Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22AHCV01417, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV01417 Hearing Date: September 19, 2023 Dept: P
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHEAST DISTRICT
|
Plaintiff, vs. ANDREW
M. DANG, an individual; MELVIN M. DANG, an individual; NORTHSTAR REAL ESTATE
GROUP, Inc., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT; AND GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE Date: September
19, 2023 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: P |
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a lawsuit by a tenant against his landlords. The
lawsuit alleges deplorable living conditions including heavy bedbug
infestation. In addition to alleging habitability and contract claims, Martin
Tokich (Plaintiff) alleges causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) and fraudulent concealment. A prior demurrer by Andrew
Dang, Melvin Dang, and Northstar Real Estate Group, Inc. (Defendants) to these
causes of action was sustained with leave to amend.
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint contains relatively few
new facts. But broadly construing those new facts, the IIED cause of action is
now sufficient. The fraud claim contains no new facts, and the demurrer to that
claim is therefore sustained.
Defendants also previously moved to strike the prayer for
attorney fees pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5. Inasmuch as the FAC still does not allege a
basis for the recovery of such fees, the motion to strike is also granted.
II. SUMMARY
OF FACTS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants for their alleged
wanton failure to properly maintain, control, or repair Plaintiff’s rented
premises located at 2841 W. Main St., Alhambra. Complaint, ¶2. Plaintiff
resided at the premises pursuant to a Rental Agreement with Defendants, which
is attached as Exhibit A; if he had known about the infestation he would not
have occupied or continued to stay at the premises. ¶10. Sometime in February
2007, Plaintiff entered into the Rental Agreement. ¶29. Sometime in February
2022, Plaintiff noticed the bed bugs and immediately notified Defendants. ¶30.
The complaint alleges “slum” housing conditions
including bed bug infestation and other deplorable living conditions in
violation of Civ. Code §§1941, 1941.1, 1942, 1942.4 and Health and Safety Code
§§17920, 17920.3 and related subsections; as well as the Los Angeles Rent
Stabilization Ordinance (RSO). ¶3. As a result of Defendants’ failure to
maintain pest control resulting in bed bug infestation, Plaintiff has suffered financial
loss, property loss, personal injury, and ongoing mental and emotional
distress. ¶4. Plaintiff had to seek medical care for his bed bug injuries. ¶31.
Plaintiff incurred the cost for inspection and extermination of the bed bug
infestation; and despite his many requests, Defendants have not reimbursed him
for this expense or for the cost of relocation and replacement. ¶33.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
failure to maintain the Premises in a safe and habitable condition, Plaintiff
has allegedly suffered and continues to suffer ongoing mental and emotional
distress, and physical injuries, including, but not limited to: (a) Painful bed
bug bites, severe skin rash, allergic reaction, scarring and personal injuries
over the entirety of his body caused by bed bugs; (b) Property damage to bed,
mattress, bedding, furniture, clothing, and personal belongings, as a result of
the bed bug infestation; (c) Relocation expenses, pest control fees, loss of
earnings, and attorney fees; (d) Plaintiff became ill several times while
living in the Subject Property, experiencing ongoing insect bites,
sleeplessness, inconvenience, humiliation, grief, anxiety, and other
symptoms. ¶7.
Plaintiff incurred out-of-pocket expenses to
remediate the premises. ¶8.
Plaintiff also allegedly spent considerable time communicating
with Defendants, trying to resolve these issues; but Defendants allegedly
ignored and did not adequately address Plaintiff’s repeated complaints. ¶9.
Defendants allegedly intentionally and willfully failed to remedy the issues
raised by Plaintiff, and maintained a policy of apathy and denial. ¶31.
The complaint sets forth the following causes of
action:
1. Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability
2. Habitability (H&S Code §17920.3)
3. Violation of Civ. Code §1942.4
4. Negligence/Premises Liability/Negligence Per Se
5. Nuisance
6. IIED
7. Breach of Contract
8. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200
9. Fraudulent Concealment.
III. DEMURRER
A. Legal Standard
Code
Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint
fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.
Code
Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer on the ground of uncertainty. However, demurrers for uncertainty are
disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible that a
defendant cannot reasonably respond to it. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best
Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.
B. The Demurrer to IIED Cause of Action
The prior order on demurrer in this action contains a
lengthy discussion regarding what is needed to allege an IIED cause of action
in a landlord-tenant context. That discussion is incorporated here:
In
brief, what is needed to state a claim for IIED is something like the
following: (1) a direct threat of physical violence (Newby v. Alto Rivera
Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288; (2) doubling the rent in response to
lawful tenant conduct (Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278); (3) eviction
without legal process (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004; (4) a dwelling that is in such disrepair it is
condemned by the health department (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980)
101 Cal.App.3d 903).
The Court previously found that a “widespread bed bug
infestation at the Subject Property that affected the entire complex,” and
which Defendants “intentionally and willfully” failed to abate does not rise to
the level of conduct that may be considered extreme or outrageous conduct
intended to cause, or carried out with a reckless disregard for causing,
Plaintiff severe emotional distress.
Therefore, the demurrer was sustained.
In
amending, Plaintiff has added the following allegations: Plaintiff is disabled
and suffers from pulmonary disease; Plaintiff’s home has never been treated for
bed bugs since they were found 16 months ago; in March 2022, the LA Department
of Health sent Defendants an inspection report about the property that includes
beg bugs, but Defendants have never treated Plaintiff’s home since this
inspection; Defendants’ blatant refusal to treat Plaintiff’s home is directly
aimed at him since he is the one who lives there and is being daily attacked
and bitten; Defendants’ refusal to treat is directly aimed at Plaintiff; Defendants
know Plaintiff is disabled and is suffering because of the bed bugs yet they do
nothing; Plaintiff has made multiple requests to Defendants (specifically to
Dang) pursuant to the ADA to have the carpet removed, hotel accommodations, and
heat treatment for the bed bugs, all of which were refused; Plaintiff has
requested numerous times that Defendants treat his unit with non-chemical heat
treatment due to his pulmonary disease but Defendants have refused to
accommodate and to provide heat treatment. FAC, ¶¶156-165.
One plausible inference to draw from these allegations is that
Defendants treated other units with chemicals. If the reason Plaintiff’s
unit has not been treated is that he requires a non-chemical treatment, this
does differentiate Plaintiff from the other tenants in a way that may be viewed
as conduct that is aimed at him. Accepting these allegations as true (and depending
of course on what Plaintiff is able to establish at trial), a trier of fact could
conclude that this conduct is outrageous, and that Defendants acted with
reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. With these new
allegations, the question is no longer one that can be decided on demurrer. The
demurrer is therefore overruled.
C. The Demurrer to the Fraudulent Concealment Cause of
Action
The Court’s
lengthy discussion in its prior order concerning the requirements for pleading
fraudulent concealment are also incorporated by reference:
The demurrer
to the original fraudulent concealment cause of action was sustained because
the facts alleged do not give rise to a duty to disclose. This is so because no
fiduciary relationship exists between landlord and tenant, and because to the
extent there was a transaction during which parties had a duty to disclose,
that occurred at the time the lease was negotiated in 2007. As the bedbug
infestation is not alleged to have occurred until over a decade later, this is
not information Defendants could have concealed at the time of the transaction.
Plaintiff cannot reasonably have relied on information Defendants concealed in
deciding to sign a lease, because the information did exist at the time.
The First Amended Complaint fails to allege facts
sufficient to constitute fraudulent concealment. It does not appear to the Court that further
amendment could remedy this problem. The demurrer is therefore sustained
without leave to amend as to fraudulent concealment.
IV. MOTION
TO STRIKE
A. Legal Standard
Code Civ. Proc. §436: “The court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper:
(a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”
B. The Motion to Strike CCP §1021.5 Attorney Fees is Granted
The
discussion in the prior order regarding attorney fees is incorporated by
reference:
The
prayer for attorney fees pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5 was stricken
because the pleading does not demonstrate the potential for conferring a
benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. No new facts have
been alleged on this issue. The motion to strike is therefore granted.
V. CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
The Defendants’
demurrer to the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is overruled.
The demurrer to the ninth cause of action for fraudulent
concealment is sustained on the basis that the facts do not demonstrate the
existence of a duty to disclose. As it does not appear that further amendment
could allege such a duty, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.
Defendants’ motion to strike Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5
attorney fees is also granted.
Defendants are to answer the remaining claims within 10
days.
Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Dated: _______________________________
MARGARET L. OLDENDORF
JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT