Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV01346, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV01346 Hearing Date: January 3, 2024 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER Date: January
3, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: P |
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff KG (Plaintiff) alleges that he
was sexually abused by two individuals while he attended school in Defendant
Pasadena Unified School District. He alleges that this occurred between 1954
and 1956, when he was 10-12 years of age. The complaint contains four causes of
action: two for negligence (against PUSD and Does); and two for negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision (also against PUSD and Does).
Before the Court are Defendant’s challenges to the First
Amended Complaint. Defendant demurs to the complaint on grounds that: (1) all causes
of action fail to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act, (2) all
causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For
the reasons that follow, the demurrer is overruled.
II. REQUESTS
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant’s request for
judicial notice:
Defendant PUSD requests judicial notice of: (1) Notice
of Entry of Order on Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Doe v. Acalanes
Union High School District, County of Contra Costa Superior Court Case
Number C22- 02613 and (2) Minute Order Granting Defendants Demurrer in R.L.
v. Merced USD, Superior Court of Merced case number 22CV-04187.
Because these documents are records of a California
court, the request for judicial notice is granted. (EC § 452(d).)
Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice:
Plaintiff KG requests judicial notice of: (1) 5/15/23 Tentative Order in Jane Doe
(Beth Hill) v. Amador USD, Case No. 22-CV-12948, (2) 7/13/21 Minute Order
in Jane Doe v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School District, Case No.
21CV376543. (3) 8/18/21 Order in Jane Doe v. Oakland Union School District,
Case No. RG21087567, (4) 4/7/22 Order in John Doe v. Roseville City School
District, Case No. S-CV-0047426, (5) 6/1/23 Order in John Doe v.
Tamalpais Union High School District, et al., Case No. CIV 2202251, (6)
7/27/23 Order in John Roe 1 -5 v. Mountain View Whisman School District, et
al., Case No. 22CV02834, (7) 5/19/21 Order in John Roe 1, et al. v.
Union High School District, et al., Case No. 20CV368341, (8) 7/20/21 Minute
Order in Reza Afshar v. Charles Sayers, et al., Case No. 20CV367836, (9)
12/8/21 Minute Order
in Robin Richie v. Oroville Union High School District, et al., Case No.
21CV01364, (10) 8/3/23 Tentative Order in W. v. Doe, Case No.
22CV012244, and (11) 9/12/23 Order in John Doe v. Tamalpais Union High
School District, et al., Case No. 2300236.T
Because these are also records of a California
court, the request for judicial notice is granted. (EC § 452(d).)
KG also requests judicial notice of Assembly floor
analysis for AB 218 dated August 30, 2019. Because this legislative history
reflects an official act of a legislative body, the request for judicial notice
is granted. (EC § 452(c).)
Accordingly, judicial notice is taken of Exhs. 1-12
to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.
III. DEMURRER
A. Legal Standard
Code
Civ. Proc. Section 430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a
complaint fails to state a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) A demurrer tests
the legal sufficiency of a complaint. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer is treated as “admitting all
material facts properly pleaded,” but not the truth of “contentions, deductions
or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th
962, 966-967.) The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are “deemed
to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v.
Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604.)
Questions
of plaintiff’s ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. (Committee
on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,
213-214.)
Allegations
need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable
facts. (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474.)
“We
treat the demurrer as admitting all the properly pleaded material facts and
consider matters which may be judicially noticed, but we do not treat as admitted
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Align Technology,
Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 343].)
Further, ‘ “ ‘we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as
a whole and its parts in their context.’ ”’ (Ibid.) Because a demurrer
tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading, we accept as true even the
most improbable alleged facts, and we do not concern ourselves with the
plaintiff's ability to prove its factual allegations. (Ibid.) ‘“Facts
appearing in exhibits attached to the first amended complaint also are accepted
as true and are given precedence, to the extent they contradict the
allegations.”’ (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091.)
Although a demurrer does not ordinarily reach affirmative defenses, it ‘“will
lie where the complaint ‘has included allegations that clearly disclose some
defense or bar to recovery.’ ”’ (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 177, 183, Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406. )
B. Meet and Confer Requirement Met
The Declaration of Marlon C. Wadlington is offered in
support of counsel’s compliance with Code Civ. Proc. Section 430.41. Wadlington
declares that he met and conferred with Plaintiff’s Counsel on the phone on August
15, 2023. He further declares that a resolution was not reached. (Wadlington Declaration
¶ 3.) Consequently, the meet and confer requirement has been met.
C.
The Demurrer is Overruled
Defendant demurs on two grounds: (1) that AB 218 violates the
California Constitution; and (2) Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim at
the time of the abuse. In addition, PUSD argues that Plaintiff cannot assert
two negligence type claims against each defendant.
i. AB 218 Does
Not Violate the California Constitution
PUSD urges that AB 218 violates the California Constitution;
specifically, the gift clause. (Demurrer, p. 12: 15.) The Government Claims Act
requires that before a suit is filed against a public entity, a plaintiff must
first file a claim for damages with the public entity itself. (Cal. Gov’t Code §905.)
AB 218 changed Government Code Section 905, to carve out a retroactive
exception to the Government Claims Act for claims of sexual abuse. It is this
retroactive application that PUSD alleges is non-compliant with the State Constitution.
Because this created “liability for past acts where no right to recovery
existed,” which in turn might result in the award of public money if Plaintiff
prevails, PUSD alleges that it is an impermissible gift. (Demurrer, p. 15: 15.)
The
California Constitution limits the spending and allocation of public funds. It
specifically limits the “gift of public money” which includes “all
appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable
claim, even if there is a moral or equitable obligation” (Cal. Const. Art. XVI,
sec. 6, see Prop. California SCJLW One Corp. v. Leamy (2018) 25 Cal.
App. 5th 1155, 1167.) In support of its argument, PUSD cites several cases
where laws permitting retroactive payment/liability were deemed
unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court, as to Cal. Const. Art. XVI,
sec. 6. (Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321 [personal injury], Conlin
v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17 [nonpayment of a contract], Powell
v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271 [jury fee payment] and Heron v. Riley
(1930) 209 Cal. 507 [automobile accident liability].)
In
opposition, KG urges that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause, as the changes
to Government Code Section 905 clearly serve a public purpose. (Opposition, p. 6:
16-25.) In support, KG cites case law for the proposition that “in determining
whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the
primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or
‘private’ purpose.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 730,
745-46.) Specifically, “the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a
public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are
therefore not a gift.” (Id.) This determination as to what is a public
purpose is left to the legislature. (Id. at 746.) The public purpose need not be stated directly
but may be inferred from the manner in which the legislation was enacted. (Scott
v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604.)
In
this case, KG cites the assembly floor analysis of AB 218 (as to which the Court
takes judicial notice). (Opposition, p. 7-10.) KG also cites cases where removing
hurdles for childhood sexual abuse victims to file claims was cited as a public
purpose. (Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
415, 422; Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) KG
urges that the public purpose has been demonstrated by the legislative history,
as the Legislature acknowledged the special nature of childhood sexual abuse
cases, by exempting prospective claims from the Government Claims Act and then,
through AB 218, by exempting retrospective claims. (Id.)
The
Court finds that the public purpose justification is valid and that the
Legislature’s judgment in this regard should be respected. Accordingly, the Court finds that AB 218 and
the changes to Government Code 905 are not unconstitutional. (See Scott,
supra, at 1605.)
ii. Plaintiff did have an enforceable claim at the time
of the abuse
Second,
PUSD urges that Plaintiff KG did not have an enforceable claim at the time of
the abuse, because he did not submit a government claim at the time. (Demurrer,
p.19: 6-10.) More specifically, PUSD urges “because Plaintiff never presented a
government claim, there was never a time in this case – before AB 2018 was
enacted in 2020 – that all elements necessary to plead causes of action against
the District existed.” (Demurrer, p. 20: 10-12.)
KG responds
that the alleged sexual abuse was clearly actionable when it occurred, and that
PUSD’s argument regarding the claims requirement focuses on the wrong
consideration. (Opposition, p. 13:9-10.)
The Court agrees. Once the Legislature
determined that the claims requirement does not apply to these revival claims, it
cannot be used as a shield to prevent the bringing of the action.
iii. The
Plaintiff may assert four causes of action.
The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that he may assert
both a claim for generalized negligence, as well as a specific claim for
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against each defendant (i.e., two
causes of action against PUSD, and two against Doe Defendants). Each claim will require slightly different
elements to be proven. This does not
constitute an impermissible “splitting” of a cause of action.
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III. CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Defendant PUSD’s demurrer is overruled. PUSD is ordered to file its answer to the
First Amended Complaint within 10 days.
Plaintiff
is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT