Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22BBCV00266, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22BBCV00266    Hearing Date: October 26, 2023    Dept: P

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

          I.        INTRODUCTION

          This is a collections case involving unpaid lease payments, related to an unlawful detainer case, 22BBCV00601. On March 25, 2023, Plaintiffs ACN Marketing Corp. and Ling Chau Investments LLC (collectively Plaintiffs) entered into a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment in this case and the related unlawful detainer case with Defendants Mahmud Ulkarim and Megna Tofu Manufacturing Company, Inc. (collectively Defendants). On March 28, 2023, the agreement was placed on the record in 22BBCV00601. On April 7, 2023, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. (April 7, 2023 Request for Dismissal.)

          Before the Court is a motion to enforce the settlement by plaintiffs. As the stipulation provides for court enforcement and plaintiffs provide evidence of the defendants failure to perform pursuant to the stipulation, the Court GRANTS the motion to enforce the settlement.

II.       LEGAL STANDARD

          Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6:¿ 
(a)¿If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside¿of¿the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.¿ 

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:¿ 

(1) The party.¿ 

(2) An attorney who represents the party.¿ 

(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer's behalf.”¿ (CCP § 664.6.)           

III.     ANALYSIS

A. Retention of Jurisdiction 

 “‘[V]oluntary dismissal of an action or special proceeding terminates the court’s jurisdiction over the matter.’  (Conservatorship of Martha P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 857, 867) [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 142.) ‘If requested by the parties,’ however, ‘the [trial] court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce [a] settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.’ (§ 664.6, italics added.)”  (Mesa RHF Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.)  “‘Because of its summary nature, strict compliance with the requirements of section 664.6 is prerequisite to invoking the power of the court to impose a settlement agreement.’”  (Ibid. (quoting Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37).) 

“A request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction under section 664.6 ‘must conform to the same three requirements which the Legislature and the courts have deemed necessary for section 664.6 enforcement of the settlement itself: the request must be made (1) during the pendency of the case, not after the case has been dismissed in its entirety, (2) by the parties themselves, and (3) either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court.’”  (Ibid. (quoting Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 440).)  “The ‘request must be express, not implied from other language, and it must be clear and unambiguous.’” (Ibid. (quoting Wackeen, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at 440).) 

Here, the parties signed a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment (Stipulation) containing the parties’ agreement for the Court to retain jurisdiction pursuant to CCP Section 664.6 to enforce the terms of the stipulation and enter judgment in the event of default. (Stipulation ¶ 10.) Prior to the dismissal of this action, the Stipulation was signed by the parties and submitted to the Court in the related unlawful detainer action. (March 28, 2023 Minute Order.)  On April 7, 2023, the Court dismissed the entire case pursuant to the Stipulation. (April 7, 2023 Request for Dismissal.)

The Court finds that the Stipulation complies with Section 664.6 requirements.  Thus, the Court has retained jurisdiction to enter judgment pursuant to the Stipulation in this action. 

B. Entry of Judgment

The Stipulation Agreement provides that Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to dismiss the action if Defendants paid Plaintiffs the unpaid rent amount of $332,120.10. (Exh. 1, p. 2: 3-4.) Pursuant to the Stipulation, Defendants would pay Plaintiffs $16,000.00 on the first of every month, and $27,500 on the fifteenth of every month, from April 1, 2023 to March 15, 2024. (Exh. 1, p. 3: 1-24.) The payments due on the first of the month applied to the monthly rent and promissory note payment for that month. The payments due on the fifteenth of the month applied to the Settlement Payment. (Exh. 1, p.3 ¶ 4(c).) All parties signed the Stipulation. (Id. at p.8.)

The Stipulation also provides that if Defendants fail to make timely payments, “Civil Case” Plaintiff’s counsel will serve a written Notice of Default on Defendants’ counsel and the individual defendant by email. (Id. at p.4, ¶ (f).) If Defendant does not remedy the default within ten (10) days of receiving notice, “Civil Case Plaintiff and UD Plaintiff may have the Judgment entered ex parte, upon 24 hours ex parte notice… for possession of the premises, forfeiture of the lease, that portion of the Settlement Amount and monthly rental payments” (Id. at p.5, ¶ h.)

On October 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion alleging that Defendants breached the stipulation.  They seek judgment in the amount of $231,000.00 for the settlement amount. (Motion p.4: 14-17.)

On July 15, Defendants made a payment of $2,500 to Plaintiffs. (Agemian Decl. ¶ 5.) No payment was made August 1, 2023. (Id.) On August 15, 2023, Defendants made a payment of $5,000 to Plaintiffs. (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel sent default notices to defendant and counsel of record for each inadequate payment. (Id. at ¶ 8.) As of the date of this Motion, Defendants have not made any additional payments, and there is an outstanding balance remaining. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs thus seek to have judgment entered in the amount of $231,000.00, representing the unpaid amounts under the Promissory Note, and unpaid rental damages through August 31, 2023. (Motion, p.4: 14-16, referencing Exh. 2 [Promissory Note incorporated into the Complaint at Exh. 3.])

The Court finds the Stipulation to be enforceable under CCP Section 664.6.  Plaintiffs provide evidence that Defendants stopped making payments and did not respond to Plaintiff’s written notices of default. (Agemian Decl. ¶¶ 5-8.) Thus, the Stipulation was breached and as the Court retained jurisdiction to enter judgment upon such breach, judgment can be entered. Plaintiffs have also provided the Stipulation to show that they are entitled to the settlement amount, less any payments made, as well as the unpaid amounts under the Promissory Note. (Motion, Exh.2.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for Plaintiffs and against Defendants for $231,000.00.

C. Double Recovery Not Permitted

          In opposition, Defendants argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to a double recovery. (Opposition, p.2:13.) In support, defendants cite Singh v. Southland Stone and Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang for the proposition that “double recovery of damages is not permitted.” (Opposition, p.2: 14-16.) In Singh v. Southland Stone, USA Inc., plaintiff Singh sued both the owner of the company that employed him and the company itself. (Singh v. Southland Stone, USA. Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 344.) To the extent that Singh supports the proposition that double recovery is not permitted, the case discussed that CACI No. 361 [on reliance damages] should not have been used with a special verdict. (Id. at 360.) However, this does not clearly support Defendants’ point here, because Singh discusses double recovery on the narrow issue of a special verdict on multiple counts and the jury’s responsibility/ability to avoid duplicative recovery. (Id.) This is not at issue in this case. In Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang, Fujifilm sought to enforce a settlement agreement between itself and defendants. (Fujifilm Corp. v. Yang (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 326, 334.) In Fujifilm, the jury’s damage award was not double recovery because of facts specific to the fraudulent transfers alleged in the case and testimony about the transfers. (Id. at 335.) Though the case cites Singh for the proposition that double recovery of damages is prohibited, it is unclear how the facts of Fujifilm apply to the instant case.  To the extent that defendants are arguing that plaintiffs are seeking a double recovery, the argument is insufficient as defendants do not present evidence to support the contention that plaintiffs are indeed moving for double recovery.  In fact, plaintiffs move for “Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs against Ulkarim and Megna, jointly and severally, in this case in the amount of 231,000.00.” (Reply, p.4: 2-5, see Proposed Judgment p.1: 24.) The use of the joint and several language indicate that plaintiffs are only seeking $231,000.00 once, not twice.

          In sum, nothing clearly indicates double recovery is being sought.  

IV.     CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement under CCP section 664.6 is GRANTED.  The proposed Judgment lodged on October 13, 2023, shall be signed and filed this date.

          Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice.  

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L. OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT