Judge: Margaret L. Oldendorf, Case: 22BBCV00500, Date: 2023-04-13 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22BBCV00500    Hearing Date: April 13, 2023    Dept: P

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

ARIEL GONZALEZ, an individual,

 

                                            Plaintiff,

vs.

 

MARIA REVELES, an individual; JASON REVELES, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

 

                                            Defendants.

 

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Case No.: 22BBCV00500

 

 

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

 

Date:   April 13, 2023

Time:  8:30 a.m.

Dept.:  P

 

          I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF PLEADING

          In this action Plaintiff Ariel Gonzalez sues Maria and Jason Reveles for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Gonzalez alleges three separate agreements with Defendants.

          Gonzalez alleges first that Defendants needed “working capital” to purchase products from a distributor that they had already sold to a customer. She alleges that Defendants agreed, “for Plaintiff to pay for the uniforms and in return, the amount loaned for this purchase would be paid back loan plus 50% of the profit made on this sale would also be paid to Plaintiff.” Exhibits A-C are alleged to be the payments Gonzalez made in performance of the agreement. Gonzalez alleges Defendants failed to provide the profit. Complaint, ¶2. Exhibit is a cashier’s check to Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co in the amount of $3,091.37. Exhibit B is a cashier’s check to Southbay Uniforms in the amount of $771.12. The amount on Exhibit C, a cashier’s check to Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co., is not visible but a handwritten notation indicates that check was for $2,840.90. These checks are dated 4-17-19.

          The second alleged agreement consists of what Gonzalez says were loans to Defendants “to cover the cost for rent and to cover the cost for merchandise purchase.” Exhibits D-E are alleged to be payments made in performance of this loan agreement. Complaint, ¶3. Exhibit D is a personal check to Southbay Uniforms for $5,600; the notation line indicates $3,400 is for rent. Exhibit E is a personal check to Marumatsu, Inc. for $3,400; the notation line indicates it is for rent. Exhibits D and E are drawn on an account in the name of Ariel Gonzalez. Both checks are dated 11-6-19.

          Finally, Gonzalez alleges that the parties entered into a written agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff would provide “working capital for the amount of $35,000 for Defendants to start the uniform company.” She alleges that in return, Defendants were to pay 50% of the net profits and to allow her to review the company statements every three months. Gonzalez alleges Defendants have not paid her profits or allowed her to examine the books. Exhibits F-H are offered as evidence of this agreement. Complaint, ¶5. Exhibits F and G are copies of two different General Partnership Agreements. Both are for the purpose of operating a business called Southbay Uniforms LLC. The partners are Elena Reveles, Jason Reveles, and Ariel Gonzalez. The partnership interests of each varies between the two agreements. In the agreement dated March 19, 2019, Elena owns half the shares and Jason and Gonzalez each own 25%; Gonzalez’s investment is listed as $25,000. In the agreement dated October 23, 2019, Ariel owns half and the other two each own 25%; Gonzalez’s interest is listed as $35,000.

          Exhibit H is a personal check from the account of Reza Properties in the amount of $25,000, to payee Jason Reveles; this check is dated March 18, 2019. Exhibit I is a cashier’s check to Jason and “Helena” Reveles for $10,000.

          In the first cause of action for breach of contract it is alleged that on March 19, 2019, Defendants entered into a notarized agreement where, in exchange for a $25,000 payment, Gonzalez would have a 25% partnership interest in the uniform company. It is further alleged that in October 2019 the parties entered into a modified agreement wherein Gonzalez would pay an additional $10,000 for a total investment of $35,000 for a 50% partnership interest. Gonzalez alleges that she performed her obligations; and that Defendants have failed to perform.

          In the second cause of action for unjust enrichment Gonzalez alleges that Defendants accepted payments from her to start a company and other loan payments and that Defendants did not perform by paying her 50% of the profits or to repay the loans.

          In the third cause of action for conversion Gonzalez alleges a right to the $16,703.39 paid to Defendants as a loan, as well as the $35,000 capital investment.

 

          II.      PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND REQUEST FOR JUDGMMENT

          On October 28, 2022, defaults were entered against Jason and Maria Reveles.

          Gonzalez submitted a default prove-up packet. At a hearing on December 22, 2022, the Court explained the reasons why default could not be entered on the information presented. The matter was set for a default prove-up on February 6, 2023.

          On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel telephoned the courtroom to say that he had just been released from the hospital and would not be able to attend the hearing. The prove-up hearing was continued to March 2, 2023, and Plaintiff’s counsel was ordered to submit a declaration regarding his hospital stay. (This declaration has yet to be filed.)

          On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a second default packet. This one was rejected by the clerk’s office.

          On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a third default packet. This evidence is insufficient, and the request for judgment is denied on the following grounds.

          1. Evidence

          The “Declaration of Ariel Gonzalez” is offered in support of default judgment, but this document is signed by Christopher Reyes, not Gonzalez herself. This document is of no evidentiary value.

          Apart from being inadmissible, the declaration suffers from other problems. It does not explain why checks written to Southbay Uniforms, Williamson Dickie Mfg. Co., and Marumatsu, Inc. should be considered funds provided to Defendants. Additional evidence and explanation is needed to connect the payments to Defendants. Also, Gonzalez fails to explain why the check from Reza Properties should be considered a check from Gonzalez. Also, there needs to be further explanation concerning the check to Jason and “Helena,” and the partnership agreement with someone named “Elena.”

          There is also no information regarding Gonzalez’s theory of the case. There are a number of checks at issue, but the allegations as to whether these were loans or investments in a business are unclear.

          2. Request for Interest, Costs, and Fees

          This does not appear to be a case where damages are certain or capable of being made certain as of a particular date. (See Civil Code §3287(a).)  How much Gonzalez may be able to recover from Defendants depends upon the strength of the evidence which, up to this point, is not sufficient. Even assuming Gonzalez is entitled to the total amount in all the checks attached to the pleading, that amount is $51,703.39; yet Gonzalez has calculated prejudgment interest by using an improper amount; and adds fees and costs to that amount.

          On the two forms upon which default was entered, Gonzalez marked box 7.f, stating interest was waived. Gonzalez may not now request a judgment that contains interest.

          The Complaint does not allege grounds for the recovery of attorney fees; nor does the prayer include a request for attorney fees.

         

          III.     CONCLUSION AND ORDER

          Gonzalez’s request for entry of judgment is denied without prejudice.

          This matter is set for a default prove-up hearing on ______________________

at ______________.  At that time the Court will hear live testimony from Gonzalez and determine what default judgment, if any, is appropriate.

 

 

 

Dated:                                                              _______________________________

                                                                              MARGARET L OLDENDORF

                                                                       JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT