                                   Plaintiff,

 

         vs.

 

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

                                  Defendants.

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Case No.: 22AHCV01307

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES; AND DENYING SANCTIONS

 

Date: December 20, 2023

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

          I.        INTRODUCTION

 This action alleges violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Vikas Kathepalli (Kathepalli) sues American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (Honda) for alleged defects with the 2020 Honda Accord she purchased. Kathepalli alleges defects to the brake system and the electrical system.  

 

Kathepalli filed the instant motion to compel furthers on August 18, 2023. Honda filed an opposition on December 7, 2023. Kathepalli filed a reply on December 13, 2023.

At issue is the sufficiency of Honda’s compliance with Requests for Production (Set One), Nos. 19-23, 25-31, 45, 46, 48, and 49 propounded and served on Defendant Honda  on February 24, 2023. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED as to Requests for Production 45 and 46 only.

          Having read and considered all the briefing, the Court does not find it appropriate to issue a monetary sanction against either party.

 

II.       LEGAL STANDARD

A. Law Governing Motions to Compel Further Responses

          A party responding to requests for inspection must either provide a statement of compliance, represent that it lacks the ability to comply, or object. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210.)

          - If a party responds with a statement of compliance, the statement must indicate whether production will be allowed in whole or in part and that all documents in the responding party’s possession, custody or control to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. (CCP § 2031.220.)

          - If a party responds that a particular demand cannot be complied with it must include a representation that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry have been made and that the inability to comply is because the item has never existed, has been lost, stolen, or misplaced, or has never been in or is no longer in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control; such response must also identify the name and address of any person or entity known or believed to have possession, custody, or control of the item or category of item.  (CCP § 2031.230.)

          - If a response includes objections, a privilege log identifying documents being withheld must be provided. (CCP § 2031.240.)

          When a party propounding demands for inspection deems responses to the requests  to be incomplete or evasive, or deems objections to be without merit, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses. Such a motion must set forth facts showing good cause for the discovery, be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, and include a separate statement. Such a motion must also be made within 45 days of verified responses or supplemental responses, or on or before any specific later date the parties have agreed to in writing. (CCP § 2031.310(a)-(c).)

          Code Civ. Proc. Section 2031.310 (h) provides for the imposition of monetary sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes such a motion unless the court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification, or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. (CCP § 2031.310(h).)

          B. Law Governing Relevancy Objections

Code Civ. Proc. Section 2017.010 permits a party to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter . . . if the matter is either itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) According to a leading treatise, “For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as ‘relevant’ to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Sup.Ct.  (1995) 33 CA4th 1539, 1546 (citing text); Lipton v. Sup.Ct. (1996) 48 CA4th 1599, 1611 (citing text); Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 CA4th 1006, 1013 (citing text)]” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2022), ¶8:66.1.) 

 

III.     ANALYSIS

          A. Meet and Confer

Counsel for Plaintiff, Timothy Lupenik, declares that he attempted to meet and confer with Defendant Honda before filing this motion. He declares that he spoke to defense counsel on June 2, 2023 to address the initial discovery responses served March 27, 2023. (Lupenik Decl., ¶ 10.) He sent an email before the phone call and attaches the email as Exh. D.  On August 15, 2023, Lupenik again called Counsel for Honda to meet and confer. (Lupenik Decl. ¶ 11.) After the August 15, 2023 phone call, Lupenik sent a follow-up email to the telephone conversation.  He attaches the email as Exh. E. Lupenik declares that the parties agreed to multiple extensions of the deadline for filing the instant motion to allow for further meet and confer efforts. (Lupenik Decl. ¶ 12.) He attaches the last set of emails regarding the extension to August 22, 2023. (Lupenik Decl., Exh. F.)

In opposition, Honda indicates it supplemented its initial discovery responses on December 6, 2023.  It attaches its supplemental production to RFPs # 19-23, 25-31, 48 and 49. (Opposition p. 293.) As the parties have not met and conferred regarding the sufficiency of the December 6 supplemental production, the motion is premature as to these discovery requests.

As Honda did not supplement its responses to RFP # 45 and 46, those discovery requests are still at issue. Lupenik’s declaration is sufficient for meet and confer purposes as to RFP # 45 and 46.

          B. The Discovery Requests at Issue

RFP 45: All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of 2020 Honda Accord vehicles regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period.

RFP 46: All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2020 Honda Accord vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty.

          C. Relevancy Objections

Honda initially objected to the discovery requests at issue on the grounds of vagueness, ambiguity, undue burden, harassment, unintelligible, privacy, trade secrecy, overbreadth, and relevance. (Motion, p. 12: 1-3.) In its opposition to this motion, Honda continues to object on the basis of relevance. (Opposition, p. 12: 5-6.) Honda argues that Plaintiff’s vehicle is a 2020 Honda Accord Hybrid, and consequently, that information about non-hybrid 2020 Honda Accords is involves a different vehicle. (Opposition, p. 12: 8-10.)

          As Kathepalli notes, the scope of discovery is broad, as the standard is reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence, not that each discovery request must itself directly yield relevant evidence. (See Reply, p.5: 21-28, referencing Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Complaints by other 2020 Honda Accord owners as to the same issues Kathepalli alleges with respect to her vehicle and warranty repairs to 2020 Honda Accords may very well lead to discoverable evidence as to Kathepalli’s lemon law claim as to her 2020 Accord Hybrid. (See Motion, p. 11: 9- p. 18: 10.) In support, Kathepalli cites Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. and Doppes v. Bentley Motors for the proposition that information of similar customer complaints, and other vehicle information regarding the same complaint as Plaintiff is alleging with respect to her vehicle are discoverable. (Motion Separate Statement, p. 115: 15- p. 117: 13.) Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. provides “‘other vehicle’ testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It was limited to the [defects Plaintiff alleged]… [the information] applied to other vehicles applied equally to plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154.) Doppes v. Bentley Motors involved multiple orders to compel information as to complaints made by other customers as to the same issues Plaintiff raised. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967.)

          In opposition, Honda attempts to distinguish Donlen on its ultimate holding. (Opposition p. 14: 7-15, see also Opposition to Separate Statement, p. 165: 15-24.) As Kathepalli is not citing Donlen for its ultimate holding, but rather the analysis of why other vehicle testimony is potentially relevant as to the same complaints Plaintiff is making as to her vehicle, this argument is not persuasive here. (See RFP #45.) Donlen does specifically approve of ‘other vehicle’ information, contrary to Honda’s assertion. (Donlen, supra at 154, see Opposition to Separate Statement p. 165: 18-19.)

Honda also similarly attempts to distinguish Doppes from the instant case by citing a different portion of the decision than Kathepalli. (Opposition, p. 14: 17-21.) Honda urges “Doppes therefore never addressed, or even considered, the propriety of the discovery requests at issue in that case.” (Opposition to Separate Statement, p. 165: 26-28.) This is not entirely accurate. At the trial court level, Doppes did discuss the propriety of the scope of discovery requests at issue. (Doppes, supra at 976, 978, 980.) Kathepalli is citing Doppes for the general proposition that if other customers made similar complaints, or repairs were made to the same components Kathepalli is urging are defective, that information is relevant. (See RFP # 46.)

Accordingly, the Court declines to find that information sought by RFPs # 45, 46 is not relevant, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Court orders a further response be furnished to RFPs # 45 and 46.

D. Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h), requires the imposition of sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response unless the court finds the imposition of a sanction to be unjust or that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification. 

Kathepalli asks for $2,165.00 in monetary sanctions against Honda. The request is supported by the Declaration of Timothy Lupinek, who indicates that he bills at $415/hour and that he spent 1 hour reviewing and editing this motion. (Lupinek Decl. ¶ 14.) He also indicates that a law clerk at the firm spent three hours drafting the motion. The law clerk’s hourly billing rate is $175. (Id.) Additionally, he anticipates an associate will spend 3 hours reviewing any opposition and drafting a reply. (Id.) The associate bills at $250/hour. (Id.) Lastly, he anticipates that he will spend 1 hour attending the hearing on the motion. He also spent $60 on the filing fee. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Accordingly, the total request is for $2,165.00 in discovery sanctions.

In opposition, Honda requests sanctions against Kathepalli for necessitating its  opposition to the motion.

           The Court finds that this motion was neither made nor opposed in bad faith. Consequently, the Court finds that neither party is entitled to recover monetary sanctions.

 

IV.     CONCLUSION AND ORDER

           Plaintiff Kathepalli’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED in part, with respect to Requests for Production # 45 and 46. Further verified responses without objection are due within 10 days of notice.  The parties’ respective requests for sanctions are DENIED.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

 

 

         

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT